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TRIANGULATING THE BOUNDARIES OF PENTAGON PAPERS
John Cary Sims*
I. INTRODUCTION
Through triangulation it is possible to determine quite precisely the
distance to a faraway object, or even how far it is to a distant star. The
key to the process is taking sightings from two or more vantage points that
are a known distance apart.'
* Professor of Law, McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific. I am grateful
for the excellent research assistance provided by David I. Bass. David Rudenstine kindly
provided several critical documents that were not otherwise accessible, and also offered
detailed and very helpful comments on a draft of this article. I also appreciate the critiques
and suggestions provided by Floyd Abrams, Nancy S. Drabble, Daniel F. Fitzgerald,
Erwin N. Griswold, Morton H. Halperin, Boisfeuillet Jones, Jr., Brian K. Landsberg,
Frederic Townsend, and James F. Woodbury. David C. Vladeck and the Public Citizen
Litigation Group handled the lawsuit necessary to secure the release of documents under
the Freedom of Information Act. The staff of the Gordon D. Schaber Law Library at the
McGeorge School of Law assisted in numerous ways, and Louise Roysdon deserves
special thanks for her processing of interlibrary loans.
The title of this article is designed to evoke associations with the mathematical
process by which two or more sightings or bearings taken from points which are a known
distance apart may be used to determine the location of another object. See, e.g., Richard
Gillespie, The Mystery of Amelia Earhart, LIFE, Apr. 1992, at 68 (describing efforts to
determine the location from which Amelia Earhart made her last radio transmissions by
triangulating radio bearings taken at various stations in the Pacific Ocean); Eric Nalder
& Gordon Lee, High Noon for Military High Tech-Whiz-Bang Weapons Get First
Battleground Test in Deserts of Persian Gulf, SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 18, 1991, at Al
(describing the operation of the Global Positioning System which "operates on the
geometric principle of triangulation: calculating location by measuring the distance to
other known points"); Christoph Hulbe & Robert Rodseth, How Astronomers Gauge the
Distance to a Star, SACRAMENTO BEE, Nov. 2, 1992, at All ("By sighting on a star in,
say, January and again in April-measuring the distance that Earth moves between those
two months-the baseline becomes a large fraction of the Earth's orbit" and distances
may be measured accurately so long as the star is no more than about 70 light years
away.). Obviously, the inquiry undertaken in this article cannot triangulate with
mathematical precision. However, triangulation also refers, by extension, to the process
of using disparate sources of information and attempting to correlate them in a manner
that allows reliable conclusions to be drawn about a matter that is not susceptible to direct
investigation. See, e.g., HANs ZEISEL, SAY IT WITH FIGURES 252 (6th ed. 1985) (the term
triangulation "has come to designate any scientific effort to approach the truth of a
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For all the attention that has been lavished on the Supreme Court's
decision in the Pentagon Papers case,2 the boundaries of the case remain
largely uncharted. That is not because the language of the opinions is
particularly obscure. The fact that the case was disposed of through a
cryptic per curiam opinion coupled with a separate opinion written by each
of the nine Justices does raise an obstacle to determining the true
holding of the case; but, since each Justice expressed rather clearly his
own view of the proper constitutional standard, there is broad agreement
on the circumstances under which Pentagon Papers would permit a
publication to be enjoined because of its potential for damaging the
national security. It seems likely that publication may properly be
restrained if disclosure of the information at issue "will surely result in
direct, immediate, and irreparable damage to our Nation or its people." 3
What has been missing in prior efforts to chart the boundaries of
Pentagon Papers has been a precise understanding of what information the
Government was attempting to prevent The New York Times and the The
Washington Post from publishing. Without the vantage point provided by
knowledge of what the Pentagon Papers contained that the Government
was concerned about, efforts to stake out the limits of the Court's holding
in the case can be no more successful than would be efforts to analyze
Cohen v. California without knowing what the offending jacket said,4
F.C.C. v. Pacifica Foundation without knowing the content of George
Carlin's monologue,5 or United States v. 0T3rien without knowing what
the defendant had burned.6
The principal impediment to using the Pentagon Papers themselves to
gain a better understanding of what Pentagon Papers means and how it
should be applied has been the sheer magnitude of the materials.7 It has
proposition through more than one independently developed research channel."); Carl
Bernstein, The Idiot Culture: Reflections of Post-Watergate Journalism, NEW REPUBLIC,
June 8, 1992, at 22 ("[T]he FBI and the Justice Department came up with conclusions
that were the opposite of our own, choosing not to triangulate key pieces of
information."); Edwin M. Yoder, The Reagan-Iran Hostage Link-Evidence for Link Is
Very Compelling, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Apr. 23, 1991, at All ("The evidence is
circumstantial but compelling.... The stories triangulated."). The triangulation to which
this article aspires is of the metaphorical, not the mathematical, variety.
2 New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
3 Id. at 730 (Stewart, J., with whom White, J., joins, concurring).
4 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (jacket bore the words "Fuck the Draft" on its back).
' 438 U.S. 726, 751-55 (1978) (providing a transcript of the monologue).
6 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (defendant had burned his Selective Service registration
certificate).
7 Detailed assessment of the impact that publication of the Papers had on the nation's
policymaking is beyond the scope of this article. At least as digested and made available
to the public by the Times and other commentators, the Papers "accused the architects
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not been possible to wade through the forty-seven volumes of the study
and reach reliable judgments about what material most concerned the
Government, how well its fears were supported by the evidence it
produced, or in what respects the Justices found the Government's
showing to be deficient.8
The thesis of this article is that the additional reference point needed
to understand Pentagon Papers is provided by the Secret Brief filed by
Solicitor General Erwin N. Griswold in the Supreme Court. Although
sealed at one time, most of the Secret Brief is now public. This document,
as supplemented by and explained in the Solicitor General's oral argument
before the Court, gives Pentagon Papers the context and concreteness that
of the war of having ignored sound intelligence advice against the bombing and of having
misled the nation about the depth of commitment and the danger of defeat." DEBORAH
SHAPLEY, PROMISE AND POWER: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF ROBERT MCNAMARA 488
(1993). Judge James L. Oakes, who as a member of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit participated in that Court's consideration of the New York Times
branch of the Pentagon Papers litigation, has written that "[c]learly, publication of the
Papers played an important role in enlightening the public and bringing the Vietnam
conflict to an end some four years later." James L. Oakes, The Doctrine of Prior
Restraint Since the Pentagon Papers, 15 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 497, 504 (1982). The
Pentagon Papers have also been described as playing a large role in the historiography of
the Vietnam War. See, e.g., GEORGE C. HERRING, AMERICA'S LONGEST WAR: THE UNITED
STATES AND VIETNAM, 1950-1975, at 283-84 (2d ed. 1986) (the Papers are "the basic
documentary source" and are "invaluable" to researchers); George M. Kahin, The
Pentagon Papers: A Critical Evaluation, 69 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 675 (1975) (Pentagon
Papers study "provides such a mass of significant data as to ensure its enduring
usefulness to anyone with a serious interest in the United States' long involvement in
Indochina"). It has also been observed that "the Pentagon Papers incident intensified the
adversarial relationship between the Administration and the media," which "led directly
to one of the most fateful decisions of the Nixon presidency: the creation of the
Plumbers." STANLEY I. KUTLER, THE WARS OF WATERGATE 111 (1990). It was the
Plumbers' efforts to plug "leaks" and their other illegal activities that ultimately led to
the forced resignation of Richard M. Nixon from the Presidency in 1974.
8 It should be recognized that any attempt to identify what the Government was most
worried about in the Pentagon Papers litigation represents an oversimplification of reality.
As discussed below, "the Government" was far from unified in its judgment about the
risks allegedly posed by the contents of the study, and it appears that the decision to seek
an injunction against the The New York Times was made before any detailed evaluation
of the Papers could be completed. Despite the initial ignorance on the part of such
decisionmakers as President Richard M. Nixon and Attorney General John N. Mitchell
about the particular security concerns raised by the Papers, as the litigation proceeded, the
Government's lawyers made strenuous efforts to identify particular items within the
Vietnam study which were alleged to have the potential to damage national security if
they were published. This article proceeds, as the courts hearing Pentagon Papers did, by
considering the merits of the various national security concerns raised in the litigation by
the government attorneys, without regard to whether those concerns actually provided the
motivation for the injunction suits against the Times and The Washington Post.
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until now have in large measure been lacking. Examination of the Secret
Brief not only permits identification of the security concerns raised by the
Government, but also allows many of those concerns to be dismissed as
plainly inadequate, while a few may be recognized as having substance.
More importantly, as to the weightiest of the national security concerns
relied on by the Government, examination of the Secret Brief and related
materials permits a much more precise identification of those characteris-
,tics of the claims which, according to the Justices, made a further restraint
on publication inappropriate. This more complete understanding of
Pentagon Papers will, in turn, shed light on the proper application of this
influential precedent in future prior restraint cases.
II. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE GOVERNMENT'S SECRET BRIEF
IN PENTAGON PAPERS
More than twenty years after it was handed down, the Pentagon Papers
decision 9 continues to fascinate and puzzle students of the First Amend-
ment. Three different versions of the Papers were published in 1971,"° and
9 New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). The documents at issue
in the litigation were referred to by the The New York Times as the "Pentagon papers"
when the newspaper published the first of its articles based on the monumental Department
of Defense study of United States involvement in the Vietnam War. Neil Sheehan, Vietnam
Archive: Pentagon Study Traces 3 Decades of Growing U.S. Involvement, N.Y. TIMES, June
13, 1971, at 1, 38. As with so many other aspects of this untidy controversy, there was
substantial confusion even as to the official title of the report that came to be known as the
Pentagon Papers. In its complaint filed in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York, the Government stated that the study was titled "History of U.S.
Decision-Making Process on Vietnam Policy." Complaint, United States v. New York
Times Co., No. 71 Civ. 2662 (S.D.N.Y. June 15, 1971), at 8-9, reprinted in 1 THE NEW
YORK TIMES COMPANY V. UNITED STATES: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 8-9 (James C.
Goodale ed., 1971) [hereinafter GOODALE COMPILATION]. That was the title used by the
Government in its principal brief to the Supreme Court, Brief for the United States, New
York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971), at 3, reprinted in 71 LANDMARK
BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 117-46 (Philip
B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1975) [hereinafter LANDMARK BRIEFS], and by the
Court itself in its per curiam opinion. 403 U.S. at 714. However, when most of the 47-
volume study was declassified by the Department of Defense and published by the
Government Printing Office in September 1971, the actual title was revealed to be "United
States-Vietnam Relations-1945-1967". UNITED STATES-VIETNAM RELATIONS-1945-
1967: STUDY PREPARED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (1971) [hereinafter G.P.O.
EDITION]. The sealed Secret Brief filed by Solicitor General Erwin N. Griswold in the
Supreme Court had identified the study by its correct title. Brief for the United States
(Secret Portion), New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971), at 2
[hereinafter Secret Brief].
'0 The first edition appeared in July 1971, shortly after the Supreme Court permitted
the newspapers to resume publishing the Papers. NEIL SHEEHAN ET AL., THE PENTAGON
[Vol. 2:2
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a book devoted to the case appeared soon after. I" The case receives
extended treatment in almost every basic constitutional law casebook, as
well as in more specialized casebooks1 3 and the standard constitutional law
PAPERS AS PUBLISHED BY THE NEW YORK TIMES (1971). This one-volume work
reproduced the Times's articles and the documents that accompanied them, and also
provided some additional commentary. It contains no index, and therefore is very difficult
to use. In August, Beacon Press published a more extensive four-volume compilation of
the Pentagon Papers made public by Senator Mike Gravel. THE SENATOR GRAVEL
EDrrION-THE PENTAGON PAPERS: THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT HISTORY OF UNITED
STATES DECISIONMAKING ON VIETNAM (1971) [hereinafter GRAVEL EDITION]. The next
year, Beacon Press added a fifth volume that includes a number of critical essays on the
Papers, as well as indices and tables to facilitate use of the four original volumes. 5 THE
SENATOR GRAVEL EDITION-THE PENTAGON PAPERS (Noam Chomsky & Howard Zinn
eds., 1972). The Government's own version of the Papers was published in 1971 at the
behest of the Chairman F. Edward Hdbert of the House Committee on Armed Services.
G.P.O. EDITION, supra note 9. The G.P.O. Edition consists of twelve volumes, and in
general is much more comprehensive than either the New York Times Edition or the
Gravel Edition. Many portions of the Papers are available only in the G.P.O. Edition. The
G.P.O. Edition, however, deleted material that was considered to merit continued
classification. Much of the deleted material may be found in the Gravel Edition, which
also attempts to chart the respective coverages of the Gravel and G.P.O. Editions. 5
GRAVEL EDITION, supra, at 314-19. The G.P.O. Edition contains no index. Two useful
guides to the different editions are George M. Kahin, The Pentagon Papers: A Critical
Evaluation, 69 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 675 (1975), and H. Bradford Westerfield, What Use
Are Three Versions of the Pentagon Papers?, 69 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 685 (1975). In
addition to the three published versions of the Papers, some additional portions of the
Vietnam study were made available during the criminal proceedings against Daniel
Ellsberg and Anthony Russo.
" SANFORD J. UNGAR, THE PAPERS & THE PAPERS (1972). There is also a detailed
examination of the Pentagon Papers controversy that focuses on the Government's effort
to prosecute Daniel Ellsberg, who made the Pentagon Papers available to The New York
Times and other newspapers. PETER SCHRAG, TEST OF LOYALTY: DANIEL ELLSBERG AND
THE RITUALS OF SECRET GOVERNMENT (1974). Much helpful material may also be found
in HARRISON E. SALISBURY, WITHOUT FEAR OR FAVOR: AN UNCOMPROMISING LOOK AT
THE NEW YORK TIMES 3-24, 231-350 (1980).
12 See, e.g., GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1107-17 (2d ed. 1991);
PAUL BREST & SANFORD LEVINSON, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING:
CASES AND MATERIALS 504-13 (3d ed. 1992); WILLIAM COHEN & JONATHAN D. VARAT,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 1549-55 (9th ed. 1993); WILLIAM B.
LOCKHART ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES-COMMENTS-QUESTIONS 887-94 (7th
ed. 1991); GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1459-67 (12th ed. 1991); RONALD
D. ROTUNDA, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND NOTES 737-46 (4th ed. 1993).
But see DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
THEMES FOR THE CONSTITUTION'S THIRD CENTURY 706-07 (1993).
13 See, e.g., WILLIAM W. VAN ALSTYNE, FIRST AMENDMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS
111-21 (1991); STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN & JESSE H. CHOPER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 336-46
(1991); STEPHEN DYCUS ET AL., NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 633-63 (1990); THOMAS M.
FRANCK & MICHAEL J. GLENNON, FOREIGN RELATIONS AND NATIONAL SECURITY LAW:
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treatises. 14 Not only have a number of distinguished law professors 5 and
judges 16 been inspired to discuss the case, and a raft of former Government
officials moved to describe their roles in it,' 7 but many of the attorneys
involved have told their own versions of the controversy as well.'
8
Despite the tall stack of material that discusses Pentagon Papers, until
very recently a number of the critical aspects of the litigation remained
largely ignored. Due to the Government's objections to the disclosure of
classified material, portions of the proceedings in the district courts and on
appeal were conducted in camera and the transcripts were sealed. Similar
precautions were taken with a number of the affidavits, briefs, and other
CASES, MATERIALS AND SIMULATIONS 1065-87 (2d ed. 1993); OWEN M. FIss & DOUG
RENDLEMAN, INJUNCTIONS 217-42 (2d ed. 1984).
14 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1045-54 (2d ed. 1988); JOHN
E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 973-78 (4th ed. 1991).
"5 See, e.g., Harry Kalven, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1970 Term-Foreword: Even When
a Nation Is at War-, 85 HARV. L. REV. 3, 25-36 (1971); Philip B. Kurland, 1970 Term:
Notes on the Emergence of the Burger Court, 1971 SUP. CT. REV. 265, 285-90; Louis
Henkin, The Right to Know and the Duty to Withhold: The Case of the Pentagon Papers,
120 U. PA. L. REV. 271 (1971); Harold Edgar & Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., The Espionage
Statutes and Publication of Defense Information, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 929 (1973).
16 See, e.g., Oakes, supra note 7; Hans A. Linde, Courts and Censorship, 66 MINN. L.
REV. 171 (1981).
"7 See, e.g., RICHARD M. NIXON, RN: THE MEMOIRS OF RICHARD NIXON 508-15
(1978); HENRY KISSINGER, WHITE HOUSE YEARS 729-30, 736-37, 1021 (1979); H.R.
HALDEMAN, THE ENDS OF POWER 110-18 (1978); JOHN EHRLICHMAN, WITNESS TO POWER
300-02 (1982).
18 See, e.g., ERWIN N. GRISWOLD, OULD FIELDS, NEW CORNE: THE PERSONAL MEMOIRS
OF A TWENTIETH CENTURY LAWYER 296-313 (1992) [hereinafter GRISWOLD MEMOIRS];
Erwin N. Griswold, 'No Harm Was Done " N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 1991, at § 4, 15; Erwin
N. Griswold, Secrets Not Worth Keeping, WASH. POST, Feb. 15, 1989, at A25; Erwin N.
Griswold, Teaching Alone Is Not Enough, 25 J. LEGAL EDUC. 251 (1973); WHITNEY
NORTH SEYMOUR, JR., UNITED STATES ATTORNEY 190-210 (1975); Floyd Abrams, The
Pentagon Papers a Decade Later, N.Y. TIMES MAG., June 7, 1981, at 22; Floyd Abrams,
The Press Is Different: Reflections on Justice Stewart and the Autonomous Press, 7
HOFSTRA L. REV. 563 (1979); James C. Goodale, Legal Pitfalls in the Right to Know,
1976 WASH. U. L.Q. 29; Stanley Godofsky & Howard M. Rogatnick, Prior Restraints:
The Pentagon Papers Case Revisited, 18 CUMB. L. REV. 527 (1988). Griswold was
Solicitor General and argued Pentagon Papers for the United States in the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit and in the Supreme Court. Seymour
was the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, the district in
which the action against The New York Times was filed, and he appeared for the
Government in both the district court and on appeal. Abrams was an attorney for The
New York Times; Godofsky was an attorney for The Washington Post. The lead counsel
for The New York Times also analyzed the significance of the case, though in a manner
that focused on the doctrinal issues presented rather than on his personal experiences or
on the procedural details of the litigation. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF
CONSENT 60-62, 79-88, 114-16 (1975).
346 [Vol. 2:2
PENTAGON PAPERS
documents. Most significantly, the Solicitor General filed two briefs for the
United States when Pentagon Papers reached the Supreme Court. One was
filed in the usual manner. A second brief, however, was filed under seal,
and it was this document that detailed the Government's objections to
publication of the Pentagon Papers and attempted to justify continuing
injunctions against The New York Times and The Washington Post.
Much of the sealed material was released as long ago as 1976, but it
has received little attention until very recently. 9 It is very difficult, and
perhaps impossible, to determine the real significance of Pentagon Papers
without careful scrutiny of the once-secret documents, and particularly the
Secret Brief filed by Solicitor General Erwin N. Griswold on behalf of
the United States. When he argued the case for the Government in the
Supreme Court on Saturday, June 26, 1971, the Solicitor General himself
emphasized the degree to which the Government's case would stand or fall
based on the Court's assessment of the Secret Brief:
On July 28, 1976, the United States Department of Justice released 232 pages of
documents that had previously been sealed. These included the transcript of the in camera
proceedings conducted before Judge Gerhard A. Gesell in the action brought by the Gov-
ernment against The Washington Post in the United States District Court for the District
of Columbia, the affidavits of three government officials filed in that action, the sealed
brief filed by the Solicitor General in the Supreme Court (along with supporting
documents), and the sealed brief filed by The Washington Post in the Supreme Court.
This development, which was prompted by a Freedom of Information Act request by New
York Times writer Anthony Lewis, went largely unnoticed, with the exception of a very
brief article in the Times. U.S. Releases 200 Pages of Pentagon Papers Data, N.Y. TIMES,
July 29, 1976, at 6. Some of the documents were redacted to withhold information still
deemed by the Government to be classified. Two limited disclosures of information
previously deleted from one affidavit were approved by Judge Gesell on December 30,
1980. United States v. Washington Post Co., Civil Action No. 1235-71 (D.D.C. Dec. 30,
1980). Later, Professor David Rudenstine secured the release of much of the sealed
material pertaining to the New York Times litigation in the Southern District of New York
and the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. David Rudenstine, The
Pentagon Papers Case: Recovering Its Meaning Twenty Years Later, 12 CARDOZO L. REv.
1869, 1871 & n. 11 (1991). The most significant items obtained by Rudenstine are the
Special Appendix Relating to In Camera Proceedings and Sealed Exhibits that the
Government filed in the Second Circuit, the sealed portion of the transcript of oral
argument before the Second Circuit sitting en banc, and the transcript of the in camera
testimony taken before United States District Judge Murray I. Gurfein in New York. On
July 27, 1989 and August 8, 1989, I submitted requests under the Freedom of Information
Act seeking disclosure of the portions of the sealed briefs in Pentagon Papers that had
not been made public. Some of the material sought was released to me on March 19,
1993, but the Department of Justice continues to withhold portions of the secret briefs of
the Government and The Washington Post. An FOIA suit has been filed to secure release
of the remainder of the briefs and related documents. John Cary Sims v. United States
Dep't of Justice, Civil Action No. 92-2180 (D.D.C. filed Sept. 23, 1992).
1993] 347
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MR. GRISWOLD:
What I tried to do in my closed brief was I spent all
yesterday afternoon in constant, successive conversation,
with the individuals from'the State Department, the Defense
Department, the National Security Agency. And I said,
"Look tell me what are the worst. Tell me what are the
things that really make trouble." And they told me-and
I made longhand notes of what they told me-and from that
I prepared the closed brief.
[JUSTICE WHITE:]
Well, Mr. Solicitor General, if we disagreed with you
on those that you have covered, the remainder of the items
needn't be looked at?
MR. GRISWOLD:
Mr. Justice, I think that the odds are strong that that is
an accurate statement. I must say that I have not examined
every one of the remainder of the items.2°
The outcome of the whirlwind litigation in Pentagon Papers turned on
two critical issues. First, what constitutional standard did the Government
need to meet in order to secure continuation of its injunction against
publication of the Pentagon Papers, if any injunction against publication
could be reconciled with the First Amendment?2' Second, did any of the
eleven items discussed in the Government's Secret Brief meet whatever
constitutional standard was adopted by the Supreme Court? 22 The first
20 71 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 9, at 219 (transcript of oral argument in Pentagon
Papers) [hereinafter ORAL ARGUMENT TRANSCRIPT]. Transcripts of arguments before the
Supreme Court generally do not identify the Justice asking a question, but the transcript
as published by The New York Times the day after argument does provide that information
in most instances for Pentagon Papers. Transcript of Oral Argument in Times and Post
Cases Before the Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 1971, at 24-26. In this article, all
references are to the transcript printed in LANDMARK BRIEFS, but, where possible,
identification of the questioner has been made by consulting the Times's version of the
transcript.
2 Justices Black and Douglas took the position that no injunction against publication
could be constitutional. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. at 713, 715
(Black, J., concurring) ("[I]t is unfortunate that some of my Brethren are apparently
willing to hold that the publication of news can sometimes be enjoined."); id. at 720
(Douglas, J., concurring) (the First Amendment "leaves ... no room for governmental
restraint of the press").
22 In his argument before the Supreme Court in Pentagon Papers, the Solicitor General
said there were ten items discussed in the Secret Brief. ORAL ARGUMENT TRANSCRIPT,
348 [Vol. 2:2
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question was addressed by a flurry of ten separate opinions, and under the
test applied, whatever it was, the second question was answered "no,"
and the newspapers were authorized to proceed immediately with their
publication of the disputed documents.
The Secret Brief is crucial to understanding the Supreme Court's
resolution of both of these questions. Although hints are dropped in some
of the opinions issued by the members of the Court who participated in
Pentagon Papers, only the Secret Brief offers a precise statement of the
matters on which the Government ultimately relied in attempting to
establish the propriety of an injunction. In addition, the constitutional
standards announced by the Justices are couched in language that is very
difficult or impossible to decipher fully without examining the Secret
Brief. Thus, if one accepts the thesis that the holding of Pentagon Papers
is that an injunction is proper only if disclosure "will surely result in
direct, immediate, and irreparable damage to our Nation or its people,
' 23
supra note 20, at 218, 220. In fact, the brief included I 1 separate items. Secret Brief,
supra note 9, at 4-10. Due to the fact that certiorari had been granted only the day before
oral argument was held, the Supreme Court did not require that either the open or the
secret briefs be printed. The open briefs of the parties and the briefs of the amici were
later printed. 71 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 9, at 17-212.
23 This was the standard applied by Justice Stewart in an opinion in which Justice
White joined. New York Times Co., 403 U.S. at 727, 730. Many commentators have
pointed to this formulation as the one most likely to have had the support of a majority
of the Court. See, e.g., Harold Edgar & Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Curtiss-Wright Comes
Home: Executive Power and National Security Secrecy, 21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 349,
373 (1976) (Pentagon Papers opinions "converge" on the proposition stated by Justice
Stewart); Floyd Abrams, The Pentagon Papers a Decade Later, supra note 18, at 77 (the
"Stewart-White opinion is generally cited as establishing the legal test of the Pentagon
Papers case"). "When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale
explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, 'the holding of the Court may be
viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the
narrowest grounds . . . .' " Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (quoting
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976)) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and
Stevens, JJ.). The Stewart-White formulation is plainly narrower than the positions stated
by Justices Black, Douglas, and Brennan; and Justice Marshall's opinion diverged from
all the other concurring opinions in the degree to which he relied upon the fact that
Congress had "refused to pass" statutes that would have made it a crime for the Times
and the Post to publish classified documents of the sort included in the Pentagon Papers.
See New York Times Co., 403 U.S. at 747 (Marshall, J., concurring). Justices Black and
Douglas, and perhaps Justice Brennan as well, would have refused to enjoin publication
even if the Government had met the test stated by Justice Stewart, but it appears that if
the Government had met Justice Stewart's standard there would have been a majority (the
three dissenters plus Justices Stewart and White) in favor of continuing to enjoin
publication. See, e.g., Archibald Cox, The Supreme Court, 1979 Term-Foreword:
Freedom of Expression in the Burger Court, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1, 7 (1980) ("[I]t seems
unlikely that the Court would now refuse an injunction when the government submitted
1993]
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it is almost impossible to say in the abstract how the holding should be
applied to actual controversies. Thus, for example, Professor David Currie
labeled Pentagon Papers the "most celebrated first amendment
controversy of the Burger years," but he concluded that it "added
nothing of doctrinal interest," precisely because none of the opinions
revealed what the study contained.24
By examining the Government's Secret Brief, however, it is possible
to interpret the articulated standard more confidently, since we know that
the justifications for a continuing restraint on publication that were stated
in the Secret Brief were found to be inadequate. The Secret Brief cannot
establish what justifications will be sufficient under Pentagon Papers, but
it can and does demonstrate what types of allegations of expected harm to
national security should be rejected.25
This article will first review the events leading up to the Pentagon Pa-
pers litigation and the procedural maneuvering that took the case on its wild
ride from complaint to Supreme Court decision in just over two weeks.26
proof adequate to satisfy the necessarily somewhat vague test stated by Justices Stewart
and White.").
24 DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE SECOND
CENTURY, 1888-1986 507 (1990) ("Neither the brief unsigned order nor the individual
opinions filed by each of the nine Justices revealed what the study contained; the decision
showed only that the Court meant what it had said about the difficulty of justifying prior
restraints."). Contrary to Professor Currie's statement that Pentagon Papers "added
nothing of doctrinal interest," it would appear that the case, at a minimum, provides solid
support for the proposition that a prior restraint is possible in a national security case upon
a proper showing by the Government. On this issue, Pentagon Papers seems to add
substantial gravity to the off-hand statement in Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716
(1931), that such an injunction could be constitutional under some circumstances.
Pentagon Papers also sheds considerable light on the showing which the Government
would need to make in order to justify such an injunction.
25 This discussion is based on the assumption that the holding of Pentagon Papers
remains good law despite the passage of over 20 years and substantial turnover in the
membership of the Court. That assumption, while it merits critical evaluation, is an
appropriate starting point for a discussion of Pentagon Papers. First, the Supreme Court
has never directly undercut Pentagon Papers or raised questions as to its continuing
authority. Second, even if some Justices were inclined to reconsider Pentagon Papers, or
even to modify or overrule it, discussion of such possible pronouncements should be
undertaken, if an appropriate case presented itself, only upon the foundation provided by
a secure understanding of what was decided in Pentagon Papers. For example,
consideration by the Supreme Court of arguments that the abortion ruling in Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973), should be overruled almost invariably includes precise analysis of
what Roe itself held. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,
112 S. Ct. 2791, 2804 (1992) (opinion of Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter)
(restating the "essential holding" of Roe v. Wade).
26 The New York Times was sued by the United States on June 15, 1971. After
consideration by the district courts and courts of appeals in New York and Washington,
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Since this has already been done well by others,27 there is no need to recite
at length every detail of the proceedings. I would like to focus, however,
on the procedures followed in the case to the extent that they cast light on
the question of whether the Government had a fair opportunity to prove the
case in support of the injunctions it was seeking. This issue seems
especially important and interesting in light of former Solicitor General
Griswold's recent assertions that the courts proceeded too quickly in the
case. In essence, while conceding that "we now know that there was
probably not adequate ground for an injunction" in the case,28 Griswold
argues that "because of the pell mell way in which the courts proceeded"
there was no adequate opportunity for the Government to ascertain with
adequate precision exactly what documents the Times and the Post had,
and what security risks, if any, they posed if published.29 For Griswold,
"the whole Pentagon Papers episode" was nothing more than "a tempest
in a teapot, ' 30 or even "a sort of phantom decision," '31 because the
newspapers did not even possess the information about which the
Government was most concerned. Therefore, in his view, the Supreme
Court should have followed the path urged by the three dissenters, who
objected to the speed of the adjudication. Griswold argues that "if the
parties had had an opportunity to explore their separate versions of the
Pentagon Papers more carefully, they might have discovered that the pa-
pers which Ellsberg made available to the newspaper in fact contained no
dangerous materials, and the Government's case might have been
withdrawn.' 
32
Former Solicitor General Griswold, in continuing to raise vigorous
objections to the manner in which the Pentagon Papers litigation was
conducted,33 finds an unlikely ally in Professor David Rudenstine.
Rudenstine applauds Pentagon Papers as "one of the most extraordinary
affirmations of free press values,"34 but asserts that "free press values not
only triumphed over national security considerations in this case, but over
D.C., certiorari was granted in both the Times and the Washington Post cases on June 25,
and oral argument was held the next day. The Supreme Court's three-paragraph per
curiam opinion and the nine opinions written by the individual Justices were filed on June
30, 1971.
27 See, e.g., Rudenstine, supra note 19, at 1872-91.
28 GRISWOLD MEMOIRS, supra note 18, at 309.
29 Id. at 302.
30 Id. at 312.
31 Erwin N. Griswold, 'No Harm Was Done, 'supra note 18.
32 GRISWOLD MEMOIRS, supra note 18, at 311.
33 As Solicitor General, Griswold made the same objections when he argued the
Pentagon Papers case before the Supreme Court. ORAL ARGUMENT TRANSCRIPT, supra
note 20, at 258-59.
3' Rudenstine, supra note 19, at 1870.
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due process concerns as well. ' 35 For the reasons that will be spelled out
in detail below, I disagree. If anything, the full record in the case,
including the once-sealed materials, shows that the judges allowed the
Government every reasonable opportunity to develop and present its claims
of potential threats to national security.
This threshold consideration of the appropriateness of the procedures
followed in the Pentagon Papers litigation is vital to what follows, because
substantial flaws in the manner in which the courts reviewed the
Government's national security claims would seriously, and maybe even
fatally, undercut the holding of the case. One who concluded that the
Government's concerns had not been given a fair hearing in Pentagon
Papers would be unlikely, in approaching later prior restraint controver-
sies, to ascribe great weight to the Court's conclusion that publication of
the Papers could not properly be enjoined.
The second portion of this article will examine in detail the Secret Brief
filed by Solicitor General Griswold in the Supreme Court. This brief
constituted the heart of the Government's case. Given the speed with which
the case went forward, the Government's arguments changed a good deal
as the litigation moved from the district courts to the courts of appeals to
the Supreme Court, and the formal briefing of the case was hasty at best.
Thus, the Secret Brief-as the Government's last written argument to the
Court-played a much more significant role in the presentation of the
Government's position than would a reply brief in a more typical case.36
The third section of this article will focus on the oral argument before
the Supreme Court. Solicitor General Griswold's argument relied heavily
on his Secret Brief to establish the factual foundation upon which any
injunction would depend. Both the Solicitor General and Professor
Alexander M. Bickel, the attorney for The New York Times, were put
under great pressure by the Justices, who were seeking clarification of each
side's formulation of the applicable First Amendment principles.
In the fourth section of this article, I will make an effort to identify the
boundaries of Pentagon Papers, utilizing the additional guidance that can
be found in the Secret Brief and the other newly-available materials, which
have not been completely considered in prior discussions of the case. I will
35 Id. at 1903.
36 The newspapers and the Government exchanged their open briefs and their secret
briefs simultaneously shortly before oral argument, and there was no opportunity to file
reply briefs. In looking for a document in ordinary appellate litigation which might be
comparable to the Secret Brief, however, a reply brief would seem to be the best choice,
because it would typically be the last written submission before oral argument. In
Pentagon Papers, the Government's Secret Brief was a seminal document, because the
Government plainly had the burden of justifying continuation of the temporary restraints
which had prevented the Times and the Post from publishing.
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argue that the Secret Brief confirms what the language of the Justices'
opinions only suggests-that the type of injunction sought by the
Government will encounter a degree of judicial skepticism that has few,
if any, equivalents in First Amendment doctrine. The Secret Brief makes
it much easier to pinpoint the areas in which the Government failed to
prove what the Court required of it, and thus it becomes easier to identify
the standard that the United States should encounter when and if it again
seeks to enjoin the publication of information alleged to pose a threat to
the Nation. This section will also briefly re-examine the Progressive case,
in which the United States sought to enjoin publication of an article
describing the design of a hydrogen bomb.37 This article's thesis is that
courts that are confronted by requests for injunctions against publication
of the sort involved in Pentagon Papers and the Progressive case can go
forward with a surer step if they use the Secret Brief and related materials
to expose the real meaning of Pentagon Papers.38
Overall, this article will attempt to sort out the inconsistent, and
sometimes wildly extravagant, descriptions attached to the Pentagon
Papers ruling. Was the case "one of the most extraordinary affirmations
of free press values ' 39 or "a tempest in a teapot"?4 Was "the granting
of any injunctive relief whatsoever" a serious error that pervaded the
litigation from the outset, as Justice Brennan claimed,4' or was the
37 A temporary restraining order against publication was issued on March 9, 1979, and
a preliminary injunction followed on March 26, 1979. United States v. The Progressive,
Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979). A later opinion declining to vacate the
injunction was itself filed under seal, although it is now reported at 486 F. Supp. 5 (W.D.
Wis. 1979). On September 17, 1979, the government abandoned its efforts to stop
publication of the article, because the same or similar information about the hydrogen
bomb was being published by others. The Progressive then published the disputed article.
Howard Morland, The H-Bomb Secret, THE PROGRESSIVE 14 (Nov. 1979). The case is
discussed in detail in Lucas A. Powe, Jr., The H-Bomb Injunction, 61 U. COLO. L. REV.
55 (1990).
38 Prior to the publication of Professor Rudenstine's article, supra note 19, the only
substantial discussion of which I am aware of the Solicitor General's Secret Brief from
Pentagon Papers was contained in the Joint Brief of Appellants Knoll, Day and Morland
in United States v. The Progressive, Inc. (7th Cir. Nos. 79-1428, 79-1664), at 27-28. The
Appellants argued that the Secret Brief refuted the Government's argument that Pentagon
Papers was distinguishable from the Progressive case "because the Pentagon Papers were
merely an 'historical' record whose publication would, at most, have caused
embarrassment." Id. at 27. The Apellants cited the Secret Brief in an effort to show that
"in 1971 the government characterized the Pentagon papers in a very different way."
Id.
'9 Rudenstine, supra note 19, at 1870.
40 GRISWOLD MEMOIRS, supra note 18, at 312.
4' New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 725 (1971) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
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Supreme Court "almost irresponsibly feverish ' 4 2 in refusing to extend the
temporary injunctions by another few weeks or months to allow the
Government to marshal its proof, as Justice Harlan stated in dissent?
Professor Harry Kalven, Jr., writing shortly after Pentagon Papers was
decided, stated that there "is no doubt that it was a great case," and one
that constituted "the special gift of the Supreme Court from the 1970
Term" because it offered such a substantial gesture of support for the
doctrine that dissent should be tolerated, even during wartime." His
colleague Philip B. Kurland, writing at about the same time, suggested that
Pentagon Papers "is not likely to prove an important one in constitutional
jurisprudence" because of its unusual facts and the failure of the
newspapers to publish the documents "which the Solicitor General told
the Court would be inimical to the security interests of the United
States."" Anthony Lewis, in a recent book on the First Amendment,
dismisses Pentagon Papers as "a famous victory for the press" that was
shown by later decisions to be "not much of a victory.""
Despite these contradictory assessments of the case, it remains
worthwhile to concern ourselves with Pentagon Papers. The opinions in
42 Id. at 753 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
43 Kalven, supra note 15, at 29, 36. See also id. at 26 ("[A]t least in matters of the
first amendment, great cases can make great contributions to a tradition, to that aura of
importance which goes beyond the profile of technical doctrine."). In contrast to the rosy
assessment offered by Professor Kalven, Professor Alexander M. Bickel, lead counsel for
The New York Times in Pentagon Papers, has noted that, even though the Times won
the case, there had never before been an attempt by the federal government to obtain a
prior restraint against a newspaper. "[T]hat spell was broken, and in a sense freedom was
thus diminished." ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 61 (1975).
4 Kurland, supra note 15, at 286, 289. See also id. (suggesting that the case is likely
to "prove sterile"); CURRIE, supra note 24, at 507 (Pentagon Papers "added nothing
of doctrinal interest"). Professor Kurland's substantive prediction merits serious
consideration even though he was demonstrably wrong in predicting that the case almost
uniformly known as the Pentagon Papers case was bound to be called New York Times
II. KURLAND, supra note 15, at 289. Nor was the "extraordinary compatibility of views"
which he noted to exist between Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun, id. at 268,
a long-lived phenomenon.
41 ANTHONY LEWIS, MAKE No LAW-THE SULLIVAN CASE AND THE FIRST AMEND-
MENT 241 (1991). Morton H. Halperin's evaluation of Pentagon Papers.is even harsher:
He finds that the decision, "much praised by civil libertarians when it was handed down,
was in fact the harbinger of a more deferential attitude toward national security claims.
A majority of the justices were clearly willing to contemplate situations in which they
would approve a prior restraint on publication of information." Morton H. Halperin, The
National Security State: Never Question the President, in THE BURGER YEARS: RIGHTS
AND WRONGS IN THE SUPREME COURT, 1969-1986, at 50, 51 (Herman Schwartz ed.,
1987). Halperin argues that Justice Harlan's dissent in Pentagon Papers, urging a high
degree of deference to the Executive Branch in national security matters, came to
command the support of a majority of the Burger Court. Id. at 52.
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that case remain the principal authority governing any effort to obtain an
injunction prohibiting the publication of information pertaining to national
security.46 Despite the many ambiguities that will forever surround the ten
separate opinions issued in Pentagon Papers, careful consideration of the
Government's Secret Brief and the related materials have the potential to
bring us closer to an understanding of the real meaning of the case.
III. FROM COMPLAINT TO SUPREME COURT DECISION IN
FIFTEEN DAYS
The New York Times began publishing the documents we know as the
Pentagon Papers on Sunday, June 13, 1971. Two days later, after the first
three installments in the Times's series had been published, the United
States sought an injunction against publication in the United States District
Court forthe Southern District of New York. The Washington Post entered
the fray on Friday, June 18, when it began publishing its own series of
articles based on the Papers, and it was sued by the Government later that
day in the District of Columbia. The courts temporarily enjoined
publication after three articles had been published by the Times and two
by the Post, and a series of injunctions issued by various courts had the
effect of preventing further publication through issuance of the Supreme
Court's decision on June 30. Only then were the newspapers free to
resume publication.
The speed with which the Pentagon Papers litigation went forward,
and the circumstances under which the Government was obliged to
undertake its efforts to establish the propriety of the injunctions it sought,
have been described as representing a triumph for free press values over
due process concerns.47 Such a description implies criticism of the
procedures utilized, since it seems unlikely that it would be desirable for
any competing interest to triumph over due process.48 This criticism merits
46 For example, the Progressive case boiled down to little more than a battle about the
proper application of Pentagon Papers to the circumstances surrounding Howard
Morland's article about the H-bomb. The defendants argued that the Pentagon Papers
standard had not been met, while the United States emphasized that there was no statute
authorizing the government to seek to enjoin the newspapers publishing the Pentagon
Papers. In contrast, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2274 and 2280 are aimed specifically at preventing the
dissemination of secret information concerning nuclear weapons. See Powe, supra note
37, at 57-61.
4' Rudenstine, supra note 19, at 1903.
48 Professor Rudenstine does not explicitly state whether he believes that the
procedures followed in Pentagon Papers were appropriate for that case, and he does not
address the question of whether those procedures should be retained in future prior
restraint cases. It seems, however, that the approach that would be called for by flexible
modern due process doctrine would be for the courts to satisfy due process concerns by
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serious consideration, since in any future controversy involving an effort
to restrain the publication of information pertaining to the national defense,
Pentagon Papers will surely be looked to for guidance as to the procedures
to be followed. More importantly, informed judgments about the scope of
the holding in Pentagon Papers, and about its correctness as a matter of
First Amendment analysis, must be sensitive to the highly unusual
circumstances under which the case was presented to and decided by the
courts. If the Government was prevented from effectively marshalling the
evidence that supported its claims, then the significance of the Supreme
Court's First Amendment ruling in Pentagon Papers would inevitably be
diminished-the outcome could be dismissed as a procedural mistake
grounded in the unique facts of the case, rather than being looked to as an
expression of First Amendment principles to be followed in future cases.49
However, if the Government was given adequate opportunities to gather
and present its evidence, the rejection of the preliminary injunctions is
properly seen, not as a product of unusual or improper procedural shackles
that disadvantaged the Government, but rather as reflective of a more
general First Amendment principle disfavoring prior restraints.
A. The Action Against The New York Times.
When The New York Times began publishing its series drawing on the
massive forty-seven-volume Defense Department study entitled "United
States-Vietnam Relations-1945-1967," few officials in the Executive
Branch were even aware that the documents existed.50 The "Pentagon
fashioning "such procedural protections as the particular situation demands." Mathews
v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976) (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481
(1972)). If that were done, both free speech values and due process concerns could be
accommodated. If, contrary to Professor Rudenstine's contention, due process concerns
were vindicated in Pentagon Papers itself, then no modification of the procedures
followed would be necessary.
'9 It seems unlikely that a future Supreme Court would read Pentagon Papers to stand
for the proposition that in a prior restraint case the Government is not entitled to have its
claim for an injunction heard under procedures that comply with due process. Rather, the
Court would either find that the procedures implemented in Pentagon Papers were
appropriate and should be followed, or it would find that they were deficient and should
be altered. The latter course would in effect represent the rejection of the position taken
by the six concurring Justices in Pentagon Papers and the acceptance of that argued for
by the three dissenters. It is somewhat problematic to discuss "due process" at all in the
context of a claim asserted by the Government, since the due process guarantee protects
persons against government action. However, such a perspective on due process is less
unusual than it at first appears, since under Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976),
every decision as to the type of process which is due depends upon a consideration of
both governmental and private interests.
"0 See Rudenstine, supra note 19, at 1875-88.
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Papers" had been prepared by the Vietnam Task Force created in the
Office of the Secretary of Defense during the Johnson Administration.
President Richard M. Nixon was one of those who had never heard of the
Papers, and his initial reaction upon learning of the Times's series was
tempered by the fact that the focus of the study was Vietnam policy under
Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson, and that the period
covered by the documents ended before his own Administration took
office.5' Apparently, President Nixon's change of heart, and his ultimate
decision to sue the Times, was largely attributable to the influence of
National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger, who told Nixon that he would
appear to be a "weakling" if he took no action.52
There is no doubt that the logistical and administrative burden facing
the Government's lawyers was enormous, if evidence was to be suc-
cessfully gathered to justify an injunction against The New York Times.
The Pentagon Papers consisted of forty-seven volumes, totalling 7,000
pages containing 2.5 million words.53 At the time The New York Times
"1 Id. at 1875-77.
12 HALDEMAN, supra note 17, at 110; KISSINGER, supra note 17, at 730. Professor
David Rudenstine has examined in minute detail the deliberations leading up to the
Government's decision to sue the Times. Rudenstine, supra note 19, at 1872-91. After
reviewing the published sources and archival materials and interviewing many of the
participants, Rudenstine concluded that the choice of an injunctive proceeding against
the Times, rather than some other remedy, originated in the Justice Department with
Assistant Attorney General Robert C. Mardian and Attorney General John N. Mitchell.
Rudenstine also attributes the Justice Department's recommendation to a sincere
judgment that national security was imperiled by publication, since "other, less risky
legal remedies were available" if the goal was merely to intimidate the press. Id. at
1891. For example, the Justice Department could have initiated grand jury investigations
into how the Times had obtained the Papers or into whether the espionage statutes had
been violated. Id.
" The first Pentagon Papers article published by the Times stated that there were 3,000
pages of analysis and 4,000 pages of official documents, totalling 2.5 million words.
Sheehan, supra note 9. The complaint filed by the Government in the Southern District
of New York disclosed that there were 47 volumes in the study. Complaint, supra note
9, at 1, 3. In fact, the Times had actually received only 43 of the volumes. Daniel
Ellsberg, the former Defense Department official and consultant who made the Pentagon
Papers available to the Times and other newspapers, had withheld the four volumes
describing various diplomatic efforts to bring about an end to the Vietnam War.
Apparently, Ellsberg was concerned that publication of those volumes carried a risk of
damaging the peace process. The four "negotiating volumes"-designated VI-C-1, VI-C-
2, VI-C-3, and VI-C-4---were not published by the Times or any other newspaper in 1971
and were not included in any of the three published versions of the Pentagon Papers.
Those volumes were finally published more than a decade later, with modest deletions of
material still considered classified. THE SECRET DIPLOMACY OF THE VIETNAM WAR: THE
NEGOTIATING VOLUMES OF THE PENTAGON PAPERS (George C. Herring ed., 1983)
[hereinafter NEGOTIATING VOLUMES].
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began publishing excerpts from the Papers and its commentary based on
the documents, every page of the forty-seven volumes was classified "Top
Secret-Sensitive. ' 5 4 The ostensible explanation for the border-to-border
classification of the study was the practice of assigning to any compilation
volume the highest level of classification merited by any item contained
within it." A second explanation was given by Solicitor General Griswold
in his argument before the Supreme Court in the Pentagon Papers case
itself: "there has been-has been, as long as I can remember, which is
quite a while-massive over classification of material. And there has been
14 See Complaint, supra note 9, at 3. "Top Secret" is the highest of the three
standard levels of classification established by Executive Order, the lowest level being
"Confidential" and the middle level being "Secret." There is no official classification
category entitled "Top Secret-Sensitive." "The mark 'Sensitive' had no basis either
in law or in the administrative classification system," SCHRAG, supra note 11, at 36, but
it was "often used to designate material that was to be withheld from other government
officials (and particularly from the Congress) because its contents were 'bureaucratically
and politically embarrassing.' " Id. (describing testimony at the Daniel Ellsberg trial by
Morton H. Halperin, the Defense Department official responsible for overseeing the
Pentagon Papers project).
Contrary to what one might assume, "Top Secret" is not, in effect, the highest level
of classification that is possible. The information that is considered to have the greatest
potential to injure the national security (such as that pertaining to cryptology, technical
systems for collecting intelligence, and the identities of human sources) is assigned one
or more "code words," which designate special-access or special-handling categories.
Former Director of Central Intelligence Stansfield Turner has observed:
Code words are not prescribed anywhere. Yet they effectively supersede the
President's directive because they impose even more rigorous standards for handling
classified materials. An intelligence document that is top secret, but not further
restricted by a code word, is considered barely classified. On sensitive documents
there were likely to be as many as four or five different code words ... indicating
the particular sensitivity of a document and establishing certain rules for the
handling of its contents. The primary rule of all code words is that you cannot
discuss the material in a code word document with anyone who has not also been
granted access to material with that code word.
STANSFIELD TURNER, SECRECY AND DEMOCRACY: THE CIA IN TRANSITION 254-55
(1985). None of the material included in the Pentagon Papers was restricted by use of
code words. SCHRAG, supra note 11, at 295 (at the Ellsberg trial, Morton Halperin
"demeaned the Papers" because they had been classified "only Top Secret").
The executive order that currently regulates the classification of nation security
information authorizes "special access programs to control access, distribution, and
protection of particularly sensitive information." Exec. Order No. 12,356, 3 C.F.R. 166
(1986), reprinted in 10 U.S.C. § 4.2. These programs include the "code word" system
described by Admiral Turner.
55 See Trial Transcript (June 18, 1971), United States v. New York Times Co., at 67,
reprinted in GOODALE COMPILATION, supra note 9, at 513 [hereinafter S.D.N.Y.
Transcript] (testimony of Dennis J. Doolin).
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much too slow review to provide declassification. 5 6 More recently, the
former Pentagon official under whose supervision the Pentagon Papers
were compiled has revealed that the real reason for the sweeping
classification was "to keep the information that they were being written"
from President Lyndon Johnson, because those involved in the project
believed that "if Johnson knew that the Pentagon papers were being
written, he would cancel the project."57
At the beginning of the litigation, then, it is fair to say that few
government officials had any particularized notion of what aspects of the
Pentagon Papers could pose a threat to national security. The situation was
further complicated by the fact that the United States did not know, and
was never able to find out, exactly which parts of the Papers were in the
possession of the Times.58 Moreover, the Times's holdings of classified
documents was not limited to the Pentagon Papers study.59
56 ORAL ARGUMENT TRANSCRIPT, supra note 20, at 226. Griswold first worked in the
Solicitor General's Office as an assistant to Charles Evans Hughes, Jr. He reported on
December 2, 1929, and served until 1934. GRISWOLD MEMOIRS, supra note 18, at 79, 108-
09. He returned to the office as Solicitor General in 1967, having spent the previous 22
years as dean of Harvard Law School. Id. at 254-58.
17 Government Secrecy After the Cold War: Hearing Before the Legislation and
National Security Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 102d Cong.,
2d Sess. 190 (1992) (statement of Morton H. Halperin).
58 The Times filed a three-page "inventory list" describing the materials in its
possession, but this was cast in terms general enough to leave some uncertainty as to
whether the Times possessed the entire Pentagon Papers study. See 1 GOODALE
COMPILATION, supra note 9, at 292-94 (reproducing the list filed by the Times). However,
the items on the Times's list correspond quite closely with actual titles of portions of the
full study. See 1 G.P.O. EDITION, supra note 9, at xi-xii (outline of the contents of the
official version of the Pentagon Papers as transmitted to the Secretary of Defense).
Examination of the list that the Times provided to the Government would have suggested
that the newspaper possessed at least portions of each of the 47 volumes in the study, with
the exception of the four negotiating volumes. Nothing on the list suggested in any way
that the Times had received the negotiating volumes, and the Times's list stated that it had
"no other materials in its possession" relating to the Pentagon Papers, other than those
listed. 1 GOODALE COMPILATION, supra note 9, at 292. Thus, the list strongly pointed
towards the conclusion that the newspaper did not have the negotiating volumes, and in fact
it did not possess them. An article that accompanied the first installment of the Pentagon
Papers published by the Times stated that the paper lacked the section of the study
concerning "the secret diplomacy of the Johnson period." Hedrick Smith, Vast Review
of War Took a Year, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 1971, at 1. In the peculiar organizational
structure of the Pentagon Papers, the "volumes" were not numbered consecutively, but
rather were identified by reference to an outline describing the topics covered. The outline
is reproduced at 1 G.P.O. EDITION, supra note 9, at xi-xii. Section "VI" of the outline
addresses "Settlement of the Conflict," and the four negotiating volumes are the four
subparts of section VI.C. of the outline, "Histories of Contacts."
59 For example, the list filed by the Times in the Southern District of New York
indicated that it possessed a summary of the command and control study on the Tonkin
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The Government, however, was not entirely unprepared to evaluate the
potential threat posed by the Pentagon Papers, since Senator J. William
Fulbright had requested the declassification of the study more than a year
and a half earlier.6° Thus, even if the Pentagon Papers had originally been
classified reflexively rather than thoughtfully, by June of 1971 there had
been a substantial opportunity to reassess the "Top Secret" classification
at the behest of Senator Fulbright.
After the Government's suit was filed on June 15, the case was
assigned to a newly-appointed federal district judge, Murray I. Gurfein.6 1
Judge Gurfein had served in the Office of Strategic Services during World
War II and later in the prosecution team at the Nuremberg war crimes
trials, so he was not unfamiliar with intelligence matters.62 Judge Gurfein
heard oral argument on the Government's motion for a temporary
restraining order in the early afternoon of the day the complaint was
filed.63 When he ruled, Judge Gurfein recognized that the questions raised
by the case were "serious and fundamental," 64 and that "the matter is
so important and so involved with the history of the relationship between
the security of the Government and a free press that a more thorough
briefing than the parties have had an opportunity to do is required.
' 65
Nonetheless, some interim ruling was necessary to decide whether the
Gulf incident, a document which was not included in the Pentagon Papers. See I
GOODALE COMPILATION, supra note 9, at 292, 294. A review of all the published versions
of the Pentagon Papers indicates that, in addition to reproducing documents from the
study, the New York Times Edition of the Papers "includes additional important
documents from other sources." Kahin, supra note 10, at 675.
60 S.D.N.Y. Transcript, supra note 55, at 56-57, 97-98 (testimony of Dennis J. Doolin);
Rudenstine, supra note 19, at 1881 n.80.
6 Judge Gurfein had been sworn in on Thursday, June 10, 1971, and, as the junior
member of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, was
responsible for the motions calendar beginning on Monday, June 14. James L. Oakes,
Judge Gurfein and the Pentagon Papers, 2 CARDOzO L. REv. 5, 5 (1980). When the
Pentagon Papers case reached him on Tuesday, June 15, for consideration of the
Government's motion for a temporary restraining order, "his only prior judicial function
had been to preside over the naturalization ceremony for a group of new American
citizens." UNGAR, supra note 11, at 165. Thus, Pentagon Papers "was Judge Gurfein's
very first case as a judge." Oakes, supra, at 14. As it happened, this extraordinary case
was also the first case on which Judge Oakes sat after his appointment to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Oakes, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint
Since the Pentagon Papers, supra note 7, at 500, and the last case in which either Justice
Hugo Black or John Marshall Harlan participated. See infra note 199.
62 UNGAR, supra note 11, at 165; SALISBURY, supra note 11, at 288; Oakes, Judge
Gurfein and the Pentagon Papers, supra note 61, at 5.
63 UNGAR, supra note 11, at 124.




Times would be free to continue publishing pending a more deliberate
review of the merits by the court, and on that issue Judge Gurfein decided
that a temporary restraining order (TRO) was justified:
I have granted the restraining order because in my opinion
any temporary harm that may result from not publishing
during the pendency of the application for a preliminary
injunction is far outweighed by the irreparable harm that
could be done to the interests of the United States
Government if it should ultimately prevail. I have intention-
ally expressed no opinion on the merits, but I believe this
matter is brought in good faith by the United States and
that on the balancing of interests mentioned, both parties
deserve a full consideration of the issues raised.66
The TRO granted on Tuesday, June 15, 1971, was to remain in effect until
Saturday, June 19, unless the court ordered otherwise.
On Friday, June 18, Judge Gurfein received testimony on the
Government's motion for a preliminary injunction. The Government
presented a number of witnesses in open court, including the official who
had supervised the review of the Pentagon Papers that had been undertaken
in response to Senator Fulbright's request for disclosure.67 Presentation of
the Government's case, however, was hampered by the short time
available for the witnesses to review the voluminous documents, and also
by the refusal of the Department of Justice lawyers supervising the case
to authorize disclosure of classified material even to the attorneys from the
United States Attorney's office.68 The district judge did agree "with
reluctance ' 69 to hear additional testimony from government witnesses in
camera, despite objection by attorneys for the Times, because "it seemed
that there was no other way to serve the needs of justice. "70
After a full day of testimony, and closing arguments that began at 9:50
p.m.,71 Judge Gurfein withdrew to prepare his opinion, which was released
66 id.
67 S.D.N.Y. Transcript, supra note 55, at 56 (testimony of Dennis J. Doolin); UNGAR,
supra note 11, at 166.
68 United States Attorney Seymour described the difficulties faced by his office in a
section of his memoirs entitled "National Security Paranoia." SEYMOUR, supra note 18,
at 198-204.
69 New York Times Co., 328 F. Supp. at 326.
70 Id. Two representatives of the Times, Chief Diplomatic Correspondent Max Frankel
and Senior Vice President Harding Bancroft, were permitted to join the attorneys for the
Times at the closed hearing. S.D.N.Y. Transcript, supra note 55, at 38-40.
71 S.D.N.Y. Transcript, supra note 55, at 159; see UNGAR, supra note 11, at 166.
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at mid-afternoon on Saturday, June 19.72 The officials of the Department of
Defense were "dumbstruck ' 73 when Judge Gurfein refused to convert the
TRO he had issued into a preliminary injunction. Overnight, the judge had
prepared a substantial opinion, in which he flatly rejected the fundamental
allegation on which the Government sought to restrain publication:
I am constrained to find as a fact that the in camera
proceedings at which representatives of the Department of
State, Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff
testified, did not convince this Court that the publication of
these historical documents would seriously breach the
national security.74
Professor Rudenstine suggests that the speed with which Judge Gurfein
scheduled and conducted the hearing, and rendered his decision,
represented a defeat for due process concerns.75 Rudenstine states that the
Government had a reasonable basis for requesting "a few more days to
prepare for an evidentiary hearing, since the study in question consisted of
2.5 million words and was prepared by a Democratic administration no
longer in power.
' 76
The proceedings before Judge Gurfein represented only the beginning
of the Pentagon Papers litigation, and by no means the end of the
Government's opportunities to prove the facts that would justify an
injunction. Moreover, there is little to support the suggestion that the
Government's failure to establish potential harm to the national security
in the district court litigation was attributable to the heft of the forty-seven-
volume study. Judge Gurfein's opinion itself makes it clear that the court
was looking for examples from the Papers that could be used to illustrate
their potential to harm national security, and that the Government failed to
identify anything in the documents that was likely to cause serious injury.
In light of the judge's willingness to grant a TRO without any attempt to
assess the factual strength of the Government's case, and his decision to
hear government witnesses in camera, it seems likely that a few, or
perhaps even one, concrete example of material that properly could have
been enjoined would have sufficed to convince Judge Gurfein that the
72 UNGAR, supra note 11, at 168.
71 SEYMOUR, supra note 18, at 200.
" New York Times Co., 328 F. Supp. at 330.
75 Rudenstine, supra note 19, at 1903.
76 Id. at 1905. The Government's argument on this point in the Supreme Court was
weakened by the fact that it never asked Judge Gurfein to allow additional time for it to




injunction he had issued should continue in force.77 Instead, the testimony
convinced the judge that the Government could not carry its burden of
justifying an injunction, even as to selected items within the larger study:
It is true that the Court has not been able to read through
the many volumes of documents in the history of Vietnam,
but it did give the Government an opportunity to pinpoint
what it believed to be vital breaches to our national security
of sufficient impact to controvert the right of a free press.
Without revealing the content of the testimony, suffice it to
say that no cogent reasons were advanced as to why these
documents except in the general framework of embarrass-
ment previously mentioned, would vitally affect the security
of the Nation.78
Even though he declined to issue the preliminary injunction requested
by the Government, Judge Gurfein continued his TRO in effect "until
such time during the day as the Government may seek a stay from a Judge
of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. ' ' 79 When he handed out
his opinion to the attorneys in the case, Judge Gurfein informed them that
Judge Irving R. Kaufman of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit was in the building and available to consider any motion.80
The Government promptly asked Judge Kaufman for and received an
extension of the TRO, through noon on Monday, June 21.81 The matter
was later scheduled for an en banc hearing before the Second Circuit on
the following afternoon, June 22.
Like Judge Gurfein, the eight judges of the Second Circuit conducted
a public hearing and then followed it with a closed hearing to permit the
Government to present sensitive information.82 The court of appeals issued
77 The judge was not hostile to the Government's position. Before he began hearing
evidence, he stated that "as a matter of simple patriotism" a newspaper "ought to be
willing to sit down with the Department of Justice and screen these documents ... to
determine whether the publication of any of them is or is not dangerous to the national
security." S.D.N.Y. Transcript, supra note 55, at 20.
78 New York Times Co., 328 F. Supp. at 330. Judge Gurfein had previously observed
that "any breach of security will cause the jitters in the security agencies themselves and
indeed in foreign governments who deal with us." Id.
" Id. at 331.
80 SEYMOUR, supra note 18, at 193.
81 The order entered by Judge Kaufman is reproduced in 2 GOODALE COMPILATION,
supra note 9, at 675-77.
82 UNGAR, supra note 11, at 197-99. The transcript of the public argument is reproduced
in 2 GOODALE COMPILATION, supra note 9, at 885-967. Professor David Rudenstine secured
the release of the transcript of the in camera argument. See supra note 19.
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its decision the next day, June 23, ordering by a 5-3 vote that the case be
remanded to the district court for further proceedings.83 The court extended
the temporary ban on publication by the Times through June 25, at which
time the prohibition would expire, except as to items specifically identified
by the Government as "pos[ing] such grave and immediate danger to the
security of the United States as to warrant their publication being
enjoined." 84 However, as to any items so identified by the United States,
either in the sealed Special Appendix that the Government had filed with
the Second Circuit or in a supplemental list to be filed by June 25, the
injunction would remain in effect until the district court could rule in the
case.
85
The New York Times filed a petition for certiorari on Thursday, June
24, the day after the Second Circuit issued its decision. The Supreme
Court acted with unprecedented speed, granting review on Friday, June 25,
and setting the case for oral argument the next day.86 Briefs were to be
exchanged by the parties on Saturday morning, and the case would be
heard beginning at 11:00 a.m., in conjunction with the Government's case
against The Washington Post, which had been decided by the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
87
The significance of several aspects of this history will be discussed
in greater detail below. At this point it is sufficient to note that,
following the filing of the Government's lawsuit against the Times on
June 15, the newspaper had been continuously enjoined from further
publication. The district judge who had issued the original TRO had,
after the evidentiary hearings, concluded that the Government had not
met its burden of proof as to anything contained in the Papers, and three
judges on the court of appeals had agreed that publication should be
allowed to resume. The majority on the court of appeals held that the
Government should have two more days to identify the specific materials
that it claimed should be enjoined, with an injunction against publication
of all disputed materials to remain in effect pending disposition on the
merits by the district court.
B. The Action Against The Washington Post
The Washington Post obtained copies of the Pentagon Papers from
Daniel Ellsberg after The New York Times had been restrained from
83 United States v. New York Times Co., 444 F.2d 544 (2d Cir. 1971) (en banc).
84 id.
85 Id. The Special Appendix is described infra note 178.
6 New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 942 (1971).
87 United States v. Washington Post Co., 446 F.2d 1327 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (en banc).
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further publication by Judge Gurfein's TRO.88 The Post began publishing
on Friday, June 18, and followed with a second installment the next day.
Although it was now more prepared to take quick action than it had been
when the first Times article appeared, the Government still encountered
substantial difficulties as it attempted to prevent the second day's article
from appearing. In contrast to Judge Gurfein's initial ruling in New York,
Judge Gerhard A. Gesell denied the TRO sought by the government and
refused to grant even a temporary restraint designed to allow the
Government's attorneys to seek relief from the court of appeals. 89 A three-
judge panel of the D.C. Circuit heard the case later that evening but did
not issue its order restraining publication until the wee hours of Saturday,
June 19, too late to affect that day's newspaper, which was already being
distributed. 90
The court of appeals later issued an opinion explaining its reversal of
Judge Gesell's denial of the requested TRO, and it ordered the district
court to hear evidence the following Monday, June 21, to determine
whether a preliminary injunction should be entered. 9' The Post was
enjoined pending the district court's decision.
The hearing before Judge Gesell on the Government's motion for a
preliminary injunction followed a pattern very similar to that which had
developed in New York. Judge Gesell heard testimony all day on Monday,
June 21, partly in open court and partly in closed session. Much of the
testimony concerned particular items contained within the Papers, with the
Post citing prior disclosures and publications in an effort to demonstrate
that no harm to the national security would result if the Post were allowed
to resume publication of the Papers. In order to meet the 5:00 p.m.
Monday deadline set by the D.C. Circuit, Judge Gesell dictated an oral
opinion from the bench. He found that "there is no proof that there will
be a definite break in diplomatic relations, that there will be an armed
attack on the United States, that there will be a compromise of military or
88 UNGAR, supra note 11, at 126-35; CAROL FELSENTHAL, POWER, PRIVILEGE, AND THE
POST: THE KATHARINE GRAHAM STORY 299-301 (1993).
" UNGAR, supra note 11, at 158-59. The Post was sued at 5:15 p.m., id. at 154, and
at 8:05 p.m. that evening Judge Gesell denied the temporary restraining order sought by
the Government. Id. at 158. The text of Judge Gesell's unpublished order appears in N.Y.
TIMES, June 19, 1971, at 10, and is reprinted in 2 GOODALE COMPILATION, supra note 9,
at 652.
90 The order of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
reversing Judge Gesell was not issued until 1:20 a.m. on June 19, after thousands of
copies of the newspaper for that day had been distributed. UNGAR, supra note 11, at 159-
60. When informed of this fact, the court of appeals indicated that the injunction applied
only to installments after the first two in the Post's series. Id. at 160.
"' United States v. Washington Post Co., 446 F.2d 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1971). Judge J.
Skelly Wright dissented.
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defense plans, a compromise of intelligence operations, or a compromise
of scientific and technological materials. ' 92 Consistent with the position
he had taken on the TRO request, Judge Gesell declined to grant the
Government any substantial time in which to seek a continuation of the
injunction from the court of appeals.93 The court of appeals did temporarily
prohibit further publication, and it set the case for en banc argument at
2:00 p.m. the next afternoon, Tuesday, June 22.
Once again, the court scheduled a public hearing, to be followed by a
closed session in which the parties could discuss more specifically the
contents of the Papers. The Government's argument in favor of a
preliminary injunction was ultimately unsuccessful, a result that might be
explained at least in part by the fact that the United States was represented
by Solicitor General Erwin N. Griswold, who was not familiar with the
case. Only a few hours before the case was to be heard, Attorney General
John Mitchell called Griswold to request that he argue the case for the
Government. Even though it is unusual for the Solicitor General to appear
in any court other than the Supreme Court of the United States, Griswold
agreed. Griswold has described the argument as follows:
I argued the case, without ever having seen the record, with-
out ever having seen a brief on either side, and without really
having very much of an idea of what it was all about. It was
a good experience because I found that I could ... complete
the argument and not have to sit down in utter confusion. 94
At a minimum, the Solicitor General's account would seem to confirm that
whatever gaps existed in the development or presentation of the factual
side of the Government's case were not remedied during oral argument
before the court of appeals.
92 Judge Gesell's oral ruling was transcribed by the court reporter and constitutes pages
266-72 of the trial transcript in the District of Columbia. It is reproduced in 2 GOODALE
COMPILATION, supra note 9, at 1009-15.
9' Judge Gesell refused to grant any stay, but since his ruling denying the preliminary
injunction was issued at 4:40 p.m. and the TRO was not scheduled to expire until 5:00
p.m., the Government had 20 minutes to seek relief from the court of appeals. See 2
GOODALE COMPILATION, supra note 9, at 1015 ("You have twenty minutes. I am sure
they are waiting for you upstairs.").
94 Griswold, Teaching Alone Is Not Enough, supra note 18, at 256. More recently,
Griswold described the court of appeals argument as follows: "I argued the case, in a
rather feckless way, since I did not know much about it, and still had never seen even the
outside of the Pentagon Papers." GRISWOLD MEMOIRS, supra note 18, at 302. As the
publications cited supra note 18 indicate, the former Solicitor General has described his
participation in the Pentagon Papers litigation with candor and volubility that are very
rarely found in an attorney who has lost a case.
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The Government did not give up, however. On Wednesday, June 23,
an additional hearing was held before Chief Judge David Bazelon to allow
the Government to attempt to supplement the proof it had presented before
Judge Gesell. One of the affidavits relied on by the Government had been
submitted by Vice Admiral Noel Gaylor, the Director of the National
Security Agency. 9 The Government argued before Chief Judge Bazelon
that publication of the text of a specific radio message intercepted by the
United States during the Gulf of Tonkin incident in 1964 could endanger
national security. As unusual as it was to have a hearing of this sort in
camera before a judge of the court of appeals,96 the Goyernment ended up
with little to show for it when the Post countered the new argument by
demonstrating that the exact text had already been published by the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee.97
The D.C. Circuit issued its opinion on Wednesday, June 23. By a 7-2
vote, the court affirmed Judge Gesell's denial of the preliminary injunction
sought by the Government.9" The majority's per curiam opinion held that
the Government's proof was inadequate:
Specifically, the district court directed the government to
present any document from the "History" the disclosure
of which in the government's judgment would irreparably
harm the United States. The government's affidavits and
9' The National Security Agency (NSA) is the component of the Department of
Defense responsible for protecting the security of communications by the United States
and for intercepting and decrypting the communications of other nations. See generally
JAMES BAMFORD, THE PUZZLE PALACE: A REPORT ON AMERICA'S MOST SECRET AGENCY
(1982) (describing the activities of NSA).
96 See LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE FOURTH ESTATE AND THE CONSTITUTION: FREEDOM
OF THE PRESS IN AMERICA 316 n.56 (1991) (indicating amazement that a trial-type hearing
was held in the court of appeals).
9' UNGAR, supra note 11, at 204; SALISBURY, supra note 11, at 322-23. Ungar states
that the session took place before Chief Judge David Bazelon, while Salisbury indicates
that "the judges reconvened." In response to reporter George Wilson's dramatic
revelation that the cable had already been published, the Government narrowed its
argument to focus on the fact that the published version of the message had not included
the "time group," which allegedly would reveal the speed with which the United States
had decrypted the message. However, the Post had not included the time groups on any
of the messages it had quoted from the Pentagon Papers. UNGAR, supra note 11, at 204.
The cable referred to had been published in The Gulf of Tonkin, The 1964 Incidents:
Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 90th Cong.,
2d Sess. 34 (1968). The same cable, including its date and time, appears at 5 GRAVEL
EDITION, supra note 10, at 325. The text of the cable was also reproduced in the Post's
Secret Brief filed in the Supreme Court. In Camera Analysis of the Evidence 9
[hereinafter Post's Secret Brief].
98 United States v. Washington Post Co., 446 F.2d 1327 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (en banc).
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testimony, presented largely in camera, discussed several of
the documents. The district court found either that
disclosure of those specific documents would not be
harmful or that any harm resulting from disclosure would
be insufficient to override First Amendment interests.
Having examined the record made before the district court
we agree with its conclusion.99
The dissenting opinion of Judge Malcolm Wilkey pointed out that the
Government did not know which documents the Post possessed, and that
under these circumstances, "the Government necessarily relied on
affidavits couched in general terms, two dated before and one on the day
of the hearing."' ° Judge Wilkey favored a remand to allow the
Government to identify the particular documents for which it continued to
seek an injunction and to pinpoint the basis for its objections. Judge Wilkey
expressed the view that if the Government used the correct standard, "the
great bulk" of the documents would be released for publication.'0 '
The Government sought rehearing before the court of appeals on the
ground that neither Judge Gesell nor the court of appeals had examined the
Pentagon Papers themselves, and that "there should be an opportunity for
an appropriate adversary hearing in court."' '° In denying the petition-by
the same 7-2 margin as in the previous day's opinion'° 3-the court detailed
the history of the proceedings and rejected the assertion that the
Government had not had sufficient time to gather the information
necessary to support its claims.0 4 The court also emphasized that, during
the in camera hearing in the district court, the Government had been
directed to focus on specific documents that would prejudice the nation's
defense interests. While the Government had discussed several documents,
the court concluded that it had not justified an injunction as to any of
them. 0 5 The majority concluded that the Government "had appropriate
opportunity to make the kind of showing appropriate to justify a prior
restraint on the nation's historic free press.""
99 Id. at 1328.
'0 Id. at 1330.
'o' Id. at 1331.
102 id.
103 Id. at 1331-32.
"o The court noted that one of the witnesses in the district court was Dennis J. Doolin
of the Department of Defense, who had been studying the Pentagon Papers since Senator
J. William Fulbright of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations requested their release
in November 1969. Id.
105 Id.
'06 Id. at 1332.
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Even though the court of appeals rejected the Government's appeal and
the subsequent rehearing motion, it extended the injunction that prohibited
the Post from resuming publication. The Government was given until 6:00
p.m. on Friday, June 25, to obtain a further stay from the Supreme Court
of the United States.
10 7
C. The Finale in the Supreme Court
The fast-paced lawsuits in New York and Washington had reached
their conclusions at about the same time, as the courts had intended. 18 The
New York Times sought certiorari on Thursday, June 24,'09 and later that
day the United States sought an extension of the stay that was preventing
publication by the Post, but which was due to expire at 6:00 p.m. the next
day.110 Solicitor General Griswold has written that it was "not decent"
for the Post to be free to publish while the Times, which had first
published the Papers, was enjoined, and that therefore the Government
sought an injunction against the Post until the two cases could be heard
together.' No doubt the Solicitor General was also concerned that further
revelations by the Post might make it impossible for any injunctive relief
to be effective, an issue already raised by the D.C. Circuit in referring to
articles being published by newspapers other than the Post and the
107 Id.
108 UNGAR, supra note 11, at 205. Although the Times was appealing a loss in New
York while the Post was attempting to defend a victory in the District of Columbia, the
divergence in outcome between the two cases in the two different courts of appeals was
less dramatic than it might at first appear. The D.C. Circuit affirmed the district court's
rejection of the Government's proof. The Second Circuit, by a narrow vote of 5-3,
decided to allow the Government one more opportunity to bolster the proof that Judge
Gurfein had found wanting. Both courts, including even the dissenting Judge Wilkey in
the D.C. Circuit, apparently agreed that much or even most of the Papers would have to
be cleared by the Government for publication almost immediately. Both courts had
allowed the Government to argue its case in camera, as had the respective district courts,
and in each circuit a series of injunctions had been combined to restrain publication
continuously from soon after the commencement of the actions through the Supreme
Court's consideration of the matter. Procedurally, the two matters which reached the
Supreme Court in the Pentagon Papers case each involved an appeal from the district
judge's denial of the Government's motion for a preliminary injunction. Unlike TROs,
which are strictly limited in duration to 10 days plus a possible renewal for 10 more days,
unless the defendant consents to a longer restraint, there is no fixed limit to the
effectiveness of a preliminary injunction. FED. R. Civ. P. 65.
'0 The petition for certiorari is reprinted in LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 9, at 3-15.
10 GRISWOLD MEMOIRS, supra note 18, at 303.
n' Id. The text of the Government's application may be found in N.Y. TIMES, June 25,
1971, at 13, reprinted in 2 GOODALE COMPILATION, supra note 9, at 1049.
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Times. 12 In filing the Government's stay application, the Solicitor General
indicated that it could be considered a petition for certiorari.' 13 On Friday,
June 25, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in both the Times case..4 and
112 United States v. Washington Post Co., 446 F.2d 1322, 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (en
banc). Daniel Ellsberg had made portions of the Pentagon Papers available to almost
20 other newspapers. Abrams, The Pentagon Papers a Decade Later, supra note 18,
at 78. The Solicitor General stated that to his knowledge the material published by the
other newspapers did not encompass any information not already published by the
Times, the Post, or the Boston Globe (the third newspaper that had been sued by the
Government to enjoin publication), but he conceded that there was a "possibility"
that "anybody" had access to undisclosed portions of the Papers. ORAL ARGUMENT
TRANSCRIPT, supra note 20, at 222-23. Professor Bernard Schwartz has characterized
this as the most important exchange that took place during the argument, since at
about 2:30 p.m. on June 26, while the Justices were still in conference on the
Pentagon Papers case, one of the law clerks heard on the radio that the Government
had obtained a TRO against the St. Louis Post-Dispatch. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE
ASCENT OF PRAGMATISM: THE BURGER COURT IN ACTION 160-61 (1990). Schwartz
states:
This news was the catalyst for the final decision. The new restraining order
had been issued while the Solicitor General was stating that, as far as he knew,
no further orders would be necessary. Griswold clearly did not know what other
papers had what materials. The likelihood that any injunction would be futile had
become very real. White and Stewart quickly announced that they would vote for
the Brennan-drafted per curiam, which now had a six-man Court behind it. The
opinion was sent to the printer late that afternoon and announced on the
afternoon of June 30.
Id. at 161. Schwartz goes so far as to speculate that the Government's effort to obtain
a continuing injunction against publication of the Pentagon Papers "might well have
succeeded if one of the Justices' law clerks had not happened to turn on his radio one
summer afternoon." Id. at 158. While none of the opinions filed in the case directly
supports Schwartz's contention that Pentagon Papers ultimately turned on the issue
of the potential futility of an injunction, in light of his proven access to reliable
information on the internal deliberations of the Supreme Court, see, e.g., BERNARD
SCHWARTZ, THE UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF THE BURGER COURT (1988), it would be
rash to dismiss his theory out of hand. Professor Powe has argued that, in light of
current technology, any injunction designed to preserve the secrecy of information is
likely to be futile, particularly if national security matters are involved. POWE, supra
note 96, at 156-58. He observes that, in Pentagon Papers, Judge Roger Robb of the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit had compared the task of
containing the Papers, at least portions of which were by then in the hands of many
newspapers, to "riding herd on a swarm of bees." Id. at 156 (quoting SALISBURY,
supra note 11, at 322).
.. 2 GOODALE COMPILATION, supra note 9, at 1049 ("[T]he Court may deem it
appropriate to treat this application as a petition for a writ of certiorari.").
"' New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 942 (1971).
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the Post case 15 and set oral argument for the next day, with briefs to be
exchanged in the courtroom.
1 6
Presentation of the Government's case in Pentagon Papers had been
plagued by lack of coordination all along. Officials from the Justice
Department and the Department of Defense had meddled in the efforts of
the United States Attorney to handle the Times case in New York, and
Solicitor General Griswold was drafted to argue the Post case in the D.C.
Circuit with almost no time to prepare. Now, finally, the two cases had
been consolidated, were scheduled for a very prompt hearing in the
Supreme Court, and were firmly under the control of a single advocate: the
highly-experienced Solicitor General and former dean of Harvard Law
School, Erwin N. Griswold.
Griswold's deputy, Daniel M. Friedman, prepared a traditional brief to
be filed with the Court. Meanwhile, the Solicitor General himself prepared
to write a brief intended to be filed under seal.1 7 Griswold met with three
high-ranking officials who had borne much of the burden of supporting the
Government's case by testimony, affidavit, or both. They were Vice Ad-
miral Noel Gaylor, Director of the National Security Agency, William B.
Macomber, Jr., Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration, and
Lieutenant General Melvin Zais, Director of Operations for the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. 18 After pressing these officials to describe what they
considered to be the most dangerous items contained in the Papers,
Griswold compiled a list of forty-one specific items and began to
investigate each in detail.
After meeting with these officials, Griswold felt "that there were only
a few [items] that had any chance of finding favor before the Supreme
Court." ' 9 Griswold finally reduced these to eleven items, which were dis-
cussed in the Secret Brief.1 20 After working much of the night to finish the
115 United States v. Washington Post Co., 403 U.S. 943 (1971). The case is known as
New York Times Co. v. United States rather than as United States v. Washington Post Co.
because the Times's petition for certiorari was filed earlier in the day than the Government's
stay application in the Post case. Accordingly, the Times case was assigned the lower docket
number and thus was listed above the Post case in the opinions of the Court.
116 GRISWOLD MEMOIRS, supra note 18, at 303. See New York Times Co., 403 U.S. at
942; Washington Post Co., 403 U.S. at 943.
17 GRISWOLD MEMOIRS, supra note 18, at 303-04. The orders granting certiorari
indicated that any portions of the argument "relating to matters claimed to affect national
security may be filed in sealed form." Washington Post Co., 403 U.S. at 943.
18 Griswold Memoirs, supra note 18, at 303-04.
1I9 Id. at 304.
120 As indicated in note 19, supra, most of the text of the Secret Brief has been
unsealed, although two paragraphs have been deleted from the bottom of page 9 of the
brief. Nonetheless, the Secret Brief is not easily accessible to those interested in
examining it. The Secret Brief is not included in LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 9, and
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brief, and getting a few hours sleep, Griswold concluded that the Govern-
ment's "only chance of success was to waive objection to the printing of
the great bulk of the material, but to seek an injunction as to the eleven
items on which I had specifically relied."' 21 Because this represented "a
great change in the position of the Government", 2 2 Griswold sought the
approval of Attorney General Mitchell, and he ultimately obtained
authorization to proceed in the manner that he contemplated.
123
The change in the Government's position between the commencement
of the Pentagon Papers litigation and the final shaping of its case before
the Supreme Court is almost impossible to overstate. At first the
Government contended that the mere fact that all 7,000 pages of the Papers
were classified "Top Secret-Sensitive" was sufficient to warrant an
injunction preventing publication. As the litigation went forward before two
district judges who demanded proof of the alleged threat to national
security, and on to the courts of appeals, the Government pointed to
specific items in the Papers.' 24 However, whenever it attempted to demon-
strate that any particular item was dangerous enough to warrant a restraint
on publication, its proof was found to be inadequate. Now, in the Supreme
Court of the United States, the dispute over the 2.5 million words in forty-
seven volumes containing 7,000 pages had been boiled down to eleven
125
is not on file in the Library of the United States Supreme Court. In fact, my inquiries
have failed to locate any copy of the Secret Brief at the Supreme Court, either sealed or
publicly available. Accordingly, the Secret Brief is attached to this article as an Appendix.
The brief has been retyped in an effort to improve its legibility, but the material has been
kept in the same lines, paragraphs, and pages as in the original brief so that citations will
be unaffected by the retyping. The sealed brief of The Washington Post is also appended,
though some material is still being withheld on security grounds. My efforts to locate a
copy of the sealed brief filed on behalf of The New York Times have not been successful.
121 GRISWOLD MEMOIRS, supra note 18, at 305. Although Griswold's memoirs
accurately report the essence of the concession that he made in his oral argument before
the Supreme Court, he was not quite as categorical as he remembers. He told the Supreme
Court that the items listed in the closed brief were "the ones on which we most rely"
and that "the odds are strong" that no other portions of the Papers would need to be
considered by the Court if they found the listed items inadequate. ORAL ARGUMENT
TRANSCRIPT, supra note 20, at 219, 220. However, Griswold never said in so many words
that the Government was seeking an injunction only as to the listed items.
122 GRISWOLD MEMOIRS, supra note 18, at 305.
23 Id. at 305-06. Griswold reports that he told Mitchell that "[I]t is my view that the
only ground we have to stand on where there is a chance of success is with respect to
these eleven items." Id. at 306. Mitchell initially indicated that he could not approve such
a concession and was not even familiar with the contents of the Papers, but in the end he
deferred to Griswold's judgment because Griswold was in charge of the case. Id.
124 Rudenstine, supra note 19, at 1899-900 and n.211.
125 It turns out that, in Solicitor General Griswold's view, there were not even eleven
items that merited continuation of the restraints on the Times and the Post. In a speech
given the year after the litigation, Griswold admitted that he "would have claimed rather
[Vol. 2:2
PENTAGON PAPERS
specific items identified by the Solicitor General as meriting an indefinite
restraint on publication.
D. The Adequacy of the Government 's Opportunities To Prove Its Case
As described at the outset of this article, Professor Rudenstine has
argued that the Pentagon Papers litigation represents the triumph of free
press values over due process concerns.1 26 Solicitor General Griswold has
similarly criticized the "pell mell way in which the courts proceeded."' 
27
These recent criticisms echo, of course, the strident objections offered at
the time of the Pentagon Papers decision itself, when Justice Harlan stated
that the Supreme Court had acted in an "almost irresponsibly feverish"
manner,1 28 Chief Justice Burger decried the "unseemly haste," 129 and
Justice Blackmun suggested that the litigation had been heard in an
atmosphere of "pressure and panic and sensationalism." "3°
The procedures that were followed and the repeated opportunities that
were given to the Government to shore up its case, however, demonstrate
that these criticisms of the fact-finding process in Pentagon Papers are not
justified. Judge Gurfein and Judge Gesell, like the judges on the courts of
appeals, were willing to continue the injunctions in force as to any items
on which the Government could present adequate proof. In addition, there
were numerous indications that if the Government had produced adequate
proof as to even a small number of items, it would have been given more
time to muster its evidence in support of an injunction against the rest of
the material. It is no doubt true that, if the Solicitor General's office had
been given a few more days to consult with the Government's trial
attorneys and with officials from the State Department and the Department
of Defense, the Secret Brief filed in the Supreme Court could have been
based on a more complete understanding of the underlying facts. But to
focus exclusively on the handling of the appeal by Solicitor General
Griswold obscures the nature of the Government's difficulty. The United
States, acting through its attorneys and upon the sworn testimony of its
less than eleven," but that he "had to take into account the wishes of other people in
the Department." Griswold, Teaching Alone Is Not Enough, supra note 18, at 257
(speech given at the convention of the Association of American Law Schools, December
29, 1972). Since it was the Solicitor General himself who had interviewed the experts
from the Department of Defense and the State Department, there is no reason to believe
that his assessment of the risks raised by publication was less well-grounded than that of
the unnamed "other people" to whom he deferred.
126 Rudenstine, supra note 19, at 1903.
127 GRISWOLD MEMOIRS, supra note 18, at 302.
128 New York Times Co., 403 U.S. at 753 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
129 Id. at 748 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
130 Id. at 762 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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officers, sought a prior restraint against publication of the Pentagon Papers.
The Supreme Court ultimately held that no injunction-or at least no
injunction extending beyond the TROs entered in Pentagon Papers-was
proper without a stronger evidentiary showing than that which the
Government made. Since no official was able to provide the facts needed
to support the Government's claims of risk to national security, the
injunctions were removed.
Subsequent events strongly suggest that it was not any lack of
opportunity to gather and present evidence, but rather the absence of
evidence to support the allegations being made, which explains the
Government's lack of success in Pentagon Papers. Although the civil
litigation against the newspapers was ended by the Supreme Court's
decision on June 30, 1971, the Justice Department went ahead with a
criminal prosecution against Daniel Ellsberg and Anthony Russo. Thus,
long after the injunctions were lifted the Justice Department continued to
gather evidence intended to prove that the publication of the Papers had
damaged national security. Such evidence was not produced within a few
days, or even a few weeks. In fact, a full five months after the Supreme
Court had ruled, Assistant Attorney General Robert C. Mardian of the
Internal Security Division belittled the Defense Department's most recent
damage assessment as "totally inadequate."' 131 Even though he continues
to object to the procedures followed, former Solicitor General Griswold
has written that he has "never seen any trace of a threat to the national
security from the publication" of the Pentagon Papers, and that the lesson
of the case is that "there is very rarely any real risk to current national
security from the publication of facts relating to transactions in the past,
even the fairly recent past. "132 Faced with enormous time pressures and
131 "Defense Department Damage Assessment," memorandum from Assistant Attorney
General Robert C. Mardian, Internal Security Division, to Attorney General John N.
Mitchell, December 2, 1971 (released to author pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act).
Mardian was voicing extreme dissatisfaction with a Defense Department memorandum
entitled "Impact of Unauthorized Disclosure of Study 'United States-Viemnam Relations,
1945-1967' and Associated Documents," which was dated November 26, 1971 and was
received by Mardian on November 29. Mardian noted that in the civil litigation Defense and
State Department officials had provided the district courts "with specific examples of the
harm that could result, including the compromise of communications intelligence data. Based
on these representations, the Solicitor General informed the Supreme Court that publication
of certain parts of the study 'could have the effect of causing immediate and irreparable
harm to the security of the United States.' " Mardian found that the damage assessment
prepared by the Department of Defense did not substantiate the earlier predictions about the
harm that would flow from publication, and he expressed the fear that the absence of an
adequate damage assessment would jeopardize the Ellsberg prosecution.
132 Griswold, Secrets Not Worth Keeping, supra note 18. When this article was
published in The Washington Post, the Post somehow misidentified Griswold as a former
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the awesome prospect of authorizing publications that the Government
stoutly maintained would cost lives and prolong the Vietnam War, the
courts proceeded quickly but in a manner respectful of the Government's
claims. Thus, if the Pentagon Papers decision is to be criticized, it should
be on the basis of its holding or on account of an alleged failure to
properly apply First Amendment principles to the facts of the case-the
procedures followed in no way deprived the Government of appropriate
occasions to make its case.
IV. THE SOLICITOR GENERAL'S SECRET BRIEF
After careful investigation, the Solicitor General decided that the
Government had no choice but to drastically pare down the national
security claims that it had presented to the lower courts. Even though his
own judgment would have cut the list even further, the Solicitor General's
Secret Brief identified the eleven items that were "the worst"-those
upon which the Government's case should rightly stand or fall.
133
This Secret Brief is extraordinarily helpful in attempting to interpret the
ten opinions filed in Pentagon Papers. For example, Justice Stewart's
opinion indicates that he was "convinced that the Executive is correct
with respect to some of the documents involved," although he could not
"say that disclosure of any of them will surely result in direct, immediate,
and irreparable damage to our Nation or its people." 134 The Secret Brief
sheds considerable light on what Justice Stewart was probably talking
about. Likewise, Justice White's opinion stated that, even though he
considered an injunction unjustified, he was "confident" that publication
of the Papers would "do substantial damage to public interests." 135 The
Secret Brief details the damage to public interests that the Government
identified as likely to occur. Justice Blackmun, in dissent, worried that
publication of the Papers would result in "the death of soldiers, the
destruction of alliances," and the "prolongation of the war" and further
delay in the release of prisoners. 36 The Secret Brief reveals the
Government's specific allegations as to how such disasters were likely to
come about.
The Secret Brief filed by Solicitor General Griswold on behalf of the
United States in Pentagon Papers is a typewritten document consisting of
dean of Yale Law School. The Post issued a correction the next day acknowledging its
"monumental error" and reporting that Griswold "was, of course, for many years dean
of the Harvard Law School." WASH. POST, Feb. 16, 1989, at A23.
133 ORAL ARGUMENT TRANSCRIPT, supra note 20, at 219-20; see supra note 125.
'34 New York Times Co., 403 U.S. at 730 (concurring opinion of Justice Stewart).
135 Id. at 731 (concurring opinion of Justice White).
136 Id. at 763 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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a cover followed by thirteen legal-sized pages of text. 137 The brief begins
by identifying the forty-seven-volume Defense Department study that was
the subject of the litigation, and noting the difficulties faced by the
Government due to its lack of complete information on what documents
actually were held by the newspapers and thus might possibly be published
by them.1 38 Accordingly, the brief notes the assumption explicitly made by
Judge Gesell in the District of Columbia that the Post possessed the entire
Pentagon Papers study. 139 The brief also notes that the full forty-seven
volumes were available to both -Judge Gesell and Judge Gurfein, that the
Government had in the course of the litigation designated specific portions
of the volumes that should not be allowed to be published, and that the
latest round of designations had been made by 5:00 p.m. on June 25,
the day beforeoral argument was to be held in the Supreme Court of the
United States. 140 The Secret Brief then identifies the vital purpose which
it was designed to serve:
137 See supra note 120 and the Appendix to this article.
138 Secret Brief, supra note 9, at 1-2.
9 Id. at 2.
140 Id. at 2-3. In the Times case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit had enjoined the newspaper, pending disposition of the remand proceedings
ordered to be held in the district court, from publishing any of the items identified in the
Government's Special Appendix, and permitted the Government to designate additional
items by June 25, 1971. In its order granting certiorari the Supreme Court continued the
injunction against publication of both categories of items (that is, those in the Special
Appendix and those to be listed no later than 5:00 p.m. on June 25). Although the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit had ruled against the
Government, it had continued the interim injunction against the Post until 6:00 p.m. on
Friday, June 25. The Supreme Court's order granting certiorari in the Post case continued
the injunction against further publication by the Post, limited to the items specified by the
Government in the Special Appendix filed in the Second Circuit and those added by the
Government by 5:00 p.m. on June 25. The Government did file a number of additional
designations on June 25, although Solicitor General Griswold described them at oral
argument as being "much too broad." ORAL ARGUMENT TRANSCRIPT, supra note 20, at
219. In addition to listing many specific items from the Pentagon Papers, the Government
also claimed a continuing need to suppress publication of "any information" relating to
13 broad categories, including "assessments of enemy force structures," "confidential
information relating to peace negotiations, assets or tactics," and "direct quotations from
secret cables and similar communications to the Department of State or Defense or to
intelligence agencies." Supplemental List of Special Items, Department of State
Appendix, at 3. While the terms of the continuing injunction entered by the Supreme
Court on June 25 theoretically would have permitted the newspapers to publish any
portions of the Papers that had not been designated by the Government, the sweeping
nature of the designations made it impossible to confidently identify any aspect of the
Papers as being cleared for publication. Therefore, neither newspaper printed any more




The purpose of this portion of the Brief for the United
States is to refer to a selected few of these items and to
endeavor to show that the publication of these items could
have the effect of causing immediate and irreparable harm
to the security of the United States.
14 1
Thus, as reflected in the Secret Brief itself, and as confirmed by
Solicitor General Griswold during argument, the Government's entire
effort to keep in place the injunctions that barred the Times and the Post
from publishing additional material turned on the persuasiveness of the
eleven "worst" security problems culled by Griswold from the 7,000
pages making up the Pentagon Papers. If no convincing example or
examples could be produced in which the appropriate constitutional stan-
dard-presumably one to be announced by the Supreme Court in Pentagon
Papers itself-permitted a continuing restraint, it was inevitable that the
Supreme Court would permit publication of all of the materials.
42
As the Solicitor General worked late into the night on June 25 and into
the early morning hours of June 26, and as he stood before the Supreme
Court that morning, he did his best to implement the only strategy that
realistically lay open to him. The Supreme Court plainly could not and
would not examine the forty-seven volumes of the Pentagon Papers in any
detail, and even if it did so, the Justices could not be expected to
undertake an independent analysis of the security consequences that would
flow from publication.1 43 Moreover, the Government's proof before Judge
Gurfein and Judge Gesell had focused on what were considered to be the
items as to which the strongest case could be made, and yet in each action
the district judge had ruled against the Government across the board.
141 Secret Brief, supra note 9, at 3.
142 Judge J. Skelly Wright of the D.C. Circuit would have affirmed Judge Gesell's
initial denial to the Government of a temporary restraining order because of what he
considered to be the Government's failure to identify any specific portion of the Pentagon
Papers which could properly be enjoined:
Of course, the Government may not know precisely which documents the Post
has. But it has identified the 47-volume report from which the documents are taken.
The Government could suggest and support at least one specific harm that would
result from publication of anything in the 47 volumes. It has not even done that.
United States v. Washington Post Co., 446 F. 2d 1322, 1326 (1971) (dissenting opinion)
(emphasis in original).
143 In fact, there was substantial tension between the two flaws that the Government
asked the Supreme Court to find in the proceedings below. The repeated demand that the
judges conduct a thorough examination of the 47 volumes of the study is difficult to
reconcile with the Government's assertion that the judges were obliged to defer almost
completely to the Executive Branch's assessment of the risks to national security which
the documents might raise.
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The Government's position had eroded to the point that at oral
argument Griswold strenuously promoted the Government's offer to
complete a thorough declassification review of the Papers within forty-five
days, if publication were enjoined during the interim.'" Yet such a
proposal-to give the Government more time to sort out the real security
problems that might lie buried somewhere in the thousands of pages of
innocuous material contained in the Papers-could not succeed unless the
Government could show that at least some items within the documents
could justify an injunction.
A. The Eleven "Worst "Items
Of the eleven "worst" items on which the Solicitor General
depended, ten can now be examined in their entirety. The other item,
which relates to the activities of the National Security Agency, has been
deleted in part from the version of the Secret Brief that has been made
public so far. Even though it would be useful to be able to examine the
full text of the deleted item, the portions of the Secret Brief that have been
made public leave no doubt as to the fundamental weaknesses in the
Government's case, while also identifying its strongest elements.'4 5 Most
of the items on which the Government placed its principal reliance have
'44 ORAL ARGUMENT TRANSCRIPT, supra note 20, at 224-26. Griswold had made a
similar request for 45 days in which to conduct a declassification review when he argued
the Post case before the D.C. Circuit. James M. Naughton, Washington Appeals Court
Continues Ban on The Post's Series on Vietnam, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 1971, at 23.
145 The discussion which follows reaches the conclusion that the Secret Brief filed on
behalf of the United States did not establish that any of the documents included in the
Pentagon Papers would, if published, cause "direct, immediate, and irreparable damage
to our Nation or its people." See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713,
730 (concurring opinion of Justice Stewart, stating the standard under which he and
Justice White would uphold a prior restraint on publication.) Since Solicitor General
Griswold prepared the Secret Brief and argued the case for the United States, the
inference might be drawn that the Secret Brief was poorly done or the case poorly argued;
however, the careful review of the factual record undertaken here does not support any
suggestion that the failure of the Government's case was due to ineffective advocacy in
the Supreme Court. The Solicitor General forcefully presented the strongest arguments that
were supported by the records made below in New York and in the District of Columbia,
and he gave focus to the Government's case by winnowing out the weaker claims asserted
below. Either the facts did not justify a prior restraint, or the facts that could have
justified such an injunction were not developed before the cases were filed, at trial, or on
appeal in the Second Circuit or in the D.C. Circuit. Griswold could discard weak claims,
and did so, but there was no opportunity, between the time that certiorari was granted on
June 25 and when the case was briefed and argued on June 26, to fashion or substantiate
national security claims that had not already been prepared by the State Department, the
Defense Department, and other agencies.
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already been made public, and it appears that the material that remains
classified is of secondary significance. The Secret Brief's eleven "worst"
national security problems raised by the Pentagon Papers were these:
1. The Four Negotiating Volumes
The first item listed by Griswold in the Secret Brief was not a page or
a section of one of the forty-seven volumes, but rather four entire volumes
describing efforts to achieve a diplomatic settlement of the Vietnam War.
The Secret Brief informed the Court that negotiations had been "carried
on through third parties, both governments and individuals," including
"the Canadian, Polish, Italian, Rumanian, and Norwegian govern-
ments."146
There is every indication that these four volumes-often referred to as
the "negotiating volumes" of the Pentagon Papers-provided the major
motivation for the Government's efforts to suppress publication of the
Papers. In fact, Daniel Ellsberg himself was sufficiently concerned about
the damage these volumes might do if published that he did not give them
to the Times or to the other newspapers to whom he made available other
portions of the Papers. 147 As a result, the negotiating volumes were not
published by any of the newspapers, were not included in any of the three
published compilations of the Papers, and were not generally available to
the public until 1983, and even then they were published with deletions.'
48
146 Secret Brief, supra note 9, at 4.
147 DANIEL ELLSBERG, PAPERS ON THE WAR 44 (1972) (indicating that Ellsberg
provided the negotiating volumes only to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, and
suggesting that this limited disclosure was intended to protect continuing negotiations);
UNGAR, supra note 11, at 83-84 (quoting Ellsberg as saying that he held back the volumes
because he "didn't want to get in the way of the diplomacy"); NEGOTIATING VOLUMES,
supra note 53, at x-xi (editor's introduction) (questioning whether disclosure of the
volumes would in fact have damaged the Paris peace talks, which had long been
hopelessly deadlocked, but concluding that there seems to be no reason to question
Ellsberg's sincerity; Ellsberg may also have felt that disclosure of the volumes, because
of their special sensitivity, would make him appear irresponsible); GRISWOLD MEMOIRS,
supra note 18, at 310 n.37 (indicating that on April 2, 1991, at a conference at Harvard's
Kennedy School of Government, Ellsberg stated that he had not delivered the negotiating
volumes to the newspapers); see supra note 58.
148 During the prosecution of Daniel Ellsberg and Anthony Russo for leaking the
Pentagon Papers, considerable attention was directed to the negotiating volumes, since
they were the materials which most strongly supported the prosecution's contention that
the leaks were likely to damage the national security interests of the United States.
NEGOTIATING VOLUMES, supra note 53, at xviii (editor's introduction). Surprisingly, in
light of the security claims being made, the negotiating volumes were available for
inspection during the Ellsberg-Russo trial in Los Angeles. Id. at xvii; SEYMOUR M.
HERSH, THE PRICE OF POWER: KISSINGER IN THE NIXON WHITE HOUSE 321 n. * (1983);
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Given the fact that these volumes formed the very core of the
Government's case, and that responsible government officials presumably
believed that their publication would seriously damage the national security
of the United States, the Secret Brief provides surprisingly meager factual
support for the concerns that were raised. The Solicitor General devoted
only two paragraphs of the Secret Brief to describing the damage that
publication of the negotiating volumes might do:
These negotiations, or negotiations of this sort, are
being continued. It is obvious that the hope of the termina-
tion of the war turns to a large extent on the success of
negotiations of this sort. One never knows where the break
may come and it is of crucial importance to keep open
every possible line of communication. Reference may be
made to recent developments with respect to China as an
instance of a line of communication among many which
turned out to be fruitful.
The materials in these four volumes include derogatory
comments about the perfidiousness of specific persons
involved, and statements which might be offensive to
nations or governments. The publication of this material is
likely to close up channels of communication which might
otherwise have some opportunity of facilitating the closing
of the Vietnam war.
49
Especially in light of the fact that the four negotiating volumes "were
generally conceded to contain the most sensitive information" in the forty-
seven volumes,' 50 it is revealing that Griswold was unable to state
objections to publication that were more specific than the observation that
Sanford J. Ungar, The Pentagon Papers Trial, ATLANTIC, Aug. 1973, at 6, 12. Columnist
Jack Anderson obtained the negotiating volumes, and he both wrote about their contents
and made them available to The New York Times, The Washington Post, and other
newspapers. See, e.g., NEIL SHEEHAN, A BRIGHT SHINING LIE: JOHN PAUL VANN AND
AMERICA IN VIETNAM 802 (1988) (stating that Sheehan acquired the negotiating volumes
"after they were obtained and made public by Jack Anderson"). Later, a request under
the federal Freedom of Information Act by Morton H. Halperin eventually led to the
official release of most of the documents, although the Government continued to insist
that some deletions be made for security reasons. The volumes were then published, along
with an introduction by Professor George C. Herring describing their eventful history.
149 Secret Brief, supra note 9, at 4-5. The discussion of China is probably a reference
to the "Ping-Pong diplomacy" of April 1971, which both represented and promoted a
warming of relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China. See
KISSINGER, supra note 17, at 708-10.
js0 NEGOTIATING VOLUMES, supra note 53, at xviii (editor's introduction).
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"[o]ne never knows where the break may come" and the description of
the volumes as containing "derogatory comments" about some
participants."' Certainly, without at least an example or two of the types
of negotiations that were ongoing or the derogatory comments that were
feared to be capable of disrupting them, the Supreme Court would find it
very difficult to determine whether the fears articulated by the Government
could justify an injunction.
2. Derogatory Comments About Allies
The second item discussed by the Solicitor General in the Secret Brief
is "the fact that there is much material in these volumes which might give
offense to South Korea, to Thailand, and to South Vietnam, just as serious
offense has already been given to Australia and Canada."' 5 2 Once again,
the discussion supporting this allegation is very thin:
For the past many months, we have been steadily
withdrawing troops from Vietnam. The rate at which we
can continue this withdrawal depends upon the extent to
which we can continue to rely on the support of other
nations, notably South Vietnam, Korea, Thailand, and
Australia. If the publication of this material gives offense to
these countries, and some of them are notably sensitive, the
rate at which our own troops can be withdrawn will be
diminished. This would be an immediate military impact,
having direct bearing on the security of the United States
and its citizens.
1 53
Secret Brief, supra note 9, at 4. It must be assumed that the Solicitor General would
have directed the Court to any specific portions of the Papers that had been convincingly
shown by record evidence to raise a serious risk of upsetting negotiations. Moreover, even
the last-minute identification of particular items alleged to be damaging, coupled with a
proffer of evidence to be provided on remand, might have carried the day. After all, that
was essentially the tactic that the Government had used successfully in the Second Circuit,
where it sought and received permission to file a Special Appendix going well beyond the
evidence that it had presented to the district court. The fact that Griswold did not identify
any specific negotiations that might be put at risk by publication provides convincing
evidence that the government officials whom he consulted had not been able to provide
such specifics.
152 Secret Brief, supra note 9, at 5. It appears that the Secret Brief is alleging that
offense had been given to Australia and Canada by the portions of the Pentagon Papers
that had already been published. See Affidavit of William B. Macomber, United States
v. Washington Post Co., No. 71-1478 (D.D.C.), at 5-6 (Canada), 7-8 (Australia).
153 Secret Brief, supra note 9, at 5.
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No effort was made to call the attention of the Court to any specific
statements contained in the Pentagon Papers that were thought likely to
damage our relations with the countries named.
3. CIA and NSA
The entire discussion devoted to the third item listed by the Solicitor
General is the following:
There are specific references to the names and activities
of CIA agents still active in Southeast Asia. There are
references to the activities of the National Security Agency.
The items designated are specific references to persons
or activities which are currently continuing. No designation
has been made of any general references to CIA activities.
This may not be exactly equivalent to the disclosure of
troop movements, but it is very close to it.
Once again, it is striking that the Secret Brief offers no example to
illustrate the nature of the harm that is feared. Not only are no details
given to support the allegations being made, but the Secret Brief does not
even allege that publication would impair the interests of the United States.
The Supreme Court was apparently left to fill in for itself the dire
consequences that might flow from references to CIA and NSA activities.
The Secret Brief does not even contend that the names and activities
referred to in the Pentagon Papers had previously been kept secret.
4. SEATO Plans
The fourth item discussed in the Secret Brief concerns "SEATO
Contingency Plan 5 dealing with communist armed aggression in Laos.
This discloses what the military plans are. The SEATO plans are
continuing plans. This involves not only the disclosure of military plans,
but a breach of faith with other friendly nations." 154 A similar problem is
described with respect to SEATO Operations Plans 4 and 6 dealing with
"military dispositions with respect to Laos, Cambodia, Thailand and
Pakistan." The Secret Brief alleges that publication would disclose the
plans to possible enemies and increase the risk of losing the support of
friendly nations, but no details are given.1 55 Most notably, any harm
154 Id. at 6.
155 It appears that much of the material identified in Item Four was not published in
either the G.P.O. Edition or the Gravel Edition of the Pentagon Papers. However, the
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expected to flow from disclosure of the plans to potential enemies is
unspecified.
5. U.S. Estimate of Soviet Reaction to Vietnam War
The entire discussion of the fifth item reads as follows:
Volume IV-C-6(b), page 129, sets forth the United
States intelligence community's estimate of the Soviet
reaction to the Vietnam War. This was made in 1967, but
is in large part still applicable. The disclosure of this
information will give Soviet intelligence insights into the
capacity of our intelligence operations, and may strengthen
them both by giving them better understanding of us, and
by leading them to correct matters on their side.
5 6
This may well be one of the items that Solicitor General Griswold put into
the Secret Brief at the behest of others and against his better judgment.'57
Not only is there no description of what the assessment by U.S.
intelligence was, so that the Justices could determine whether it added
anything to the widespread public discussion of Soviet attitudes, but the
Secret Brief makes no effort at all to establish that harm is either likely to
occur (saying only that it "may" happen) or, if it does, is likely to be
serious.
The weakness of the Secret Brief's claim on Item Five becomes even
more apparent upon examination of the actual material at issue.' 58 The
G.P.O Edition does provide a more detailed description of the document about which the
Government was concerned:
The JCS sends the Secretary of Defense a draft memorandum for the President on
military intervention in Laos. The JCS suggests that if the President decides that
U.S. forces should be employed in Laos, that [SEATO Plan 51 is the proper basic
vehicle for the contemplated action. The political objective of the intervention is to
confront the Sino-Soviet Bloc with a military force of Asian and Western Powers
capable of stopping the communist advance. JCS Memorandum for Secretary of
Defense, JCSM 661-61, 20 September, 1961.
11 G.P.O. EDITION, vol. V-B-4(b), at vi. The words "SEATO Plan 5" are contained in
the document describing the contents of Volume V-B-4(b), while those words are deleted
when the same document is reproduced at the beginning of Volume V-B-4(a). "JCS"
refers to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
156 Secret Brief, supra note 9, at 6.
'5 See Erwin N. Griswold, Teaching Alone Is Not Enough, supra note 18, at 257
(indicating that he "would have claimed rather less than the eleven" items).
'58 As described supra note 9, almost all of the Pentagon Papers study was declassified
by the Department of Defense and published by the Government Printing Office in
September 1971. The four negotiating volumes and some portions of the other volumes
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estimate predicted the following possible reactions if increases in U.S.
forces and intensified bombing continued:
The Soviets might take certain actions designed to
bolster North Vietnam and possibly to warn the United
States such as the provision of limited numbers of
volunteers or crews for defense equipment or possibly
aircraft. They might also break off negotiations with the
United States on various subjects and suspend certain
agreements now in effect. The mining or the blockade of
the North Vietnamese coast would be most likely to
provoke these responses, since this would constitute a direct
challenge to the Soviets and there would be little they could
do on the scene.'59
This bland summary of nonspecific responses with which the Soviets
"might" respond to escalation by the United States could not have
justified, under any conceivable legal standard, an injunction against
publication.
6. U.S. Estimate of Soviet Supply Capacity
The three-sentence discussion of this item discloses only that the
material involved-Volume IV-C-6(b), page 157-is closely related to
Item Five and consists of an estimate of Soviet capacity to provide
weapons to North Vietnam; and that there "is much about it that is
current, and its disclosure to the Soviet Union would give them
information which could lead to serious consequences for the United
States." '16 Once again, no effort is made to identify the "serious
consequences" faced by the United States or to establish how likely it is
that they will occur. All that the document revealed about the Soviet
capacity to provide weapons is that the Soviets would be at "as great a
military disadvantage as we were when they blocked the corridor to Berlin
in 1961" and that Moscow "should be expected ... to provide some new
were withheld. Since the government was under no compulsion to publish any of the
Papers, it is unlikely that anything published in the G.P.O. Edition of the Papers raised
even a colorable security concern, at least as of September 1971 when the G.P.O. Edition
was published. In fact, the G.P.O. Edition deleted some material even though it had
already been published in the private editions of the Papers. For detailed comparisons of
the three versions of the Papers, see 5 GRAVEL EDITION 314-19, and the Kahin and
Westerfield articles, all of which are cited supra note 10.
"9 4 GRAVEL EDITION, supra note 10, at 469.
16o Secret Brief, supra note 9, at 7.
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and better weapons and equipment."' 6' No matter what legal standard was
applied, disclosure of this fragment could not properly be enjoined.
7. Memorandum of Joint Chiefs of Staff
The one paragraph of the Secret Brief devoted to this item identifies
it as an internal memorandum of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated May 27,
1967, containing a recommendation "that a nuclear response might be
required in the event of a Chinese attack on Thailand."'' 62 The entire
discussion of the potential harm to national security that could flow from
publication of the memorandum is as follows:
Although such a recommendation was never formally made,
the disclosure that this was considered as a possibility,
though in an internal memorandum, could have very serious
consequences to the security of the United States.
163
It is not surprising that the Government preferred not to allow the
publication of any document discussing the possible use of nuclear
weapons in response to Chinese intervention in the war in Southeast Asia.
However, since it must have been obvious to everyone-especially the
Chinese-that the United States would at least consider the use of such
weapons if China became involved in the conflict by introducing major
combat forces, publication of a recommendation on that subject, especially
one that was not adopted, could not justify an injunction."
8. Telegram from Ambassador Thompson
The eighth item described in the Secret Brief was the text of a
telegram written by Llewellyn Thompson in 1968, when he was the United
States Ambassador to the Soviet Union. The telegram is described as
containing Thompson's assessment of Soviet reaction to the course of
action in Vietnam, and the expected damage from publication is described
in the following manner:
The publication of this telegram would provide valuable
intelligence information for the Russians. It is important to
1614 GRAVEL EDITION, supra note 10, at 485.
162 Secret Brief, supra note 9, at 7.
163 id.
'64 Although the portion of the Pentagon Papers that concerned the Government was
published in full in 1971, 4 GRAVEL EDITION, supra note 10, at 492, the corresponding
discussion from the Secret Brief was not declassified until March 1993.
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them to know what we think about them. Moreover, we
cannot have an effective ambassador abroad if he is not
able to report candidly and in confidence to the Secretary
of State and the President.
The publication of this telegram would impair Mr.
Llewellyn's [sic] continuing effectiveness. He is now an
important and valuable member of our SALT talks
delegation dealing with strategic arms limitation, which
surely directly affects the security of the United States.
The full text of the Thompson telegram appears in the Gravel Edition
of the Papers. 65 The telegram discusses a wide range of possible Soviet
responses to various possible moves the United States might take to
escalate its involvement in the Vietnam War, but it had been written more
than three years earlier by the then-Ambassador, who admitted that his
"crystal ball" was "very cloudy." The Government's concern seemed
to be based primarily on a generalized need for confidentiality in
communications by ambassadors.
The specific diplomatic concerns raised in Item Eight ultimately
amount to nothing more than the suggestion that after publication it would
not be possible for former Ambassador Thompson to continue to serve
effectively as a member of the U.S. delegation to the SALT talks. Given
the very measured tone of the telegram, it is not at all clear that there was
any reason to expect a hostile response by the Soviets. In any event, the
Secret Brief's concerns that publication of the Papers might prevent
Ambassador Thompson from assisting in the SALT negotiations seem
highly exaggerated, given the fact that poor health had already forced
Thompson to withdraw from the talks held in the spring of 1971.1
9. Discussions Between South Vietnam and Laos
The Secret Brief's entire discussion of the ninth item consists of the
following:
Volume IV-C-9(b), page 52, contains reference to
extremely confidential discussions which took place
between the military staffs of South Vietnam and Laos,
given to us in confidence, relating to possible South
16' 4 GRAVEL EDITION, supra note 10, at 246-47.
'66 Thompson was too ill to attend the SALT IV talks, which were held in Vienna
between March 15, 1971 and May 28, 1971; he was replaced by Ambassador J. Graham
Parsons. JOHN NEWHOUSE, COLD DAWN: THE STORY OF SALT 205, 211, 219 (1989 reprint
ed.) (originally published 1973).
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Vietnamese military action in Laos with the consent of
Laos military authorities. The publication of this not only
involves a breach of confidence, but also involves grave
risk of reactions from the other nations involved. 6
The concerns raised by Item Nine are similar to those raised in Item
One with regard to the negotiating volumes of the Pentagon Papers. Absent
once again are details that might have enabled the Supreme Court to assess
the seriousness of the Government's allegations. Labeling a disclosure a
"breach of confidence" does not establish that the conditions for an in-
junction against publication have been met, and the Secret Brief made no
effort to establish what consequences would likely, flow from disclosure.
The Gravel Edition again discloses the material in question:
In May, talks started between Lao and GVN military staffs.
... In July, it was discovered that GVN was using Chinat
agents, disguised so as to appear to be South Vietnamese
with Nung ancestry, on covert operations. JCS disapproved
of the effort despite appeal from COMUSMACV. The
Chinats appeared to be the result of a secret bilateral
agreement concluded during 1966.168
This seems to be material capable of causing embarrassment to the
United States, but only because the public would become aware of tensions
between the United States and the South Vietnamese government that were
already well known to the governments themselves.
10. Activities of the National Security Agency
Item Ten pertains to the work of the National Security Agency (NSA),
which is responsible for the government's code-breaking and code-making
activities. The Solicitor General informed the Supreme Court that its claim
was "not a matter of United States codes," since those were "regarded
as not destructible, or sufficiently nondestructible to be practically
effective. '"69 Rather, the potential threat to national security involved the
'67 Secret Brief, supra note 9, at 8.
168 2 GRAVEL EDITION, supra note 10, at 401-02. GVN refers to the government of
South Vietnam. Chinats are Chinese Nationalists. COMUSMACV refers to the
Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam.
169 Secret Brief, supra note 9, at 8. Solicitor General Griswold reports as follows
concerning his meeting with Admiral Gaylor: "I had in the back of my mind the thought
that the publication of the plain text of any coded telegram would be serious, since it
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codes and ciphers of other countries, particularly unfriendly nations. The
Secret Brief asserted that "various items" had been specified in the
Papers that would make the enemy aware of significant U.S. intelligence
successes. 170 That, in turn, would permit an enemy country "to minimize
our chance of successful interception," with adverse consequences for
current U.S. military operations.
1 71
Unfortunately, the final two paragraphs of page nine of the
Government's Secret Brief, which concern the activities of NSA, are still
classified. This deletion calls for the exercise of some additional caution
in assessing the Secret Brief, since it is at least theoretically possible that
the deleted paragraphs are radically different in nature from the ten items
that have been released in full and from the portion of Item Ten that has
been released. However, all the available evidence points to the conclusion
would provide information for breaking the code. Admiral [Gaylor] laughed at this, and
said: 'That has not been true since about 1935.' " GRISWOLD MEMOIRS, supra note 18,
at 304 (Griswold incorrectly refers to the individual he spoke to as Admiral "Naylor").
Judge Gurfein originally operated under the same misconception as Griswold, until Vice
Admiral Francis J. Blouin, a government witness during the district court proceedings and
the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, confirmed that the security of U.S. codes was not
at issue. BAMFORD, supra note 95, at 282-84. See also David Kahn, American Codes and
the Pentagon Papers, NEWSDAY, June 25, 1971, reprinted in DAVID KAHN, KAHN ON
CODES 167, 168 (1983):
The reason that American cryptography sustained no injury is simply that today's
cipher machines are designed to withstand precisely this sort of exposure. The safety
factor is built in....
The public state of the cryptographic art can thus produce ciphers that can
withstand massive disclosures and that are, in all practical senses, unbreakable. The
National Security Agency stays far, far ahead of the public art.
170 Secret Brief, supra note 9, at 8. The concerns expressed about a possible threat to
NSA's interception efforts were potentially substantial, since it is possible that, to the
extent that other nations become aware that the United States is reading their cables, they
may be motivated to increase the security of their communications, making NSA's work
more difficult in the future. See BAMFORD, supra note 95, at 287 (describing a meeting
between Milton Zaslow-a high-ranking NSA official-and Senior Vice President
Harding Bancroft of the Times, in which Zaslow described NSA's concerns about
publication of "anything that might alert foreign governments to the fact that their
communications systems had been penetrated"; Bancroft gave assurances that the Times
would not publish any such material); SALISBURY, supra note 11, at 317-18 (describing
the same meeting); United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057, 1081-82 (4th Cir. 1988)
(Wilkinson, J., concurring), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 908 (1988) (when the United States'
capabilities for electronic surveillance are revealed, "countermeasures can be taken to
circumvent" the surveillance).
7 Secret Brief, supra note 9, at 8-9. "Signal intelligence now gives direct support to
our troops today, and saves many lives. It also helps, directly in the recovery of downed
pilots." Id. at 9.
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that analysis of the Pentagon Papers litigation would not be significantly
altered by examination of the deleted paragraphs.
The importance that the Government placed on protecting NSA,
relative to its concerns about the negotiating volumes and the other items
addressed in the Secret Brief, may be ascertained in a number of ways.
In the District of Columbia litigation, the Government presented an
affidavit by Vice Admiral Noel Gaylor, the Director of NSA. At first, the
Government requested that Judge Gesell consider the affidavit ex parte,
without it being available to counsel for the Post. 72 Judge Gesell refused
to accept the affidavit on those terms.173 Later, the Government agreed to
allow the Post's attorneys and experts to review the affidavit, and the
discussion between the court and counsel confirmed that the affidavit
dealt with codes.' 74 Toward the end of the hearing, the affidavit was
discussed once more, with the references again confirming that it dealt
with codes.' 75
Despite the Government's efforts to raise concerns that publication of
the Pentagon Papers would interfere with NSA's activities, Judge Gesell's
oral opinion denying the preliminary injunction sought by the Government
stated that there was no proof that publication would result in "a
compromise of scientific and technological materials."'' 76 The codes issue
remained in the case, however, with the Government even attempting to
present additional material on the issue to the Chief Judge of the court of
172 Transcript of In Camera Proceedings (June 21, 1971), United States v. Washington
Post Co., No. 1235-71 (D.D.C.), at 90 [hereinafter D.C. Transcript]. Admiral Gaylor's
affidavit was marked as Government Exhibit 8 for identification. The transcript of the in
camera proceedings before Judge Gesell was originally sealed, but was released in 1976.
See supra note 19.
7 In denying the Government's request, Judge Gesell stated: "That is so foreign to
my make-up that I just can't do it." D.C. Transcript, supra note 172, at 90.
174 Id. at 172-73.
' Judge Gesell stated that the "security aspect in the Admiral's affidavit ... isn't
as pressing as it may appear on the papers, the Court having been advised that the Post
does not intend and is not going to publish precise times of messages." Id. at 216.
William R. Glendon, counsel for the Post, then stated that the Post did not have one
message about which Admiral Gaylor was particularly concerned. Id. at 217. Judge
Gesell understood Admiral Gaylor's affidavit to allege that the message in question
possibly had "some special significance in terms of compromising the Signals
intelligence system." Id. at 216. As discussed supra note 97 and text accompanying
notes 95-97, one cable particularly relied upon by the Government had already been
published in congressional hearings. It appears that these matters concerning codes were
what Judge George MacKinnon was referring to in his dissenting opinion in the D.C.
Circuit, when he stated that "by agreement of the parties some of the documents will
be protected." United States v. Washington Post Co., 446 F.2d 1327, 1329 (D.C. Cir.
1971) (en banc).
176 D.C. Transcript, supra note 172, at 269.
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appeals after argument had been held before the full court.'7 7 In addition,
the Director of NSA was one of the three government experts with whom
Solicitor General Griswold met on June 25 to discuss what security
problems should be addressed in the Secret Brief to be filed the next day
in the Supreme Court.
The precursor of the Secret Brief was the Special Appendix that the
Government filed in the Second Circuit. 7 8 That document has been
released in its entirety,179 and contains two brief references to matters
concerning codes. The Special Appendix identifies diplomatic messages
between the State Department and U.S. embassies, and notes that the
Pentagon Papers quote the messages. The complete description of the risks
posed by publication of the text of one set of messages is as follows:
"Presumably would assist enemy in analyzing and possibly breaking
codes employed at that time and thereby all traffic of that period."'' 80 For
the second set of messages, the analysis is no less sparse: "Presumably
would assist in breaking codes in use during period. Many similar
examples are interspread [sic] throughout this volume. ' 8'
The use of the word "presumably" in each statement seems poorly
calculated to convince a court that an injunction against publication was
177 The unusual hearing before Chief Judge Bazelon is discussed supra note 97 and text
accompanying notes 95-97.
78 Special Appendix Relating to In Camera Proceedings and Sealed Exhibits Submitted
by Appellant United States, United States v. New York Times Co., No. 71-1617 (2d Cir.
1971) (filed under seal on June 21, 1971) [hereinafter Special Appendix]. The United
States Attorney for the Southern District of New York sought permission to file the
Special Appendix on June 21, 1971, when counsel for the parties appeared before a panel
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and were informed that the
court had scheduled an en banc argument for the next day. Transcript of Proceedings,
United States v. New York Times Co. (June 21, 1971), at 3, 6-7, reprinted in 2 GOODALE
COMPILATION, supra note 9, at 869-80. United States Attorney Seymour proposed to file
a document that would "call the Court's attention to particular portions of this very
voluminous top secret study." Id. at 6. Since the Government's proposed submissions
took the form of affidavits, Professor Bickel, counsel for The New York Times, objected
that this would give the Government "a second bite of the apple." Id. at 7. In response,
Seymour conceded that "the fellows who prepared these affidavits, these officials, have
explained why they point to these pages, so that technically it is an affidavit and could
be construed as testimony." Id. at 8. Chief Judge Henry J. Friendly stated that the court
"would view any additional characterizations as improper," but that a brief that said
"please look at X, Y or Z" could be of great assistance to the court. Id. at 9. As filed,
the Special Appendix consisted of a five-page summary of the testimony in the in camera
proceedings before Judge Gurfein, followed by a fifteen-page "analysis of the significant
portions of the Top Secret study on Vietnam, the publication of which would seriously
damage the national security of the United States." Special Appendix at 1.
"' See supra note 19.
'80 Special Appendix, supra note 178, at 12.
"81 Id. The volume referred to is VI-C-4, the last of the four negotiating volumes.
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warranted. If the National Security Agency is not willing to say that
publication "will" or at least "is likely to" make U.S. communications
vulnerable to decryption, it is hard to see how a court could properly
authorize an injunction. It appears that the elliptical phrasing in the Special
Appendix was not inadvertent, since there could be no serious claim that
quotations from cable traffic would actually give any advantage to those
nations seeking to read the cables without authorization. Former Solicitor
General Griswold has disclosed that the Director of the National Security
Agency told him that there was no risk because "there was a separate
code for each message, that printing a plain text of a telegram would help
to break the code for that message, and that, of course, was of no
importance, since the plain text of the message was already available."
1 82
The Solicitor General communicated this concession to the Supreme Court
in unmistakable terms when he filed the Secret Brief, and perhaps he felt
a need to do so since the portions of the Special Appendix quoted above
had suggested that U.S. codes might indeed be at risk.'83
112 GRISWOLD MEMOIRS, supra note 18, at 303-04. The fact that publication of the
messages would not in any way jeopardize U.S. codes is further confirmed by the fact that
three of the four messages referred to in the Special Appendix were later released by the
Government and published. See NEGOTIATING VOLUMES, supra note 53, at 601 (Saigon
Embassy message 10856); 602-03 (Saigon Embassy message 12247); 629-32 (Department
of State message 213389 to Oslo). The fourth message was deleted by the Government
when it released the negotiating volumes. Id. at 628-29 (Oslo message 4531 to Secretary
of State).
183 The affidavits and testimony presented by the Government were much more
detailed in the District of Columbia litigation than in the Times case in the Southern
District of New York. The explanation for the disparity is to be found in the tight shackles
placed on the government witnesses and trial attorneys in New York by officials from the
Department of Defense and the Department of State. The United States Attorney for
the Southern District of New York has stated that, "Impossible as it may be to believe,
the Defense and State Department representatives simply would not explain to the
government lawyers which of the documents in the forty-seven volumes of the Pentagon
Papers presented specific risks to national security, although they were absolutely positive
that such documents existed." SEYMOUR, supra note 18, at 199. The Special Appendix
filed in the Second Circuit represented an effort by the Government to shore up the
relatively weak showing it had made before Judge Gurfein, though on the matter of
NSA's activities the Special Appendix was itself contradicted by the Secret Brief. Sanford
Ungar has offered another explanation for the fatal gaps which existed in the
Government's evidence:
One reporter close to the case suggested later that the military experts had refrained
from telling what they were genuinely most worried about as a potential security
threat in the Papers. "The spooks didn't trust even the government lawyers," he
said. "The generals probably could have come up with some devastating stuff in
the Pentagon Papers if they tried harder and trusted the people they had to tell."
UNGAR, supra note 11, at 222; see SCHRAG, supra note 11, at 223. But see SALISBURY,
supra note 11, at 327 ("Lack of trust in the government lawyers seems to have existed;
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The newly-released material from pages eight and nine of the Secret
Brief indicates that the National Security Agency was concerned that its
interception activities would be harmed by publication of the Pentagon
Papers. If NSA provided any specification, however, it must be contained
in the two paragraphs that remain classified.1
84
It is unfortunate that Item Ten is not available for review in its entirety.
However, it appears doubtful that the argument pertaining to Item Ten
would substantially alter the analysis offered here. Both district judges who
heard all the evidence rejected the Government's allegations that NSA's
activities would be threatened by publication. In addition, Item Ten is
given tenth place on a list of eleven items, while the four negotiating
volumes, which by consensus are considered to have contained the most
sensitive material, were listed first. Perhaps any concerns about code-
breaking were subordinated to those relating to the negotiating volumes
and other alleged security problems because, even if accepted by the
Supreme Court, they would have justified an injunction against a very
small portion of the forty-seven volumes. 85 In any event, whatever the
precise nature of the additional arguments presented by the Solicitor
General in the two paragraphs deleted at the end of Item Ten, the Supreme
that genuine security items were concealed in the Papers seemed less and less likely with
the passage of years and extensive scrutiny of the Papers.").
184 According to James Bamford, NSA's real concern was that publication of the
Papers might cripple a highly successful U.S. effort at intercepting Soviet
communications:
Code-named Gamma Gupy, the operation involved eavesdropping on Soviet
government leaders by intercepting their scrambled radio-telephone conversations
as they traveled around Moscow in their limousines.... What started teeth rattling
at NSA was that some of Brezhnev's conversations had been referred to, without
their origin being identified, in one of the volumes that was reported to have been
given to the Soviet embassy but was never printed in the Times.
The fears seemed to be confirmed when, immediately after the Papers were
reported to be in Russian hands, the intercepts became much more mundane.
BAMFORD, supra note 95, at 283. Bamford further states that The New York Times
assured NSA that it would not reveal details from the Papers (such as the time of
intercepted communications) that would alert foreign governments to the fact that their
communications systems had been penetrated. Id. at 287.
85 As discussed in note 175 supra, the proceedings before Judge Gesell referred
particularly to one message alleged to pose a threat to the electronic interceptions
conducted by the United States, and there were allegations that the publication of the
"time groups" of messages could be harmful, but the Post disclaimed any intention to
publish that information. See supra note 175. Judge James L. Oakes, who participated in
the Pentagon Papers litigation as a judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, has revealed that, while voting to deny the injunction sought by the
Government, he "had some doubts about one cable proposed for publication." Oakes,
supra note 7, at 503. Judge Oakes did not state whether his concerns related to NSA
activities or to some other matter.
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Court found them insufficient to warrant any further injunction against the
newspapers. 
8 6
The Supreme Court's refusal to approve an injunction against
publication of Item Ten is easily understood if one reviews pages eight
through ten of the secret brief filed by The Washington Post in the
Supreme Court. While this brief was filed simultaneously with the Solicitor
General's brief, and thus could not answer it directly, the brief presents a
devastating rebuttal to the affidavit filed in the D.C. litigation by Admiral
Gaylor, the Director of NSA. 187 Apparently, Admiral Gaylor attempted to
identify only three passages that were alleged to have the potential to
expose U.S. code-breaking successes: one passage was a report of a
division-sized troop movement; the other two involved quotations from the
summary of the command and control study of the Gulf of Tonkin
116 An additional reason for doubting that sensitive code-related information was
contained in the Papers is the fact that none of the material carried any designation
beyond "Top Secret." A document containing information derived from electronic
intercepts or pertaining to codes is precisely the sort of material that is safeguarded by the
assignment of code words if disclosure would put at risk the NSA's electronic
interception programs. The intelligence produced from the NSA's intercepts is labeled
"HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY" (with "COMINT" referring to
communications intelligence, which is within the broader category of information known
as "SIGINT"-signals intelligence). BAMFORD, supra note 95, at 119. "Once a
document is so marked, it is automatically elevated to a status higher than top secret; it
is restricted to those few holding a final top secret special intelligence clearance and
indoctrinated into the tight-lipped world of SIGINT." Id. at 119-20. Access to such
documents is further limited by the assignment of such code words as "TOP SECRET
UMBRA" and "SECRET SPOKE". Id. at 120; JEFFREY RICHELSON, THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY 316-17 (1985).
Essentially, each code word is a separate, highly specialized entity. . . . Each
requires separate briefings, indoctrination, and oaths. Often a document contains
references to a number of operations and sources and carries a stupefying
classification like TOP SECRET UMBRA GAMMA GANT HOLYSTONE DESKTOP. In such
a case the reader would have to be cleared and certified for each category.
BAMFORD, supra note 95, at 120-21. This is precisely the system described in more
general terms by former CIA Director Stansfield Turner in the material quoted above in
note 54.
What is striking is the fact that nothing in the Pentagon Papers was classified beyond
Top Secret or assigned any code word indicating that signals intelligence was involved.
The absence of such precautions strongly suggests that, contrary to the Government's
assertions, the Pentagon Papers presented no risk to the activities of NSA. One other
explanation cannot be completely excluded, though it seems highly unlikely. Perhaps
information which should have been classified beyond Top Secret was not so classified
only because of errors. There is no reason to believe that underclassification mistakes of
this sort could become so pervasive that nothing in the 47 volumes of documents would
be assigned a code word, if indeed signals intelligence product was reproduced in the
Papers.
87 Post's Secret Brief, supra note 97, at 8-10.
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incident. 88 The Post pointed out that intelligence concerning movement of
a division might well come from sources other than electronic intercepts,
and that the intercepts that had occurred in the Gulf of Tonkin were
already well known. 89 The only other matters as to which Admiral Gaylor
raised any objection concerned descriptions of U.S. cooperation with the
South Vietnamese on interception activities. To show how innocuous the
disputed passages were, the Post's lawyers reproduced them all on less
than one page of their sealed brief.' 90
11. Prisoners of War
The entire discussion of Item Eleven in the Secret Brief reads as
follows:
Finally, reference should be made to prisoners of war.
We are currently engaged in discussions on the prisoner of
war issue, in some cases with governments which are not
wholly friendly, such as Sweden and Russia. It is obvious
that these conversations are conducted on the understanding
that they will be confidential, and they are not very likely
to be fruitful if that confidence is broken. This is covered
by the oral testimony of Mr. Doolin in both cases.
There is one of these in particular which it is very likely
that we will not be able to proceed further with as a result
of the publication of the papers which has already been
made by the New York Times and the Washington Post.
The longer prisoners are held, the more will die. 91
The concerns raised in Item Eleven seem similar to those stated in Item
One. Each item relates to ongoing negotiations that could greatly benefit
the United States if successfully concluded, and in both cases the
negotiations allegedly were threatened by publication of descriptions of
earlier stages of the negotiations or of earlier negotiations similar to the
ongoing efforts. 192 The discussion of Item Eleven, however, like the earlier
treatment of Item One, never identified particular negotiations that were
188 Id. at 8-9.
189 See supra notes 97, 175.
190 Post's Secret Brief, supra note 97, at 10. Although the Post's brief reproduced
these passages in full, deletions have been made by the Government in the version of the
brief that is available for public review.
' Secret Brief, supra note 9, at 10.
192 Id. at 4-5, 10.
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jeopardized or established any direct, immediate link between the intended
publication and the feared consequences.
9 3
B. Additional Arguments by the Solicitor General
Although the Secret Brief discusses only eleven items contained in the
Pentagon Papers, several additional arguments are presented at the end of
the brief. First, the brief argues that, despite the extensive powers available
to the President to protect the confidentiality of information that, if
disclosed, has the capacity to threaten national security, "there will
inevitably be weak spots in any system."' 194 The Secret Brief argues that
when such weak spots occur, "the Presidency is powerless to provide the
required protection except with the aid of the courts."' 95 The second
concluding argument refers to messages received by the United States from
Iran and Great Britain, in which each nation expressed concern over the
publication of information pertaining to confidential diplomatic
exchanges. 96 Finally, the Secret Brief concludes with a rhetorical flourish:
This is a great and free country. It must remain a great
and free country.... The Constitution should be construed
in such a way as genuinely to preserve a free press, while
likewise leaving to the Presidency the protection which it
requires for the free flow of information from foreign
'9' The Secret Brief refers to the testimony of Dennis J. Doolin, Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, but that testimony, which was not
summarized for the Supreme Court in the Secret Brief, did not establish that failure of
ongoing negotiations concerning prisoners of war would be directly caused by publication
of the Pentagon Papers. Doolin had filed an affidavit in the District of Columbia litigation
alleging that countries which "have helped us with Hanoi on behalf of our men" would
be embarrassed by revelation of their past involvement, and that they might well refuse
to help in the future. Affidavit of Dennis J. Doolin at 3, United States v. Washington Post
Co. (D.D.C.), at 3. In his testimony before Judge Gesell, Doolin stated that there was a
"possibility" that some of the countries that had acted as intermediaries in the past
would be embarrassed if their involvement were to be disclosed. D.C. Transcript, supra
note 172, at 116.
194 Secret Brief, supra note 9, at 11.
'9 Id. The Secret Brief coyly observes that the "Federal Judiciary has been referred
to as 'the least dangerous branch.' " Id. at 10. There is no citation, but the Solicitor
General plainly intended to refer to the book written by counsel for the Times.
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962).
196 The Secret Brief quotes a telegram sent by the American ambassador to "a friendly
country." Secret Brief, supra note 9, at 11-12. While the brief does not identify the
country involved, the State Department has released the full text of the telegram, which
indicates that the country was Iran. Telegram from U.S. Ambassador Douglas MacArthur
2d, Tehran, to the U.S. Department of State, Washington, D.C., June 25, 1971.
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nations and for the free development of thought and ideas
between the President and his immediate advisers.'97
V. THE ORAL ARGUMENT IN PENTAGON PAPERS
Few of the oral arguments before the United States Supreme Court can
match the drama of the argument that took place when the Pentagon
Papers case was called on the morning of Saturday, June 26, 1971.1"98 Not
only had the controversy been front-page news at every stage of the
litigation, but the proceedings in the district courts and the courts of
appeals had moved at such a brisk pace, and in such a cloud of uncertainty
as to the scope of the matters in dispute and the evidence bearing on them,
that oral argument offered the parties the opportunity finally to clarify their
positions. The drama was further heightened by the Government's last-
'97 Secret Brief, supra note 9, at 12-13.
'98 Professor Charles Alan Wright has described Pentagon Papers as the most dramatic
case that Erwin Griswold argued as Solicitor General. Charles Alan Wright, 'A Man May
Live Greatly in the Law ", 70 TEx. L. REV. 505, 512 (1991) (book review of Griswold's
memoirs). Griswold himself has said it was his toughest argument, Saundra Torry, Erwin
N. Griswold Is the Dean of Supreme Court Observers, WASH. POST, July 15, 1991, at F5,
and that it was "the most spectacular case" in which he appeared. GRISWOLD MEMOIRS,
supra note 18, at 296. Griswold has argued 127 Supreme Court cases, more than any
other living lawyer. Id. At least part of the electricity of the occasion is accessible to those
who take the opportunity to listen to the audio recording of the argument, as Griswold
does every four or five years. Id. at 307.
Even the tape of the Pentagon Papers argument has been the subject of controversy.
The Supreme Court began making audio recordings of the arguments before the Court in
1955. The tapes are used to prepare the official transcript of argument and are then sent
to the National Archives. On June 30, 1981, CBS News broadcast a portion of the tape
of the Pentagon Papers argument in a story commemorating the 10th anniversary of the
Supreme Court's decision in the case. Fred Graham, The Background of the Court's
Secret Tapes ; NAT'L L.J., October 28, 1985, at 1-2 (letter). The correspondent who made
the broadcast stated that this "was the first (and only, to my knowledge) time that the
actual voices of the Justices and counsel in oral arguments had been broadcast on the
air." Id.; see FRED GRAHAM, HAPPY TALK: CONFESSIONS OF A TV NEWSMAN 94-98
(1990). Although the Archives makes the tapes available for educational use, Chief Justice
Burger apparently objected to the use of a tape in a television broadcast and halted the
transfers of tapes from the Supreme Court to the Archives. DAVID M. O'BRIEN, STORM
CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS 153 (2d ed. 1990). When other
Justices learned in 1986 of the Chief Justice's action, they forced a discussion of the
matter in conference, and the deliveries were resumed. Id. Portions of the oral argument
tape in Pentagon Papers have recently been made conveniently available in conjunction
with the publication of edited transcripts of 23 oral arguments before the Supreme Court.
MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT: THE MOST SIGNIFICANT ORAL ARGUMENTS MADE BEFORE
THE SUPREME COURT SINCE 1955 (Peter Irons ed., 1993). Unfortunately, the tape has been
severely edited, with many telling exchanges omitted.
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minute request that at least part of the argument be conducted in camera,
a request that was denied when the Court took the bench. 99
Finally, the drama of the occasion was significantly enhanced by the
identities and the performances of the advocates. For the Government,
Solicitor General Erwin Griswold was a force to be reckoned with by
virtue of his many appearances before the Court, his long service as dean
of Harvard Law School, and his reputation for independence. 20 0 The New
York Times countered with Alexander M. Bickel, Professor of Law at Yale
and one of the country's leading experts on constitutional law and the
Supreme Court.2 1 In the clash of these advocates in a momentous case,
and in the close questioning of them by the Justices, are to be found many
of the final clues necessary to piece together the real meaning of Pentagon
Papers.20 2 Several important themes emerge from the wide-ranging
199 Although it was not known at the time, the Pentagon Papers argument also had the
distinction of being the last one heard by Justices Hugo Black and John M. Harlan. Both
Justices fell sick during the summer and were forced to resign before the Court began its
1971 Term.
200 At times, Griswold would maintain his independent course even while arguing a
case before the Supreme Court. A Supreme Court Justice has been quoted as saying that
"He's like the U.S.S. Griswold. Questions from us just bounce off him harmlessly as he
cruises through his speech." LINCOLN CAPLAN, THE TENTH JUSTICE: THE SOLICITOR
GENERAL AND THE RULE OF LAW 33 (1987). John P. Frank has described the Griswold
style as "American Gothic snowplow." Wright, supra note 195, at 506. Even the author
of a book quite critical of Harvard Law School and of Griswold's long tenure as its dean
labeled him "a giant of legal history, rightfully ranked with Christopher Columbus
Langdell, Roscoe Pound, and James Landis in the small circle of men who most
powerfully left a mark on Harvard Law School and, indirectly, on all American law
schools." JOEL SELIGMAN, THE HIGH CITADEL: THE INFLUENCE OF HARVARD LAW
SCHOOL vii (1978).
20' Perhaps as a bit of psychological warfare against the Government, the Times had
provided its readers with the following description of the TRO proceeding before Judge
Gurfein:
The arguments pitted a 30-year-old staff member of the United States Attorney's
office, Michael D. Hess, against Prof. Alexander M. Bickel of the Yale Law School,
a 46-year-old constitutional authority who has been mentioned as a possible
Supreme Court nominee. Prof. Bickel represented The Times and its personnel.
Fred P. Graham, Judge, at Request of U.S., Halts Times Vietnam Series Four Days
Pending Hearing on Injunction, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 1971, at 1.
202 The Washington Post was represented at oral argument by William R. Glendon of
the firm of Royall, Koegel & Wells. Glendon was not as experienced as Griswold and
Bickel in constitutional law matters, and his exchanges with the Justices did not match the
intensity of those the Justices had with Griswold and Bickel. Perhaps the Post would have
been better able to hold its own in the argument if Edward Bennett Williams had been
able to argue the case, as he was asked to do by Post Executive Editor Benjamin Bradlee.
EvAN THOMAS, THE MAN TO SEE: EDWARD BENNETTr WILLIAMS-ULTIMATE INSIDER;
LEGENDARY TRIAL LAWYER 266 (1992). Williams was in the middle of a trial in Chicago
and did not feel that he could obtain an adjournment without damaging his client's case.
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exchanges between the Solicitor General and the Justices. 2°3 First, the
Solicitor General placed great emphasis on the Secret Brief as presenting
the Government's strongest claims for an injunction. 20 4 Griswold conceded
that the designation of sensitive items that the Government had filed the
previous day was "much too broad. ' 205 While not willing to abandon all
of the additional items listed in the Special Appendix that the Government
had filed in the Second Circuit, Griswold made it clear that he had
personally selected the eleven 20 6 items discussed in the Secret Brief and
that he had not had an opportunity to look at all of the items listed in the
Special Appendix:
[MR. GRISWOLD:]
To the best of my knowledge, based on what was told
me yesterday afternoon by the concerned persons, the ten
items in my closed brief are the ones on which we most
rely. But I have not seen a great many of the other items in
the special appendix for sheer lack of time.20 7
The second theme developed by Solicitor General Griswold was the
great difficulty that the Government was facing because of its lack of
precise knowledge of what documents the newspapers possessed and
because of the pace of the litigation.20 ' Griswold emphasized that the
hearings below had been directed merely to the question of the propriety
of preliminary injunctions and did not constitute full trials on the merits. 209
He further argued that there "simply was not time to prepare a
comprehensive listing, or a comprehensive array, of expert witnesses.
' 21 °
He also stated that the Government had been relying on the fact that the
Id. Soon after, the Post hired the Williams firm to represent it in place of Royall, Koegel
& Wells. Id. at 268; FELSENTHAL, supra note 88, at 305.
203 The Court allowed two hours for argument. Griswold argued first, followed by
Bickel and then Glendon. Griswold then presented a rebuttal.
204 See supra text accompanying note 20.
205 ORAL ARGUMENT TRANSCRIPT, supra note 20, at 218-19.
206 During argument, the Solicitor General incorrectly referred to the number of items
in the Secret Brief as "ten." Id. at 220.
207 Id. at 220. Many of the items listed in the Special Appendix that were not included
in the Secret Brief were later published in either the Gravel Edition or the G.P.O.
Edition of the Papers, or both. See supra note 158.
208 As Griswold put it at one point, "We don't know now- never have known-what
the papers have." ORAL ARGUMENT TRANSCRIPT, supra note 20, at 218.
209 Id. at 258.
210 id.
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district judge would examine the study itself, which he stated the judge in
the Times case had refused to do.21" '
The third major topic developed by Griswold was the standard that he
asserted should govern the case and how he perceived that standard to
depart from that propounded by the newspapers. Griswold noted that his
opponents had not argued that no injunction against disclosure could ever
be permitted by the First Amendment. Rather, he said, the newspapers
agreed that "an injunction would be permissible in this case if the dis-
closure of this material would in fact pose a grave and immediate danger
to the security of the United States." '212 Although Griswold, in response
to a question from the bench, conceded that his case depended on the
claim "that the disclosure of this information would result in an 'im-
mediate grave threat to the security of the United States of America,' ",213
as the argument developed it became clear that the burden of proving
"immediacy" was not one that the Government would willingly shoulder,
or one that it was confident it could meet:
[T]he materials specified in my closed brief will, as I have
tried to argue there, materially affect the security of the
United States. It will affect lives. It will affect the process
of the termination of the war. It will affect the process of
recovering prisoners of war. I cannot say that the termina-
tion of the war, or recovering prisoners of war, is some-
thing which has an "immediate" effect on the security of
the United States. I say that it has such an effect on the
security of the United States that it ought to be the basis of
an injunction in this case.214
At oral argument, Justice Stewart questioned the Solicitor General on this point,
pointing out that the judge being referred to, Judge Gurfein in the Southern District of
New York, "didn't 'refuse' to. He failed to. He didn't have time to" review all the
volumes. Id.
212 Id. at 217.
213 Id. at 222.
214 Id. at 228. The open brief filed by the Government was similarly ambivalent on the
question of the immediacy of harm. The brief argued that an injunction would be proper
to enjoin "[a]rticles [t]hat [p]ose a [g]rave and [i]mmediate [d]anger to the [s]ecurity of
the United States," Brief for the United States at 7, reprinted in LANDMARK BRIEFS,
supra note 9, at 117, and then suggested that "immediate" should be construed to mean
"irreparable" in matters related to diplomacy:
The standard adopted by the Second Circuit is that of "grave and immediate"
danger to national security. Since the effect of particular action upon diplomatic
relations may be extremely severe in the long run even though its immediate impact
is not clear or great, we believe that, insofar as this standard involves the conduct
of foreign affairs, the word "immediate" should be construed to mean "ir-
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In concluding his argument, Solicitor General Griswold objected to the
"immediacy" requirement as applied by Judge Gesell:
[11n the modem world, the standard that Judge Gesell
applied is just too narrow. And, as I have said, that the
standard should be "great and irreparable harm to the
security of the United States."
In the whole diplomatic area the things don't happen at
8:15 tomorrow morning. It may be weeks, or months.2t 5
The last important component of the Solicitor General's argument was
an attempt to apply his proposed standard of "great and irreparable
harm" to the facts of the case as set out in his Secret Brief. Again and
again, Griswold suggested that diplomatic matters were at the top of the
Government's list of sensitive materials. Although Griswold could not be
more specific in open court, he was undoubtedly referring to Item One in
the Secret Brief when he told the Court that there were four related
volumes dealing with one subject, "the broaching of which to the entire
world at this time would be of extraordinary seriousness to the security of
the United States." '216 The Solicitor General made a number of other
specific references to diplomatic concerns, almost to the exclusion of any
other alleged danger to national security.2"7 And, when he wrapped up his
rebuttal and prepared to sit down, he returned to the assertion that the
foreign relations of the United States would be seriously damaged by
publication:
reparable." Indeed, in the delicate area of foreign relations frequently it is
impossible to show that something would pose an "immediate" danger to national
security, even though the long-run effect upon such security would be grave and
irreparable.
Id. at 9. The Government's open brief is reprinted in 71 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note
9, at 117-46.
215 ORAL ARGUMENT TRANSCRIPT, supra note 20, at 231. Despite his resistance to an
immediacy requirement, Griswold later argued that "if properly classified materials are
improperly acquired, and ... it can be shown that they do have an immediate, or current
impact, on the security of the United States ... there ought to be an injunction." Id. at
257.
216 Id. at 221. Griswold added: "And, as I say, that is covered in my closed brief and
I am not free to say more about it." Id. If Griswold's motion for a closed argument had
been granted he would have been able to inform the Court more directly about the injuries
that the Government alleged would result from publication.
217 See id. at 229 ("[I]t is perfectly obvious that the conduct of delicate negotiations
now in process, or contemplated for the future has an impact on the security of the United
States."); id. at 230 (referring to SALT talks).
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I believe, and have sought to show in the closed brief
which is filed here, that there are materials in-there are
items in this material which will affect the problem of the
termination of the war in Vietnam, which will affect
negotiations such as the SALT talks, which affect the se-
curity of the United States vitally over a long period, and
which will affect the problem of return of prisoners of war.
And I suggest that, however it is formulated, the standard
ought to be one which will make it possible to prevent the
publication of materials which will have those conse-
quences.218
Oral argument for The New York Times was presented by Alexander
Bickel, and Professor Bickel's exchanges with the Justices are nothing
short of entrancing. As with the Solicitor General, the Justices felt free to
engage in a wide-ranging interrogation with the confidence that they would
receive thoughtful responses from an advocate capable of engaging them
as an equal on matters of constitutional law.21 9 Much of Bickel's argument
was based on the fact that in Pentagon Papers the Government was acting
under a claim of inherent presidential authority, since there was no statute
that authorized the Executive to seek a prior restraint on publication.
218 Id. at 260.
219 The respectful reception he received in the Supreme Court might have come as a
welcome relief to Professor Bickel, who was treated harshly in his argument before the
Second Circuit. Bickel's co-counsel Floyd Abrams has referred to that appearance as
Bickel's "most trying and least successful argument of the entire Pentagon Papers case."
Abrams, supra note 18, at 78. See also UNGAR, supra note 11, at 197 ("Bickel fumbled
and was continually harassed by Chief Judge Henry J. Friendly.").
220 Professor Bickel placed great emphasis on the argument that a well-drawn statute
could provide authority for issuance of an injunction against publication in circumstances
where the President could not properly obtain an injunction under his Article II authority
alone. See ORAL ARGUMENT TRANSCRIPT, supra note 20, at 236 ("I would demand less
of the statute than I would demand of the President."). In Pentagon Papers, the only
statutes directly relevant were those authorizing criminal prosecution of those committing
espionage, see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 793(e), which several Justices indicated might be applied
to punish publication of the Papers after the fact. See Edgar & Schmidt, The Espionage
Statutes and Publication of Defense Information, supra note 15; Edgar & Schmidt,
Curtiss-Wright Comes Home, supra note 23. In Pentagon Papers, the Government had
initially placed considerable emphasis on the espionage statutes as allegedly providing a
basis for enjoining publication of the Papers, but Judge Gurfein found them inapplicable,
328 F. Supp. at 328-30, and the Government did not pursue the issue on appeal. The
existence of a statute specifically designed to prevent disclosure of secret information
about nuclear weapons was asserted by the Government to be a significant distinction
between Pentagon Papers and the Progressive case. Like Pentagon Papers, the
Progressive case ended without any definitive resolution of the issues revolving around
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However, Bickel did take issue directly with the Solicitor General on the
question of the standard that the Government would need to meet in order
to justify a prior restraint.
Griswold had strenuously, if not entirely consistently, rejected the
notion that the Government was obligated to show that serious harm to
national interests would flow immediately from publication of the disputed
documents. Bickel responded by emphasizing that immediacy of harm was
built into Chief Justice Hughes' classic example in Near v. Minnesota22'
of a troop ship threatened by disclosure of its sailing date.222 Bickel
pointed out that Griswold was resisting the use of the word
"immediate, '2 23 and Bickel urged the Court to insist that "the link,
between the fact of publication and the feared danger-the feared
event-be direct, and immediate, and visible. ' 224 Bickel asserted that all
that the Government had ever done to meet its burden was to present fears
couched "in terms of effect on diplomatic relations," a category of injury
that he argued "does not meet any possible First Amendment
standard.- 225 Bickel then focused on the critical differences between his
proposed formulation of the constitutional standard and that argued for by
the Government:
[The feared effect on diplomatic relations] doesn't meet
[the First Amendment's requirements] either in the
statement of the seriousness of the event that's feared, or
what is more important and more obvious in this case, in
the drawing of the link between the act of publication as
the cause of that event, and the event that is feared. That
link is always, I suggest, speculative, full of surmises, and
a chain of causations that after its first one or two links gets
involved with other causes operating in the same area. So
that what finally causes the ultimate event becomes
impossible in saying which the effective cause was. And the
standard that I would propose under the First Amendment
would not be satisfied by such showing.
the presence or absence of specific congressional authorization for prior restraints. See
supra notes 37, 46. In the Pentagon Papers controversy itself, the Government attempted
to utilize the espionage statute against Daniel Ellsberg and Anthony Russo (though not
against the newspapers), but the prosecution was dismissed because of government
misconduct. See SCHRAG, supra note 11, at 329-57.
22' 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
222 Id. at 716.
223 ORAL ARGUMENT TRANSCRIPT, supra note 20, at 234.
224 Id. at 237.




And your standard is that it has to be an extremely
grave event to the Nation; and it has to be directly,
proximately caused by the publication?
MR. BICKEL:
That's exactly correct.226
A few minutes later, Justice Stewart launched a series of questions that
forced Professor Bickel to concede that even an isolated incident of loss
of life would be of sufficient gravity to warrant an injunction if publication
threatened directly and immediately to bring about such damage:
[JUSTICE STEWART:]
Let us assume that when the members of the Court go back
and open up this sealed record, we find something there
that absolutely convinces us that its disclosure would result
in the sentencing to death of 100 young men whose only
offense had been that they were 19 years old, and had low
draft numbers. What would we do? ... I suppose that in a
great big global picture this is no-this is not a national
threat. . . . There are at least 25 Americans killed in
Vietnam every week, these days.
MR. BICKEL:
No, sir, but I meant it's a case in which the chain of
causation between the act of publication and the feared
event-the death of these 100 young men-is obvious,
direct, immediate-
[JUSTICE STEWART:]
That's what I'm assuming in my hypothetical case. ...
You would say the Constitution requires that it be
published, and that these men die? Is that it?
MR. BICKEL:
No. No, I'm afraid I'd have-I'm afraid my inclina-
tions of humanity overcome the somewhat more abstract
devotion to the First Amendment, in a case of that sort.227
226 ORAL ARGUMENT TRANSCRIPT, supra note 20, at 238.
227 Id. at 239-40. The potential significance of Professor Bickel's concession was not
lost on the attorneys for the amici who were supporting the newspapers' position. In an
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Professor Bickel, upon further questioning by Justice Stewart, confirmed
that the feared event did not have to be of a "cosmic nature," and that
the troop ship example given in Near was comparable to Justice Stewart's
example of a threat to 100 men.228
VI. THE BOUNDARIES OF PENTAGON PAPERS
Using the Secret Brief filed by the Solicitor General, the very pointed
exchanges between Griswold and Bickel on the one hand, and the Justices
on the other, and the opinions written by the Justices in Pentagon Papers,
it is now possible to delineate the boundaries of the case with much
greater precision than before.
Upon examination of the Secret Brief it becomes clear that prior efforts
to consider the nature of the material involved have been conducted
without adequate recognition of the widely varying types of security claims
that the Government was asserting. For example, Professor Rudenstine has
argued that the Government's effort to obtain an injunction in Pentagon
Papers "has been discounted because of the general assumption that the
administration's allegations of harm were general and not supported by
specific references to the classified documents in dispute. It turns out that
both assumptions are false. ' 229 In fact, as the discussion of the Secret
Brief above illustrates, the eleven items principally relied on by the
Solicitor General fit no common profile. Some were couched in such
general terms as to be inadequate to demonstrate any likelihood of damage
to the national security.23° Others were highly specific, but dealt with
extraordinary motion filed later on June 26, after oral argument, they sought to file a
memorandum containing an alternative response to the hypothetical. They argued that the
hypothetical "must be answered in a totally different manner" and that "the answer is,
painfully but simply, that the right of a free people to deternine its destiny has been, and
should continue to be, paramount to any attempt by the government to impinge upon,
erode, or ultimately destroy the right of the people to know." Motion of Amicae Curiae
to File Joint Post-Argument Memorandum, along with Proposed Memorandum, filed by
Kristin Booth Glen (for the National Emergency Civil Liberties Committee), Norman
Dorsen (for the American Civil Liberties Union), and Thomas Emerson (for 27
Congressmen), New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). It appears
that the motion was not acted upon by the Court. Professor Emerson's classic article on
prior restraint appears to have taken a less absolutist position. Thomas I. Emerson, The
Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 648, 661 (1955) (Near's "war
exception rests upon peculiar factors of obvious weight").
228 ORAL ARGUMENT TRANSCRIPT, supra note 20, at 240.
229 Rudenstine, supra note 19, at 1899.
230 The Secret Brief's discussion of Item Three, for example, states that the Papers
contain references "to the names and activities of CIA agents still active in Southeast
Asia" and "to the activities of the National Security Agency." No details are given.
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disclosures likely to be dismissed as trivial.2 3' A few others, particularly
Item One-the four negotiating volumes-did have a substantiality to them
that no doubt caused the Justices to evaluate them seriously. Any effort to
discuss these highly divergent claims as if they were similar is bound to
come up short.
As Professor Rudenstine states, the Government's claims in Pentagon
Papers have been dismissed as being uniformly flawed by lack of
specificity.232 It turns out that some of the items relied on in the Secret
Brief suffered from that infirmity, but others did not. Likewise, some of
the items were reasonably well supported by testimony or affidavits, while
others were not. Some items were plausible or even convincing in their
predictions of harm to the interests of the United States, while others could
be dismissed out of hand.
In surveying the boundaries of Pentagon Papers, I propose to proceed
as the Supreme Court undoubtedly did-by focusing on the strongest
claims asserted by the Government. To the extent that the claims that
publication of a particular item would cause damage to national security
may easily be dismissed as too general, trivial, or unsupported, the
Supreme Court's denial of an injunction tells us little or nothing about the
First Amendment principles being applied by the Court. However, in order
to enter the judgment that it did, which lifted all restraints on publication
of the information contained in the Pentagon Papers,233 the Supreme Court
must have concluded that even the strongest claims advanced by the
United States were insufficient to warrant further restraint on publication.
It is in identifying the apparent reasons that those items could not be
enjoined that the core of Pentagon Papers will be exposed.
131 Item Five, for example, amounted to no more than a few sentences describing
possible Soviet responses to U.S. escalation, including: sending of limited numbers of
volunteers, breaking off negotiations with the United States, or suspending agreements in
effect with the United States. All of these would be obvious possible ways in which the
Soviets could manifest opposition to escalation by the United States.
232 For example, in granting the preliminary injunction requested in the Progressive
case, the district judge stated that in Pentagon Papers "the Supreme Court agreed with
the lower court that no cogent reasons were advanced by the Government as to why the
article affected national security except that publication might cause some embarrassment
to the United States." United States v. The Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990, 994
(W.D. Wis. 1979). Contrary to Judge Warren's assertion, the Government's claims in
Pentagon Papers were couched in terms of predicted injury to the national defense and
foreign relations of the United States, not in terms of possible embarrassment.
233 The newspapers also possessed materials not included in the Pentagon Papers study.
For example, The New York Times had a copy of the summary of the command and
control study of the Gulf of Tonkin incidents. 1 GOODALE COMPILATION, supra note 9,.
at 292, 294.
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The scope of the national security claims seriously advanced by the
Solicitor General in the Supreme Court was much narrower than has
previously been recognized. For all of the talk about the "massive" and
"unprecedented" size of the body of classified material contained in the
Papers, it was eventually conceded by the Government that most of the
documents deserved to be declassified.234 Thus, even as it was reversing
Judge Gurfein and remanding the New York case for further proceedings,
the Second Circuit ruled that an injunction against publication would
remain in effect only for the documents as to which the Government
advanced a specific security claim.235 Similarly, Judge Wilkey's dissent in
the D.C. Circuit argued only that the Government should be allowed
another opportunity to prove that portions of the Papers would damage
national security if published; he conceded that the bulk of the material
could not be suppressed.236 The suggestions that there were relatively few
portions of the Papers that even arguably had the potential to damage
national security were confirmed to a significant degree when, after the
conclusion of the litigation, the Government Printing Office published most
of the forty-seven-volume study, including many of the items identified in
the Special Appendix filed in the Second Circuit.
237
After careful examination of the Secret Brief and related materials, it
appears that the Government's strongest claim-and perhaps its only
serious claim-concerned the possible damage to the foreign relations of
the United States that might be caused by publication of Item One, the
four negotiating volumes. Item Eleven, concerning the prisoner-of-war
issue, may fairly be considered as an adjunct of Item One, since it raised
precisely the same concern in the P.O.W. context that Item One raised
with regard to the negotiations designed to end the war; in each case, the
Government asserted that nations that had served as useful intermediaries
between the United States and Hanoi would refuse to provide any further
assistance if their roles were revealed.
234 Former President Richard Nixon has termed the Pentagon Papers "the most
massive leak of classified documents in American history," while conceding that
Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird "felt that over 95 percent of the material could be
declassified." NIXON, supra note 17, at 508, 509.
235 United States v. New York Times Co., 444 F.2d 544 (2d Cir. 1971) (stay issued
by the court of appeals would be vacated on June 25, except as to the items listed in the
Special Appendix or any additional items identified by the Government as posing "grave
and immediate danger of the security of the United States").
236 United States v. Washington Post Co., 446 F.2d 1327, 1329 (D.C. Cir. 1971)
(Wilkey, J., dissenting) ("I would affirm the action of the trial court in not restraining
the publication of the vast majority of these documents."); id. at 1331.
237 By the time the G.P.O. Edition was published, the Gravel Edition had already
appeared, rendering moot some of the security claims raised by the Government. See
supra notes 9, 158.
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For purposes of the analysis that follows, Items One and Eleven will
be considered to constitute the most serious threat to national security
identified by the Government in Pentagon Papers, and the other nine items
will be put aside. Item Ten was a weak claim so far as the released
portions of the Secret Brief go, but since two paragraphs discussing that
Item have not yet been released, definitive analysis is not possible.238 Items
Two and Three, while they concerned matters of considerable importance,
were presented at such a high level of generality that there was simply no
way for the Supreme Court to assess their weight.239 Items Four through
Nine were all identified with great particularity, but involved small
amounts of information with little or no apparent potential to damage
240thnational security. Unless the Government could prevail on Items One
and Eleven, it is inconceivable that any of the snippets of information
contained in Items Four through Nine would be considered by the Supreme
Court to pose such a grave threat to the Nation's interests as to justify an
injunction.
For these reasons, this analysis will follow the priorities set by Solicitor
General Griswold, with the negotiating volumes treated as the principal
security concern on which the Government relied. The reality of Pentagon
Papers as it was presented to the Supreme Court may be starkly put: if
there was no proper basis for suppressing publication of the negotiating
volumes, then the newspapers were entitled to be free of any further
restraint on their publication of the Papers.
241
Under Justice Stewart's formulation, which is generally considered to
identify the common ground on which a majority of the Justices agreed,
an injunction is proper only if disclosures "will surely result in direct,
immediate, and irreparable damage to our Nation or its people.
' 242
Accordingly, an injunction against publication of national defense
information is proper if and only if (1) the threatened injury is of an
appropriate nature and expected magnitude; (2) the threatened injury will
238 For the reasons discussed supra text accompanying notes 184-90, it is unlikely that
the case for enjoining Item Ten was any stronger than that presented with regard to Item
One.
239 See supra text accompanying notes 152-54.
240 As discussed supra text accompanying notes 156-68, Items Five through Nine were
all published in their entirety in the Gravel Edition of the Papers. Portions of Item Four,
which concerned various SEATO contingency plans, were published, but others were not.
241 Michael D. Hess, the former Assistant United States Attorney who represented the
Government in the New York litigation, has stated that "the only real issue" concerned
the negotiating volumes. SALISBURY, supra note 11, at 319. Likewise, Floyd Abrams, one
of the attorneys for the Times, has observed that "the core of the Government's case was
based not upon potential military dangers but upon possible diplomatic harm." Abrams,
supra note 18, at 25.
242 New York Times Co., 403 U.S. at 730.
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"surely" occur; and (3) the threatened injury will follow directly and
immediately from publication. By considering each of these elements in
turn, using as a reference point the allegations made about the negotiating
volumes, the boundaries of Pentagon Papers may be traced. In addition,
an effort will be made to determine what alterations, if any, need to be
made in the analysis of the case to take account of the fact that the
negotiating volumes on which the Solicitor General placed such great
emphasis were not, it turns out, in the hands of the Times or the Post.
Former Solicitor General Griswold has suggested that the nonavailability
and the resulting delay in publication of the negotiating volumes greatly
diminishes the significance of the Pentagon Papers decision. As will be
explained below, I disagree.
A. Nature and Magnitude of Injury
As recounted above, the newspapers did not dispute that some feared
consequences could justify an injunction against publication of national
defense information. After all, in Near v. Minnesota, Chief Justice Hughes
had, in dictum, not only stated that a government might prevent the
publication of the sailing dates of troop ships, but he asserted that no one
would question that proposition.243
243 Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931). The particular injunction involved
in Near was declared unconstitutional. Professor Kurland has observed that there "is no
basis for suggesting" that in Pentagon Papers "the Court moved away from either the
holding or the dictum of Near." Kurland, supra note 15, at 287. While the potent
implication of the Near dictum for Pentagon Papers and all other prior restraint cases is
undeniable, Chief Justice Hughes advanced the dictum in a manner that is startlingly off-
hand. For the often-quoted proposition that "[n]o one would question but that a
government might prevent actual obstruction to its recruiting service or the publication of
the sailing dates of transports or the number and location of troops," the supporting
footnote tersely cites a single authority, "Chafee, Freedom of Speech, p. 10." See
ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., FREEDOM OF SPEECH 10 (1920). In criticizing the Blackstonian
formulation in which speech is seen to be protected against all "previous" restraints, but
only against such restraints, Chafee had stated as follows: "In some respects this theory
goes altogether too far in restricting state action. The prohibition of previous restraint
would not allow the government to prevent a newspaper from publishing the sailing dates
of transports." Id. at 9-10. Although the analysis adopted by Hughes is not spelled out,
it appears that he simply lifted the example given in Chafee's argument against
Blackstone. How did the proposition become one that "no one would question" rather
than one "suggested by Professor Chafee of Harvard Law School"? That transformation
seems to be a reflection of Professor Chafee's position as "a passionate champion of free
speech." HARRY KALVEN, JR., A WORTHY TRADITION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN AMERICA
137 (Jamie Kalven ed., 1988). See also id. (Chafee, "through his writings, single-
handedly ... created the field [of free speech] as a law topic"). The unstated argument
apparently is that if even Zechariah Chafee accepted the notion that it would be
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At a minimum, Justice Stewart's formulation requires that the feared
harm to the national interests be "irreparable," 2" and it seems very likely
that both the injury feared in the troop ship hypothetical from Near and the
damage flowing from disruption of the foreign relations of the United
States that was feared in Pentagon Papers properly qualify as irreparable,
at least under most circumstances.245 And, while Justice Stewart does not
specifically articulate the requirement that there be a threat of "grave"
or "serious" injury, his formulation plainly demands that the threatened
injury be of such a magnitude. The Solicitor General himself had argued
for a standard of "grave and irreparable harm to the security of the United
States, ' 246 and Justice Stewart's colloquy with Professor Bickel proceeded
on the assumption that trivial or inconsequential damage to the Nation
would not be enough to warrant an injunction, while an injunction could
properly be entered to prevent an injury which, while grave or serious, fell
short of being of a "cosmic nature." '247
Given the Near dictum and Professor Bickel's concession that, if the
other requirements for a prior restraint were met, the loss of 100 lives
would be harm of sufficient magnitude to support an injunction,248 the
permissible for the government to prevent the publication of the sailing dates of troop
ships, then "no one would question" that it was so. Chafee's credentials as a defender
of free speech were certainly in order, since his law review articles and other activities
challenging the Government's use of the Espionage Act against those protesting U.S.
participation in World War I had been vigorous enough to cause conservative alumni of
Harvard Law School to present the University's Board of Overseers with charges against
Chafee. Peter H. Irons, "'Fighting Fair" Zechariah Chafee, Jr., the Department of
Justice, and the 'Trial at the Harvard Club, " 94 HARV. L. REV. 1205 (1981). The
controversial law review articles were incorporated in FREEDOM OF SPEECH. Many years
later, Chafee published a revised edition of the book. ZECHARIAH CHAFEE JR., FREE
SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES (1941). The later book discusses Near and notes that the
case recognizes exceptions to the immunity from previous restraints for "exceptional
cases like disclosures of the sailing dates of transports or the location of troops." Id. at
379. Chafee makes no mention of the earlier edition of his book as providing the
foundation for Near's dictum.
244 New York Times Co., 403 U.S. at 730.
245 If the sailing date of a troop ship were published, there would be situations where
the date could simply be changed without interfering with the military operations which
were underway, but oftentimes a change of plans would be costly or even impossible.
Likewise, under some circumstances it might be possible to restore good diplomatic
relations promptly following a disruptive development, but often the restoration would
take time and require the sacrifice of other national interests.
246 ORAL ARGUMENT TRANSCRIPT, supra note 20, at 228, 231.
247 Id. at 240.
248 It has been reported that Justice Hugo Black, after hearing Professor Bickel concede
that there were circumstances in which publication could properly be enjoined,
complained, "Too bad the New York Times couldn't find someone who believes in the
First Amendment." BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN 145 (1979).
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holding of Pentagon Papers sheds little light on the threshold of gravity
or seriousness of injury that the Government must meet. Since the Vietnam
War was causing U.S. casualties, including deaths, on a daily basis, and
large numbers of Americans were being held as prisoners of war, it seems
highly likely that if publication prolonged the war by disrupting peace
negotiations or preventing them from being successful, that would qualify
as grave injury to the United States. Thus, the denial of the injunction
sought by the Government cannot be attributed to any holding that the
nature and magnitude of the harms were constitutionally inadequate to
justify a prior restraint.249
B. Likelihood of the Harm Occurring
Justice Stewart placed on the Government the burden of demonstrating
that the feared injury would "surely" flow from publication,250 while
Justice Brennan's concurring opinion indicated that it must be shown that
the feared harm would "inevitably" be caused by publication.' The
requirement of likelihood of injury stated in these opinions is so high that
one is tempted to find the critical line drawn in Pentagon Papers to be that
between serious harms that are certain or inevitable, which justify an
injunction, and those that are possible or even probable, which will not
support an injunction.5
Professor Powe, who was law clerk for Justice Douglas at the time of Pentagon Papers,
has endorsed the account of the Court's internal deliberations contained in The Brethren
as "remarkably accurate." PowE, THE FOURTH ESTATE AND THE CONSTITUTION, supra
note 96, at 316 nn.59, 61. See also supra note 227.
249 Professor Rudenstine agrees on this point, although he seems to be addressing
himself to the entire body of national security claims made by the Government, without
limiting himself to the negotiating volumes. See Rudenstine, supra note 19, at 1900-01.
250 New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 730 (1971) (concurring
opinion of Justice Stewart).
251 Id. at 726-27 (concurring opinion of Justice Brennan).
252 Professor Rudenstine, after examining the specific claims made by the Government,
seems to conclude that the Government failed because it did not provide sufficient proof
of probability of injury. See Rudenstine, supra note 19, at 1901-02 ("[N]o one said that
these disclosures would lead to the direct and immediate death of United States
soldiers."). There is some ambiguity to Professor Rudenstine's discussion of this issue,
however, since in discussing "the probability that injury will result from publication,"
he also makes references to the Government's failure to "satisfy the requirement of
immediate and direct irreparable harm." Id. at 1902. Perhaps he is reading Justices
Stewart and Brennan as demanding proof that direct and immediate harm is highly
probable. I believe that a more precise analysis of Pentagon Papers is possible if the issue
of likelihood of injury is distinguished from the question of whether the harm is directly
and immediately caused by publication.
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Despite the rigor of the demand that the Government prove that the
damage it fears will "surely" take place if publication goes forward,
closer analysis of the Pentagon Papers opinions, in light of the Secret
Brief, demonstrates that, at least in the view of Justices Stewart and White,
whose 'votes were critical to the outcome of the case, the Government had
met its burden of establishing that serious consequences would flow from
publication of the Papers.
Justice Stewart stated that he was "convinced that the Executive is
correct with respect to some of the documents involved. ' 253 Justice White
indicated that "[a]fter examining the materials the Government
characterizes as the most sensitive and destructive," he could not "deny
that revelation of these documents will do substantial damage to public
interests.' '254 Indeed, he stated that he was "confident that their disclosure
will have that result. ' 255 Justice Stewart and Justice White each joined in
the opinion written by the other, which tends to support further the
conclusion that neither Justice found the Government's showing on
likelihood of injury to be inadequate, even though the standard they
articulated demanded that injury be shown to "surely" follow upon
publication.
In the abstract, without consideration of the Secret Brief, the portions
of the Stewart and White opinions dealing with likelihood of injury have
always been somewhat puzzling. Without knowing more about the
particulars of the Government's claims, it has been difficult to understand
what allegation could lead the Justices both to accept the accuracy of the
Government's predictions of harm and to deny an injunction. The Secret
Brief clears up much of the mystery, especially once it is understood that
the material about which the Government was most concerned was the
negotiating history. Presumably, the Justices had no reason to doubt the
accuracy of the Government's forceful, earnest, and repeated assertions
that the intermediaries would be extremely unhappy about the disclosure
of their involvement, and might refuse in the future to play such a helpful
role. After all, even Daniel Ellsberg had apparently reached that conclusion
and acted on it by withholding the negotiating volumes from the
newspapers, even as he distributed the other forty-three volumes widely.
Admittedly, the Secret Brief used a broad brush to paint the results that
were likely to flow from publication of the negotiating volumes, but both
government witnesses and common sense provided strong support for the
conclusion that the practice of diplomacy depends to a large degree on
secrecy.
253 New York Times Co., 403 U.S. at 730 (concurring opinion of Justice Stewart).
254 Id. at 731 (concurring opinion of Justice White).
255 id.
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One potential source of ambiguity is the tradeoff between the gravity
of harm and the likelihood that it will occur. For example, the Government
alleged that release of the negotiating volumes would cost lives by
prolonging the Vietnam War, since negotiations would be frustrated due
to the refusal of other nations to continue to serve as intermediaries
between the United States and the North Vietnamese. Anticipated loss of
life is a grave injury that could support issuance of an injunction against
publication, as Professor Bickel conceded. At the same time, it could fairly
be said that publication of the negotiating volumes would "surely" cause
disruption of our diplomatic efforts to end the war. The difficult question,
on which the entire case can be said to turn, is whether the disruption
resulting from publication would actually lead to the feared loss of life.
While that question could be addressed as one directed to the gravity of
injury or to its probability, the formulation provided by Justices Stewart
and White quite properly recognizes that the heart of the matter is the
question of directness and immediacy. Given predictions of serious harm
to the national interest, and having determined that at least some of the
Government's predictions were accurate, Justices Stewart and White
proceeded to inquire whether the feared consequences would be directly
and immediately caused by publication.
C. "Direct "and "Immediate "Harm
The harms identified and relied upon by the Government appear to have
been of a nature and magnitude to warrant an injunction, and at least the
two swing Justices believed it extremely likely that the feared injury would
occur. How, then, could the case have turned out as it did? The key issues
on which everything turned can once again be identified by utilizing the
vantage point provided by the Secret Brief. The Government had not estab-
lished that serious harm justifying an injunction would be the "direct" and
"immediate" result of publication of the negotiating volumes.
256
256 While directness and immediacy are closely linked in Justice Stewart's articulation
of the prior restraint standard, they are distinct concepts, and in some factual situations
they would merit independent analysis. The concept of "directness" would focus on the
length of the causal chain thought to exist between the precipitating event-publication
-and the feared consequence-prolongation of the war through the disruption of
diplomatic relations. "Immediacy," on the other hand, would look to the temporal
relationship between cause and effect. The opinions in Pentagon Papers do not analyze
the two issues separately, nor does it seem that such analysis would be worthwhile under
the facts presented in Pentagon Papers. In the absence of proof to the contrary by the
Government, it appeared that the lack of immediacy and the lack of directness were two
sides of the same coin-no immediate adverse consequences could be identified precisely
because the harm that was feared would come about only if a complex chain of events
actually occurred in the manner in which the Government was hypothesizing.
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The opinions of Justice White and Justice Stewart are much more easily
understood and analyzed once it is recognized that the negotiating volumes
were the pivot on which the entire controversy turned. Solicitor General
Griswold's reliance on diplomatic concerns was clear even from his oral
argument, but the degree to which the negotiating volumes dominated the
litigation becomes apparent only upon examination of the Secret Brief.
257
Their importance to the Government's case may be shown directly-the
negotiating volumes are the first item listed, and they are described
forcefully and at greater length than any other item, with one exception.258
But there is an indirect confirmation of their status as well. The very
weakness of the other items listed in the Secret Brief must have forced the
Justices to recognize that, as the Solicitor General all but conceded at oral
argument, no injunction could properly be granted as to any of the Papers
unless disclosure of the negotiating volumes could be enjoined.
Once Justices Stewart and White came to focus on the negotiating
volumes, they had to determine what degree of directness and immediacy
of injury needed to be established to warrant a prior restraint. The
Government recognized that as a practical matter it could not prove
immediacy. Therefore, while paying occasional lip service to the
contention that the likelihood of immediate injury had been demonstrated,
Griswold's principal effort was to convince the Court that no showing of
In contrast, consider a hypothetical situation in which a terrorist group has access to
a nuclear device and will be enabled, through information soon to be published, to
irretrievably trigger an explosion, which would occur several months later. In such an
instance, there might not appear to be immediate harm, but the harm, when it occurred
months later, would surely be a direct consequence of publication. Even in this
hypothetical, the divergence between immediacy and directness is less than it appears to
be, since there could be an argument that harm takes place for purposes of the Pentagon
Papers analysis when nothing further can be done to stop it from occurring. In the
hypothetical, the vulnerable aspect of the Government's case would likely be not so much
the directness or immediacy requirements, but rather the need to prove what has been
assumed for present purposes-that in fact nothing could be done in the time available
to prevent the explosion from taking place. This doomsday problem, worthy of Dr.
Strangelove, was suggested to me by former Solicitor General Griswold.
257 It is worth noting that even the Government's arguments against publication of the
negotiating volumes were pitched at a fairly high level of generality. For example, neither
the discussion of the negotiating volumes nor the discussion of the P.O.W. negotiations
in the Secret Brief refers to any specific pages of the volumes, and the Special Appendix
filed in the Second Circuit referred to only a few specific items. Unlike the Pentagon
Papers at large, however, the negotiating volumes do display a high degree of homo-
geneity, since they consist almost exclusively of descriptions of the details of unsuccessful
negotiating approaches that had been undertaken with the participation of named
intermediaries.
258 Item Ten is given a longer description, but two paragraphs of that portion of the
Secret Brief have not yet been released.
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directness or immediacy should be required. As Justice Stewart's opinion
demonstrates, that effort failed.
The critical issues on which Pentagon Papers turns, therefore, are the
closely-related questions of the directness and the immediacy of the harm
that is alleged to be likely to flow from publication.25 9 The Government
never contended that the disruption of the relations between the United
States and other nations would itself constitute a harm serious enough to
justify a restraint on publication. Rather, its argument was that disclosure
would embarrass the intermediaries, that the withdrawal of go-betweens
would prevent or disrupt the United States' efforts to negotiate with Hanoi,
and that as a result the war would be prolonged and the return of prisoners
delayed.
The Government never pointed to any ongoing negotiations that it
claimed would be disrupted by publication of the negotiating volumes, or
even to any specific approaches that were being contemplated. Even if
some negotiations had been referred to, serious questions would have
remained as to whether any substantial likelihood of success could be
predicted and, if so, whether it could be established that success would
become less likely or impossible if publication made an intermediary or
prospective intermediary unwilling to participate. Even in those situations
in which a third country provides useful assistance, it may well not be
possible to say with confidence that success could not be achieved in the
negotiations without that nation's involvement. And even if there will be
diplomatic reversals as a result of publication, it may be many months or
years before the effects are felt. Upon close examination of Item One,
Solicitor General Griswold's reluctance to accept "immediacy" as part
of the constitutional standard is easily understood. Quite simply, if the
Government were required to prove that grave injury to the Nation would
flow immediately from publication of the disputed materials, it would
inevitably lose the case.
The Solicitor General made no serious effort to demonstrate any direct
and immediate threat to any negotiations. While he did indicate in a
general way that negotiations described in the Pentagon Papers, or
259 Professor Archibald Cox questions whether the immediacy requirement is a sound
one. ARCHIBALD Cox, THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 229-30 (1987). Except for
cases in which the anticipated delay of a feared harm would allow time for public debate
leading to a proper resolution of the controversy, Cox urges that "the immediacy of the
harm threatened by the publication seems properly to bear only on the degree of
probability that the harm will occur." Id. at 230. Any dilution of the Pentagon Papers
standard along this line would seem to invite a multiplication of injunction actions like
the Progressive case, in which speculative predictions of grave future harm become
cloaked with a false credibility because of the possibility that harm will come about at
some unspecified time in the distant future.
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negotiations that were similar, were continuing, there was no specification
at all of what negotiations were underway, what immediate threat was
raised by the prospect of disclosure, or what the prospects were for success
if the negotiations were to continue unimpeded. To the extent that the
Court agreed with Bickel that immediate peril must be shown, it is hard
to imagine a claim less likely to be well received than the cavalier
assertion that "one never knows where the break may come and it is of
crucial importance to keep open every possible line of communication.""
The farthest that the Solicitor General was willing to go in alleging
immediacy was to state, without tying the allegation to any particular
countries, that "publication of this material is likely to close up channels
of communication which might otherwise have some opportunity of
facilitating the closing of the Vietnam war.
' 261
D. The "Missing" Volumes
A critical issue that remains to be addressed in order to come to an
understanding of what the Supreme Court actually decided in Pentagon
Papers is the fact that the four negotiating volumes were not disclosed to
the newspapers by Daniel Ellsberg, and therefore were not included in any
of the three published versions of the Papers. The divergence between the
government's fears as to what the Times and the Post intended to publish
and what they actually published has been given great emphasis in former
Solicitor General Griswold's recent efforts to diminish the stature of
Pentagon Papers.
Griswold himself invigorated the public debate about the broad issues
raised by the use of national security concerns to justify withholding
information on government activities from the public. In a 1989
commentary for The Washington Post, Griswold recounted his role in
Pentagon Papers and, in the context of the ongoing Iran-Contra
investigation, drew the lesson that "there is very rarely any real risk to
current national security from the publication of facts relating to
transactions in the past, even the fairly recent past. ' 26 2 Griswold observed
that following the Supreme Court's decision in their favor the newspapers
published many of the disputed items in 1971, and that the entire contents
260 Secret Brief, supra note 9, at 4.
261 Id. at 5.
262 Griswold, Secrets Not Worth Keeping, supra note 18. Two of the Government's
witnesses from the litigation have also conceded that the harms they predicted would flow
from publication either did not materialize or did not justify an injunction. Abrams, supra
note 18, at 25, 72 (Vice Admiral Blouin stated that he did not believe that "there was
any great loss in substance"; former Deputy Under Secretary of State William B.
Macomber indicated that Pentagon Papers was "probably decided properly.").
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of the Pentagon Papers were soon published in the Gravel Edition of the
Papers. Griswold forcefully stated that he "had never seen any trace of a
threat to the national security from the publication," that it "quickly
becomes apparent to any person who has considerable experience with
classified material that there is massive overclassification," and that "the
principal concern of the classifiers is not with national security, but rather
with governmental embarrassment of one sort or another. ' 263 Coming
from the advocate who had represented the United States before the
Supreme Court in the Pentagon Papers litigation, this discussion naturally
attracted considerable attention.2 4
On June 30, 1991, the twentieth anniversary of the Supreme Court's
decision in Pentagon Papers, Griswold took up his pen again to discuss
the case, this time in The New York Times. While the title of the piece-
'No Harm Was Done'-reiterated the bottom line presented in the earlier
Washington Post article, the analysis was radically different. Now
Griswold explained that Pentagon Papers "resulted in a sort of phantom
decision by the Supreme Court" because Ellsberg had held back the nego-
tiating volumes, making it impossible for any injury to occur as a result of
the Supreme Court's refusal to impose an injunction on their publication.
265
Griswold explained that he had learned at a seminar in April 1991, in
which Daniel Ellsberg participated, that the negotiating volumes, the
"most troublesome part" of the Papers, had not been turned over by him
to the newspapers. 66 Griswold elaborated a bit on this version of the Pen-
tagon Papers legend by concluding that as far as he was aware none of the
material that was objectionable from his point of view "was ever pub-
lished by anyone, including the newspapers, until several years later.
' 267
26' Griswold, Secrets Not Worth Keeping, supra note 18.
264 The Griswold commentary was itself much commented upon even within the first
few days after it appeared on February 15, 1989. See, e.g., Haynes Johnson, Issues Larger
Than Lives, WASH. POST, February 17, 1989, at A2 (Griswold provided "timely
testimony" that "the problem is not security but the use of secrecy to hide information
that would be embarrassing or damaging to officials involved."); Eleanor Randolph, In
a Free Press, Truth Emerges Slowly, WASH. POST, February 16, 1989, at A52
("Griswold, who tried to keep the nation from reading the Pentagon Papers 17 years ago
... decided to 'fess up'."); David G. Savage, Contrary Interests Provoke Thornburgh-
Walsh Clash Over North Trial, L.A. TIMES, February 19, 1989, at part 1, page 28
(Griswold "said he was misled by then-President Richard M. Nixon's aides about the
impact of releasing the Pentagon Papers.").
265 Griswold, 'No Harm Was Done,' supra note 18.
266 Griswold reported that he had also learned at the seminar that Ellsberg had
"blocked out footnotes on pages he delivered, thus withholding important information
such as names, places and dates." Id.
267 GRISWOLD MEMOIRS, supra note 18, at 310. Griswold states that some comments
about the 1989 Post article have overstated his position, and he emphasizes that there is
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The thrust of former Solicitor General Griswold's most recent
descriptions of Pentagon Papers is to downplay the significance of the
case, so that it becomes no more than "a tempest in a teapot"268 or even
"a sort of a phantom decision. ' 269 However, the Solicitor General's
revisionist look at the case is not persuasive. Griswold emphasizes that it
was only in 1991 that he learned that the negotiating volumes had not been
given to the newspapers, and he suggests that this is the reason why his
1989 article is susceptible to misinterpretation.
Though he was unaware until recently of what documents had been
given to the Times and the Post, that must be because he did not happen
to come across the information, even though it was available.27° On the
very day it began publishing the Papers, the Times indicated that it did not
have "the volume" concerning negotiations, and during the course of the
litigation it never contradicted that statement.271 Sanford J. Ungar's 1972
book on the Pentagon Papers litigation had reported that Ellsberg had not
disclosed the negotiating volumes.272 Professor Philip Kurland had also, in
the immediate aftermath of the Supreme Court's decision, called attention
to this specific issue:
The result [of the Supreme Court's ruling] was that the
Pentagon Papers were published in various versions in the
newspapers and in books. The sky did not fall. But the fact
is that none of the papers which the Solicitor General told
the Court would be inimical to the security interests of the
United States has yet been published. It is not clear whether
a difference between "a prospective evaluation when you have no means of foreseeing
what the consequences may be" and a retrospective evaluation after publication. Id. at
312 n.40. He continues: "I have no regrets about my representation of the United States
in the Pentagon Papers case, though I do not think, as things turned out, that any
measurable harm actually resulted from the publication by the newspapers of those
portions of the Papers which they had." Id.
268 Id. at 312.
269 Griswold, 'No Harm Was Done,' supra note 18.
270 In a speech given in 1972, Griswold stated that at most one or two of the eleven
items he referred to had been printed by the newspapers, and that others were included
in the Gravel Edition of the Papers. Griswold, Teaching Is Not Enough, supra note 18,
at 258. However, Griswold also indicated that "there was one item, probably the most
important, that has never been printed anywhere." Id. The item being referred to was
undoubtedly Item One, the four negotiating volumes, which were not published until 1983.
See note 53 supra.
27 See supra note 58. Although the material concerning negotiations was divided into
four "volumes" within the structure of the Pentagon Papers study, after its
declassification that material was published by Professor George C. Herring in one
volume. See supra note 53.
272 UNGAR, supra note 11, at 83-84.
1993] PENTAGON PAPERS 417
WILLIAM AND MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
this is due to self-restraint on the part of the newspapers or
whether the newspapers have been denied access to them by
their suppliers.273
The negotiating volumes also received a great deal of press attention
during the espionage prosecution of Daniel Ellsberg and Anthony Russo.
Precisely because the material they contained was considered to be more
sensitive than that in the rest of the Papers, 274 the Government placed great
reliance on them in attempting to prove that there would have been harm
to the national security if they had been published in 1969, when Ellsberg
had made an unauthorized copy.275 Even before the Ellsberg trial began in
Los Angeles, the negotiating volumes found their way to columnist Jack
Anderson, who wrote a series of articles based on them in June of 1972.276
Then Anderson gave the documents to The Washington Post and The New
York Times, who followed up with extensive coverage of their own.277 For
several months, the negotiating volumes were open for inspection in the
clerk's office of the federal district court in Los Angeles, along with the
other exhibits in the case.278 The four negotiating volumes were released
by the government under the Freedom of Information Act, and they were
published in 1983.279 Thus, whatever significance is to be attributed to the
fact that the negotiating volumes were not in the possession of the Times
and the Post in 1971, it has long been generally known to those interested
in the Papers controversy that those four volumes were considered to
contain the most sensitive material and that they were not part of the
Papers published in 1971.
More significant than the fact that it has long been known that the
negotiating volumes were not published with the other Pentagon Papers is
273 Kurland, supra note 15, at 289.
274 The negotiating volumes were thought to raise special security concerns because
they dealt with ongoing and unresolved issues, and therefore only three or four people had
access to them while they were being compiled. NEGOTIATING VOLUMES, supra note 53,
at x (editor's introduction).
275 Id. at xii.
276 Id. at xiii.
277 Id. at xv-xvi.
278 Id. at xvii-xxi. Judge William Matthew Byrne, Jr. dismissed the case on May I1,
1973, based on government misconduct, including a break-in at the office of Ellsberg's
psychiatrist by members of the White House Plumbers, who were seeking information to
use against Ellsberg. Id. at xxi.
279 NEGOTIATING VOLUMES, supra note 53. Griswold acknowledges that the fact that
the negotiating volumes had not been turned over to the newspapers by Ellsberg had been
reported in Seymour Hersh's biography of Henry Kissinger, but Griswold had not read
the reference. GRISWOLD MEMOIRS, supra note 18, at 310, citing SEYMOUR M. HERSH,
THE PRICE OF POWER: KISSINGER IN THE NIXON WHITE HOUSE 321 n. * (1983).
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the recognition that, contrary to former Solicitor General Griswold's sug-
gestion, the peculiar tale of the negotiating volumes in no way undercuts
or limits the significance of the Supreme Court's decision in Pentagon
Papers. Griswold's thesis apparently boils down to the contention that,
because the newspapers did not actually possess the highly sensitive nego-
tiating volumes, the Supreme Court had no need to rule on the question of
whether the First Amendment guaranteed the papers' right to publish them.
Griswold criticizes the Supreme Court for not allowing the Government "a
reasonable period of time to examine what the newspapers actually had."
2 0
If anything, the circumstances surrounding the negotiating volumes
support a more expansive reading of Pentagon Papers, rather than the very
narrow interpretation that Griswold would give to the case. It is absolutely
clear that the Supreme Court, when it ruled that the newspapers could
resume publication, had no way of knowing that the negotiating volumes
would not be published with the other materials. There had been a good
deal of maneuvering in the lower courts, as the Government attempted to
learn precisely what documents the newspapers possessed, and the matter
had never been resolved to the Government's satisfaction. The Times had
provided a listing of the documents it had, but there was not enough detail
to allow the Government to determine exactly what portions of the Pen-
tagon Papers had been given to the paper. The Post was also successful in
resisting a complete cataloging of the documents in its possession, and
accordingly Judge Gesell assumed that the paper had the entire study.
As the litigation proceeded, culminating in the filing of the Secret Brief
and argument in the Supreme Court, the Government emphasis was placed
on the negotiating volumes. The four complete volumes constituted the
first item discussed in the Secret Brief, and much of the testimony
presented by the Government in the trial courts and the arguments pre-
sented on appeal emphasized the damage that could be expected to occur
if the negotiations were revealed. Since neither the Times nor the Post ever
told the Court that they did not have the negotiating volumes, the Supreme
Court plainly had to resolve the case on the assumption that they did
possess those volumes. So long as it had not been established that the
newspapers did not possess the negotiating volumes and that they had not
agreed to forgo publishing them,28' only an injunction could protect the
280 GRISWOLD MEMOIRS, supra note 18, at 298.
2' In the District of Columbia litigation, the attorneys for The Washington Post did
provide assurances, with respect to a few items about which the Government was
especially concerned, either that the paper did not have the sensitive information or that
it would not publish it if it did possess it. See, e.g., D.C. TRANSCRIPT, supra note 172, at
217. Similarly, the Post's sealed brief in the Supreme Court indicated that one of the
documents singled out by the Government was not held by the Post. Post's Secret Brief,
supra note 97, at 8.
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Government's interests if in fact it was entitled to prevent publication.
Even though the Supreme Court had before it the complete set of forty-
seven volumes, along with the Government's strenuous argument that ex-
tremely serious diplomatic consequences would flow from publication of
the negotiating volumes, the Court still concluded that no further restraint
could be reconciled with the First Amendment. Thus, because the pub-
lished versions of the Papers omitted the very materials on which the
Government placed its principal. reliance, the significance of the Supreme
Court's ruling that no injunction was proper has been undervalued to some
degree.
The question remains why neither the newspapers nor the Government
informed the Supreme Court, or the lower courts for that matter, of the
pertinent facts concerning the negotiating volumes. On the Government's
side, even though it is now conceded that the negotiating volumes were the
material with which the Government was primarily concerned, there was
apparently no willingness to limit the injunction request to those volumes.
Griswold suggests that if the Government had known that the negotiating
volumes were safe, "there might well have been no Pentagon Papers
case," 282 but it is very doubtful that the controversy could have been
avoided so easily. Throughout the litigation, and right down to preparation
of the Secret Brief and through Griswold's argument in the Supreme
Court, the Government failed to focus on the negotiating volumes as its
sole concern. In fact, it was only with the filing of Solicitor General
Griswold's Secret Brief on the morning of argument that the negotiating
volumes in their entirety were identified as the foremost security concern.
Portions of those volumes had been relied on all along, but even the
Special Appendix filed in the Second Circuit placed no special weight on
the negotiating volumes as compared to the other documents contained in
the Papers. Thus, while focusing exclusively on the negotiating volumes
would undoubtedly have increased the chances that the Government would
obtain further injunctive relief as to those volumes, the Government
apparently was unwilling to allow the other forty-three volumes to be
published in their entirety.
Since so much of the Government's firepower was directed at the
negotiating volumes, and the papers knew that they did not possess those
volumes, they presumably could have reduced their risks of losing the case
by simply telling the courts that they did not have the material and that
therefore no injunction would be proper. Perhaps the papers were confident
enough of prevailing that they were willing to accept some increase in the
risk of losing. More likely, they feared that any additional details that they
revealed about the documents in their possession would fuel further efforts
22 GRISWOLD MEMOIRS, supra note 18, at 298.
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by the Government to force disclosure of all the documents held by the
Times and the Post, which might well have enabled the Government to
identify Ellsberg as the source. The newspapers had been largely successful
in fending off the Government's discovery efforts, and they were no doubt
reluctant to reopen the issue.283 Lastly, the newspapers, if they considered
the issue explicitly, must have realized that the Government would not be
content to walk away from the litigation, even if it were assured that the
negotiating volumes would not be disclosed. For one thing, the Government
might still attempt to secure an injunction against disclosure, on the theory
that it would do no harm at all if the papers had truthfully denied
possessing the documents. From the point of view of the Times and the
Post, however, any injunction against publication, even one with no
practical effect, would be a catastrophic loss. Moreover, since the
Government never did limit its injunction claim to the negotiating volumes,
any disclosure by the papers that took that issue out of the case would still
leave before the Supreme Court the many other items for which the
Government was seeking a continuation of the injunctions.
E. The Legacy of Pentagon Papers
From time to time the Pentagon Papers are dismissed as "historical"
documents that had no serious potential to damage the national security,
and on that basis it is sometimes deemed appropriate to decline to give
Pentagon Papers full force in controversies involving more contemporary
documents. For example, in his decision granting a preliminary injunction
against The Progressive's article concerning H-bomb design, the district
judge dismissed Pentagon Papers on the ground that "the study involved
283 At least for the Times, tactical concerns about the difficulties of fending off
renewed discovery efforts by the Government took a back seat to an ideological position.
The Times instructed its attorneys to defend the newspaper's right to make the editorial
decisions on whether and when material such as that included in the Papers would be
published. The Times was opposed to allowing the Government or the courts to participate
in such editorial decisions, and therefore it objected to advance identification of the
materials it held. The Times realized that in the particular circumstances of the Pentagon
Papers case the failure to emphasize that it did not have the negotiating volumes might
make it more difficult for it to prevail in the litigation, but it was willing to run whatever
slight risk was involved. Telephone Interview with Floyd Abrams (Sept. 3, 1993). As
discussed supra note 58, the inventory list filed by the Times pointedly failed to include
the negotiating volumes. Moreover, the front-page article published with the first portion
of the Pentagon Papers flatly stated that one "important gap in the copy of the Pentagon
study obtained by The New York Times" -was that it lacked "the section on the secret
diplomacy of the Johnson period." Hedrick Smith, Vast Review of War Took a Year,
N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 1971 at 1.
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in the New York Times case contained historical data relating to events that
occurred some three to twenty years previously.
284
Upon examination of Solicitor General Griswold's Secret Brief, it is
now indisputable that, at least before the Supreme Court, the Government's
efforts to suppress publication of the Papers focused on the potential harm
that disclosure would cause in the future.285 The fact that the classified
secrets were contained in a study that was a "history" of our nation's
involvement in Vietnam is entirely beside the point. It may be true that a
history, in general, is less likely to contain information that, if published,
will cause harm to national security than would a current intelligence
estimate or a description of a technical system for collecting intelligence,
but true secrets do not lose their potential for doing harm simply because
they have been incorporated in an analysis of a past event. As to the
material about which the Government was most concerned-the negotiating
volumes-the potential damage to the nation's interests was alleged to be
that a description of past events would embarrass other nations that had
acted as go-betweens in the past and might be needed again in the future,
but that disclosure would cause them to refuse to participate.
The Progressive litigation also provides an opportunity to test the
analysis of Pentagon Papers offered above.286 The district judge granted
a temporary restraining order against publication of an article purporting
to describe the design of the hydrogen bomb; the TRO in that case-unlike
Pentagon Papers-was followed by a preliminary injunction. The crucial
paragraphs of the district court's opinion reasoned as follows:
The Secretary of State states that publication will increase
thermonuclear proliferation and that this would "irreparably
impair the national security of the United States." The
Secretary of Defense says that dissemination of the Morland
paper will mean a substantial increase in the risk of thermo-
nuclear proliferation and lead to use or threats that would
"adversely affect the national security of the United States."
214 United States v. The Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990, 994 (W.D. Wis. 1979).
285 The broader claim originally asserted under the direction of Assistant Attorney
General Mardian "was simply that the executive branch had classified these documents
as 'top secret' and that ended the matter." SEYMOUR, supra note 18, at 202.
286 In an eerie coincidence, when Professor Bickel argued the New York Times case
before the Second Circuit, in attempting to give the court an example of circumstances
under which a prior restraint might be justified even in the absence of an applicable
statute, he referred to "a case where possibly the hydrogen bomb turns up." Oral
Argument, United States v. New York Times Co., 444 F.2d 544 (2d Cir. 1971) (No. 71-




A mistake in ruling against the United States could pave
the way for thermonuclear annihilation for us all. In that
event, our right to life is extinguished and the right to
publish becomes moot.
In light of these factors, this Court concludes that
publication of the technical information on the hydrogen
bomb contained in the article is [analogous] to publication
of troop movements or locations in time of war and falls
within the extremely narrow exception to the rule against
prior restraint.287
Now that the Secret Brief can be examined in detail, the parallels
between Pentagon Papers and Progressive are more apparent than was
recognized by the district court in Progressive when it granted the
preliminary injunction. In each case, the ultimate harm projected by the
Government was extremely serious and obviously irreparable--continuation
of the Vietnam War in one case, nuclear proliferation and possible nuclear
destruction in the other. The two cases likewise shared earnest predictions
that the feared harm would flow inexorably from publication. While the
Government did not go so far as to predict that nuclear war would occur
if the Morland article were published, it did assert that nuclear prolifera-
tion-which might lead to nuclear war-would result from publication.288
Lastly, the cases both involved situations in which the request for an
injunction should have been resolved on the basis of the lack of proof that
the feared harm would be the "direct" and "immediate" consequence
of publication. As discussed above, that is apparently the basis upon which
Pentagon Papers itself was decided, yet the district court in The
Progressive failed to discuss that aspect of Pentagon Papers.289 Instead, the
court parroted the language from the Stewart and White opinions and
concluded that the standard stated by those Justices had been met, without
making any effort to apply the "direct and immediate injury" require-
ment to the facts presented.
If the district court in the Progressive case had looked for guidance to
the Secret Brief and to the analysis presented above, it is difficult to see
how it could have concluded that the Government had demonstrated that
direct and immediate injury would flow from publication of the H-bomb
287 The Progressive, 467 F. Supp. at 995, 996.
288 See id. at 995.
289 Professor Powe has observed that the district judge "must have understood the lack
of immediacy, but he did not respond." Powe, supra note 37, at 60. See Oakes, supra
note 7, at 517-18.
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article. The court's own analysis made it clear that any harm that might
result from publication lay far in the future and would depend on many
causative factors other than the controversial article:
A number of affidavits make quite clear that a sine qua non
to thermonuclear capability is a large, sophisticated
industrial capability coupled with a coterie of imaginative,
resourceful scientists and technicians. One does not build a
hydrogen bomb in the basement. However, the article could
possibly provide sufficient information to allow a medium
size nation to move faster in developing a hydrogen
weapon. It could provide a ticket to by-pass blind alleys.29°
The parallels between Pentagon Papers and Progressive with respect
to the question of directness and immediacy of injury are striking. While
in each case the Government produced evidence that it was likely that pub-
lication would cause harm to the interests of the United States, the feared
consequences in each case were over the horizon. Damage to the relation-
ships between the United States and its negotiating intermediaries might
eventually prolong the war and delay the return of P.O.W.s, but no such
direct and immediate result could be identified. Likewise, the Morland
article might undermine efforts by the United States to prevent nuclear
proliferation, but even so there would be no direct and immediate injury;
at worst, some nation that was already on the road to a thermonuclear cap-
ability, but years from its destination, might be able to speed its journey
by avoiding dead-ends. For these reasons, it seems very likely that Penta-
gon Papers, carefully analyzed in light of the Secret Brief, calls for
rejection of injunction claims like those advanced by the Government in
the Progressive case. Pentagon Papers teaches that even sincere, plausible
predictions of serious and irreparable injury to the national interest cannot
justify an injunction against publication unless the feared injury will be
directly and immediately caused by disclosure of the disputed
information.29 1
Thomas S. Martin, the former Department of Justice official who
directed the Government's civil litigation in national security mat-
ters during the Carter Administration, including the Progressive case,
reviewed the cases that came after Pentagon Papers and concluded
that "the courts largely have ignored the formulas" stated in that
290 The Progressive, 467 F. Supp. at 993.
291 Judge Oakes has observed that the Government's proof in the Progressive litigation
also fell short on the "likelihood" prong of the Pentagon Papers standard, since "the
testimony suggested only that the article 'could possibly' provide information allowing"
the feared proliferation to occur. Oakes, supra note 7, at 517.
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case.292 Martin characterizes Progressive, Snepp v. United States,2 93 and
Haig v. Agee,294 as reflecting "a changing judicial attitude toward the kind
of national security claims that were put forward and almost summarily
rejected in the Pentagon Papers case. "295 He further argues that "the
inability to predict with certainty no longer seems an insuperable bar to
judicial action restraining speech when compelling testimony indicates a
reasonable probability of serious national injury. "296
Martin's assertion that the authority of Pentagon Papers has been
undercut by subsequent decisions is flawed by his inaccurate description
of Pentagon Papers itself. The notion that the national security claims
advanced by the Government in the Pentagon Papers litigation were
"almost summarily rejected" is indefensible. Rather, those claims
received very serious consideration at each level of the courts. The
Government was even permitted to present in camera testimony and
argument in the district courts and the courts of appeals. Moreover, the
rejection of the Government's claims was not based on any sweeping
generalization rooted in hostility to the Government's "inability to predict
with certainty." In Pentagon Papers, it was the Solicitor General who
narrowed the request for relief from a plea for broad suppression of the
Pentagon Papers study to the identification of a handful of "worst" cases.
And, as to the negotiating volumes that constituted the principal concern
among the listed items, Justices Stewart and White appeared ready to find
merit in the Government's allegations that publication would irreparably
damage important national interests. Rather than representing the discharge
of a blunderbuss, Pentagon Papers, as illuminated by consideration of the
Secret Brief, is properly seen as a bit of judicial sharpshooting by Justices
Stewart and White. The Government could not demonstrate that "direct"
and "immediate" injury would flow from publication of the negotiating
volumes, and came very close to not even trying to allege such injury.
While the holding of the case that only direct and immediate injury will
support an injunction is highly significant, the application of that principle
to the facts presented in Pentagon Papers was not at all difficult. Nor, if
the narrow scope of this holding is properly understood, do the later cases
discussed by Martin represent any dilution of Pentagon Papers.297
'9' Thomas S. Martin, National Security and the First Amendment: A Change in
Perspective, 68 A.B.A. J. 680, 684 (1982).
293 444 U.S. 507 (1980).
294 453 U.S. 280 (1981).
295 Martin, supra note 292, at 684. Martin describes Pentagon Papers as a "stunning
victory for First Amendment values." Id. at 681.
296 Id. at 684.
297 Martin notes that despite "all the dramatic antirestraint language in the Pentagon
Papers opinion," the preliminary injunction entered by the district court in the Progressive
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VII. CONCLUSION
Examination of the Solicitor General's Secret Brief in Pentagon Papers
reveals that the Government's concerns about the publication of the Papers
were much more narrowly focused than has been recognized before now.
Accordingly, the teaching of the case is less sweeping than is sometimes
thought, since neither the magnitude of the injury that was allegedly
threatened by disclosure of the negotiating volumes nor the likelihood that
such injury would actually result can easily be dismissed as insufficient.
The fatal defect in the Government's case-and one that fully justified the
decision by Justices Stewart and White to allow the resumption of publica-
tion despite their statements that the Government was correct in its allega-
tions about at least some of the documents-was an almost total default
by the Government in its efforts to demonstrate that injury would be a
direct and immediate result of publication. That aspect of Pentagon Pa-
pers, while somewhat narrower than the proposition for which the case is
sometimes cited, is striking precisely because of the seriousness of the
Government's claims regarding the negotiating volumes and the unwilling-
ness of Justices Stewart and White to reject those claims as insubstantial.
Detailed examination of the Secret Brief filed by the Government in Pen-
tagon Papers thus confirms the observation that the case, properly under-
stood, establishes a standard for prior restraints under which "it is most
difficult for the government to prevail.
291
case was in effect for months and was eventually dissolved only because the disputed
information was published by another author. Id. at 682. For the reasons presented above,
and especially in light of the fact that the district court decision in The Progressive was
never reviewed by any appellate court, I would consider the court's departure from the
principles of Pentagon Papers as nothing other than an error. A district court has no
authority to revise Supreme Court precedent even if the district judge understands the
dimensions of the prior holding, which District Judge Warren apparently did not in dealing
with Pentagon Papers. Neither the Snepp nor the Agee cases discussed by Martin undercuts
Pentagon Papers, since each involved the asserted First Amendment rights of a former
C.I.A. officer, not a newspaper, book publisher, journalist, or member of the public seeking
to disclose information alleged to have the potential to injure the national security. In each
case, the Supreme Court placed great reliance on the employment relationship that had
given the former employee access to classified information. In attempting to equate the
issues raised in Pentagon Papers with those presented in Snepp and Agee, Martin commits
the error that he warns readers against: attempting "to put all speech in a single category,
an approach that invites disaster." Id. at 685.
298 Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New York State Crime Victims Bd., 112




The pages that follow contain the sealed Pentagon Papers briefs filed
by the United States and by The Washington Post in the Supreme Court.
The corresponding brief filed by The New York' Times has not been
located. Because of the poor quality of the copies that are available, the
briefs were retyped in the interest of legibility. In order to make citation
easier, the briefs were retyped in the same pages, paragraphs, and lines as
the original. Typographical and other errors in the originals have been
retained. In a few places, which are indicated, material in the briefs is still
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ANALYSIS OF THE IN CAMERA EVIDENCE
The Government presented affidavits from Dennis J. Doolin,
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia and Pacific
Affairs (P1. Ex. 7); William B. Macomber, Deputy Under Secretary
for Administration, Department of State (P1. Ex. 5); Lt. General
Melvin Zais, Director of Operations Directorate of the Joint Staff
of the Military Joint Chiefs of Staff (Pl. Ex.6), and Vice Admiral
Noel Gayler, Director, National Security Agency (P1. Ex.8). Messrs.
Doolin and Macomber were called by Respondents as adverse witnesses.
As demonstrated by the following analysis, these affidavits,
and the limited number of specific documents in the study which they
cite, are utterly devoid of any credible evidence of a threat to national
security.
Mr. Doolin
Mr. Doolin, who according to his testimony in open court had
been reviewing the study since 1969 for security purposes in connection
with a request for access thereto by Senator Fulbright, set forth in his
affidavit six specific instances of documents which he claimed would, if
published, seriously impair national security.
Item 1 in the affidavit lists certain documents that allegedly
"describe in great detail" a 1965 memorandum from Maxwell Taylor to
President Johnson listing respective negotiating requests of the United
States and Hanoi which he described as "blue chips." Mr. Doolin stated
that if this document were revealed, "the North Vietnamese would have
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a major advantage in any negotiations." (Gov't Ex. 7, p. 1) Judge
Gesell, however, read the document and strongly disagreed (Tr. 132):
"Here are the six blue chips that are revealed by
this top secret document, and let's just consider them:
"[Cease] bombing the north; [cease] military
operations of the Viet Cong Unit, [stop] increasing
our forces in the south; withdraw our forces from
the south; give amnesty to the Viet Cong; give econo-
mic aid to the north.
"Now I grant you those are perhaps blue chips,
but they are the kind of blue chips that I would think
today any high school graduate could put down. There
is nothing in here of an intimate secrecy about blue
chips."
This is the only document from the entire 47-volume series that the
Government presented to the trial court for inspection.
Item 2 refers to a 1966 report that the North Vietnamese had
complained about leaks to the press with respect to negotiations through
third party intermediaries, with specific mention of the "Lapira peace
feeler." Upon cross-examination, Mr. Doolin stated that he was un-
aware of the classification of the report (Tr. 102) and did not even know
what the "Lapira peace feeler" was (Tr. 105-E), but that in his judg-
ment the document should nevertheless continue to be secret or top
secret because such a disclosure would dry up future channels of com-
munication to Hanoi. (Tr. 102-105E) Mr. Doolin was thus unaware
that the "Lapira peace feeler," which involved an Italian contact with
Hanoi in 1965, had been a well-publicized matter prior to the litigation
and indeed was fully described in a book entitled "The Secret Search
for Peace in Vietnam" by Kraslow and Lurie. (Ibid.)
Item 3 cites, for the same proposition, several references
to the so-called Seaborn mission which would allegedly show that a
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Canadian member of the International Control Commission was "acting as
our agent" in discussions with the North Vietnamese. Again, Mr. Doolin
was unaware that the Seabom's mission as an emissary of the United States
had previously been widely publicized and is fully set forth in a book
entitled "The Last Crusade" written by Chester L. Cooper, a former
State Department official. (Tr. 110-111, Post Ex. 2)
Item 4 refers to the scenario of the overthrow of President
Diem which had previously been widely known and, in any event, has
already been published in newspapers not subject to injunction.
Item 5 objects generally to any revelations as to "negotiations
with Hanoi in the mid-1960's via other governments" on the basis that
the governments involved could be embarrassed by their past roles
and be less willing to help in the future. Mr. Doolin conceded, however,
that it was well known that some governments have been attempting to be
a channel of communication. In this regard, besides being unaware of
the publicity given the Seaborn and Lapira contracts referred to above,
Mr. Doolin was also apparently unaware of a recent well-publicized
article in LIFE magazine concerning ex-Prime Minister Wilson's ver-
sion of such activities. (Tr. 113)
Item 6 refers to SEATO operational plan which Mr. Doolin
admitted he had not read. He did not know whether the plan was still
in effect. (Tr. 120)
Finally, Mr. Doolin had indicated in his prior testimony in
open court that some of the subject documents gave information con-
cerning current troop movements. Upon further questioning (Tr. 117)
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he retracted and corrected his statement, saying that he was discuss-
ing "past troop movements, about the strategy of the buildup and so
forth." (Tr. 116)
William B. Macomber
William B. Macomber, Deputy Under Secretary for Administra-
tion in the Department of State, filed an affidavit (Ex. 5), in which he
set forth purported reactions from American Embassies throughout the
world to the publication of the Ne~v York Times articles. It developed
that these comments had been solicited by the Department of State.
(Tr. 146) It also developed that while the cited comments in his affidavit
viewed the subject publication with concern, the affidavit had not set
forth all the responses received, and that some had given a reaction
"that it was too early to tell" or that "We will get along all right."
(Tr. 176-177)
Similarly, Mr. Macomber had set forth in his affidavit (at
pp. 15-16) a list of contracts made by third parties to North Vietnam on
behalf of the United States referred to in the subject documents, and he
expressed concern about disclosure of these contacts. His attention was
drawn to the fact that the Seaborn mission, one of those in the list, had
received wide publicity as noted above. (Tr. 205-207) He sought to
parry that disclosure. by claiming that the subject documents were
more detailed. But he agreed that other contracts listed in his affidavit
has been similarly disclosed to the public. (Tr. 209)
Despite the conceded fact that none of the documents here in-
volved, some extending back over 20 years, have ever been declassified,
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Mr. Macomber cited with approval the State Department's declassifica-
tion program. (Tr. 150) Mr. Macomber sought to explain that it would
be relatively simple to declassify documents upon application (Tr. 152),
but the Court pointed out that there really was no indication that any
such procedure was a realistic one. (Tr. 153)
With reference to classification of documents, Mr. Macomber
agreed that the initial classification was made by the writer of the
document who makes his subjective judgment thereon. (Tr. 179-180)
While claiming that there was a routine procedure to declassify docu-
ments, Mr. Macomber was unaware as to whether that routine practice
had been followed on the subject documents. (Tr. 182) Mr. Macomber
was questioned by the Court as to his views respecting how leaks could
be prevented under the circumstances here where large volumes of
documents were assembled. The Court specifically inquired as to
whether Mr. Macomber felt that the remedy was to proceed to court
to seek to enjoin the leaks. (Tr. 185) Mr Macomber urged that in
the absence of effective security restrictions there must be some remedy
and thought that judicial proceedings were the answer. (Tr. 185-186) The
Court replying noted the difficulties and problems which would follow
from placing the enforcement of the Government's security problems
in the hands of the Courts. (Tr. 187)
Mr. Macomber expressed his concern over the dire results
that would follow from the publication of the Vietnam study materials.
He was asked whether in the eight days since the first New York Times
publication there had been any actual incident reflecting his concern.
(Tr. 178) He indicated that the Australian Prime Minister had "in a
remark made for our ears, stated that he was appalled."' (Tr. 179)
He cited no other instances.
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General Zais
General Zais' affidavit states that he recently reviewed the
documents in the study and would not recommend declassification of
any of them at this time. He identifies specific documents to support
his conclusion, but these are so obviously lacking in substance that
he, himself, backs away from them. Thus, he states (p. 4):
"My unwillingness to accept the responsibility
for recommending declassification of any documents
at this time is not premised upon these identifications
or upon my expectations that upon further study of
these documents, additional identifications will be
made."
Instead, he says that because we are at war in Vietnam the documents
should remain classified unless there is a positive assurance that their
disclosure will not weaken the resolve of our allies in that war.
The total incompatibility of this reasoning and the First Amend-
ment standard is clearly demonstrated by the insubstantiality of the
examples which he cites. He first refers (pp. 2-3) to contingency plans
in 1964 and 1965 for responding to a Chinese offensive. Conceding that
"these particular operational plans are no longer in use," he claims
that they reveal "possible total force commitments and planned areas of
operation which are valid for future operations." In view of the vast
changes in U.S. forces levels in Southeast Asia during the past seven
years, marked advances in military transportation capabilities in the
interim, and the decided change in American foreign policy objectives
as announced in the Nixon doctrine, these 1964 and 1965 contingency plans
are patently obsolete. Moreover, examination of these documents cited by
General Zais reveals that they contain only vague references to the plans
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in question and not the plans themselves. No document referred
to sets forth possible troop level commitments or areas of deploy-
ment. Indeed, one of the documents listed in this regard (IV. C. 5, p. 9)
contains nothing more than a the vague generality that:
"A variety of CINCPAC contingency plans were
in existence at the time which addressed the problem
and called for various deployments, some of them pre-
emptive, to deal with it."
Similarly, the chronologies referred to by General Zais
(at p. 3) are very general in nature and appear to deal primarily
with the evolution of policy. The lack of specificity is demonstrated
by that fact that one chronology (Vol. IV. C. 6 (a), pp. i-xvii) covers
the entire period from January 1965 to April 1968 in 17 pages. Neither
chronology contains references to troop deployment times as claimed.
The third item is claimed to be a description of planning for,
and past conduct of, certain covert operations in North Vietnam which,
if disclosed, would allegedly "foreclose the future conduct of such
operations." Analysis of the documents cited, however, reveals that
they contain only the most generalized discussion of covert operations
plans initiated in 1963 and 1964. Indeed, the greatest specificity as to
the type of operations proposed is contained in the following passage
(IV. C. 2(a), p.2):
"Instructions forwarded by the JCS on 26 November
specifically requested provision for: '(1) harrass-
ment; (2) diversion; (3) political pressure; (4) capture
of prisoners; (5) physical destruction; (6) acquisition
of intelligence; (7) generation of intelligence; and
(8) diversion of DRV resources."
To paraphrase Jude Gesell, supra, p. 2, these are covert tactics that
"today any high school graduate could put down. There is nothing in here
of an intimate secrecy."
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Admiral Gayler
Admiral Gayler, Director of the National Security Agency,
warns that publication of the study material might reveal sensitive
information on electronic eavesdropping by the United States.
He picks out three passages from the study to document his
concern -- one of February 9, 1967 about North Vietnamese troop
movements and two others concerning the Gulf of Tonkin incident of
August 4, 1964.
The quoted passage on enemy troops movements in much too
vague to disclose the source as an electronic intercept. Thus it states
(Affidavit pp. 2-3):
[paragraph deleted]
Any number of "intelligence sources" could have detected a division-
sized troop movement, i.e., it could have been detected by aerial
reconnaissance, electronic sensors, captured prisoners or documents,
Special Forces and South Vietnamese patrols monitoring troop move-
ments, North Vietnamese agents, etc. Indeed, the number of qualifying
words in the report would tend to indicate the lack of hard facts as to
the intentions of the enemy that would be expected if the information
came from intercepts of enemy codes.!
In any event, neither the Post nor the Government believes that a
copy of this report is in the possession of the Post.
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The two Tonkin Gulf passages are as follows:
"At 1940 hours. . . 'received information indicating
attack by PGM P4 imminent.' Evidently this was based on
and (sic) intercepted communications, later identified as an
intelligence source,' indicating that North Vietnam naval
fources had been ordered to attack the patrol."
"In the meantime .... the engagement was described
for higher headquarters -- largely on the basis of the de-
stroyers' radar and sonar indications and on radio intercept
information."
This information is already a matter of official public record
and has been widely disseminated. Secretary McNamara first re-
ferred to this message from the destroyer Maddox in his statement
before Joint Hearing of the Foreign Relations and Armed Services
Committees of the Senate on August 6, 1964.* and the full text of the
cable was published in the record of the 1968 hearings before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee as follows:
"In the message sent by CTU72.1. 2 to AIG-181
dated [deleted] the following sentence is included:
'RCVD info indicating attack by PGM/ P-4 imminent.
My position 19-10.7 N 107-003 proceeding southeast
at best speed.' ...
A detailed chronology showing the dates and times of the
cables from the destroyer and the information which it obtained
from radio intercepts is set forth in "Truth Is The First Casualty"
by Joseph C. Goulden at pp. 256-57. This, it would come as no
surprise to a trained intelligence agent familiar with the wide
publicity given the Tonkin Gulf incident, that the Maddox was inter-
cepting North Vietnamese communications at the time.
Joint Hearings Before The Committee on Foreign Relations
and the Committee on Armed Services, 88th Cong. 2d Sess., p.8
1964).Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations. 90th
Cong., 2d Sess.. p. 34 (1968).
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The only other specific reference in the Gayler affidavit
(p. 4) is to information that would "give some detail" on an agree-
ment for collaboration between U.S. and the South Vietnamese with
respect to intelligence operations and the implementation thereof.
Reference to the source materials cited demonstrates not only that
they date back to April. 1961, but also that they are completely
innocuous in nature. The full text of the references cited is as
follows:
V.B. 4 Bk. 1, p. 51 (a):
"Communications Intelligence: Expand the current
program of interception and direction finding covering
Vietnamese Communist Communications activities in
South Vietnam, as well as North Vietnam targets.
[material deleted]
"This program should be supplemented by a program
duly coordinated, of training additional Vietnamese Army
units in intercept and direction finding by U. S. Army
Security Agency. Also, U. S. Army Security Agency
teams could be sent to Vietnam for direct operations,
coordinated in the same manner.
V.B. 4 Bk. 1, p. 53 (last line):
"The US Army Security Agency actions to supplement
communications intelligence will require [deleted] personnel
and [phrase deleted] equipment."
B.B. 4 Bk. 1, pg. 84, para 6c:
"Expand the communication intelligence actions
by inclusion of [number deleted] additional Army Security Agency
personnel to train the Vietnamese Army in tactical
COMINT operations."
Thus, the Gayier affidavit offers nothing which could possibly
impair national security.
19931 PENTAGON PAPERS 439
Conclusion
Not surprisingly, the Government has failed to identify a single
document in this historical study whose publication would present any
credible risk to national security. Indeed, its proof reflects a deep-
seated -- almost reflex -- commitment by many high Government offi-
cials to maintaining continued secrecy with respect to information
once classified that has only historical significance.
Finally, it is clear from its "Supplemental List of Special
Items" that the Government continues to tilt at windmills. In addition
to designating some 100 items, including one entire volume, the
Supplemental List would bar publication of all documents that fall in
13 broadly defined categories. These categories include, inter alia:
"Official communications which criticize present
Vietnam officials or efforts by Vietnam Govern-
ment Agencies or officials affecting vietnamization
programs.
"Documents relating to the military involvement of
any foreign Government in Vietnan (sic) other than
U.S. and Vietnamese troops.
"Confidential information relating to peace negotia-
tions assets or tactics."
The First Amendment clearly cannot tolerate continued prior restraint
of a free press in order to permit the Government to further engage in
the futile task of attempting to demonstrate that the disclosure of his-
torical documents of this nature would present a grave and immediate







IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1970
NEW YORK TIMES COMPANY,
PETITIONER
V.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
PETITIONER
V.
THE WASHINGTON POST COMPANY, et al.
ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT AND THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT






[Vol. 2:2WILLIAM AND MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
NOS. 1873 and 1885
19931 PENTAGON PAPERS 441
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1970
No. 1873
NEW YORK TIMES COMPANY,
PETITIONER
V.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
No. 1885
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
PETITIONER
V.
THE WASHINGTON POST COMPANY, et al.
ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT AND THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES
(SECRET PORTION)
There have been great difficulties in the presentation
of this case. The United States does not know what materials
are in the possession of the New York Times or the Washington
Post, and neither District Court below was willing to require
disclosure of these papers, even in camera, without repre-
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sentatives of the United States present. It would appear
in evidence that the papers already published by the two
newspapers bear some relation to a compilation of 47 volumes
entitled "United States-Vietnam Relations-1945-1967,"
prepared by a Vietnam task force in the Office of the
Secretary of Defense. The covers and every page in this
compilation are marked "Top Secret-Sensitive."
It was obviously impossible for the United States
to prove directly that the publication of the papers held
by the two newspapers would involve immediate and irreparable
injury to the security of the United States. The only method
by which the United States could proceed was to seek to show
that there were items in the 47-volume study which would
have this consequence.
When it appeared to be impracticable for the
Washington Post to produce in camera the papers it had, the
District Court said:
"THE COURT: I think if you feel that
way, because of your problems, I can pro-
ceed on the assumption that you have all
the documents the government is referring
to. We will proceed on that basis. If you
want to show that there are some documents
you don't have, you can prove it. I will
proceed on the assumption you do."
Accordingly, the government introduced evidence
through witnesses, and through affidavits, which made specific
reference to items in the 47-volume compilation. The 47
volumes were available in the courtroom in the District of
Columbia, the relevant portions being regarded as incorporated
by reference in the testimony and the affidavits considered
by the District Court. The 47 volumes are a part of the
record in the New York Times case in the Southern District of
-2-
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New York and have been transmitted to this Court as a part
of the record here.
It is to those 47 volumes that references have
been made in the "Special Appendix" mentioned in the decision
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
and in the orders entered by this Court in these cases on
June 25, 1971. This is likewise true of the items included
in the "supplemental list" which was filed (in accordance with
the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
and with the orders of this Court) by 5:00 p.m. on June 25,
1971.
The purpose of this portion of the Brief for the
United States is to refer to a selected few of these items
and to endeavor to show that the publication of these items
could have the effect of causing immediate and irreparable
harm to the security of the United States. A number of
these items were considered hastily by Judge Gesell during
the hearing before him on Monday, June 21, 1971. No trace
of criticism is intended by the observation that Judge Gesell's
consideration was hasty. This was inevitable under the cir-
cumstances. Nevertheless, the consideration was necessarily
hasty, and the presentation with respect to it was inevitably
extremely difficult since no one knows yet what documents
either of the newspapers actually have. It is true that they
have provided "Inventories." However, these are not very
helpful, and they do not, in general, identify particular
documents. There are various versions of some of these
documents, and the inventories do not show which version the
papers have. It is also clear that they have some items
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which are included in the 47 volumes.
We now turn to a few selected items from the
47 volumes which, we submit, involve a serious risk of
immediate and irreparable harm to the United States and its
security.
1. There are four volumes in the 47-volume
compilation which are designated in their entirety. They
are: Volume VI-C-1, VI-C-2, VI-C-3, and VI-C-4. These
contain a comprehensive detailed history of the so-called
negotiating track. Negotiations were carried on through
third parties, both governments and individuals. These
included the Canadian, Polish, Italian, Rumanian, and
Norwegian governments. They also included individuals, some
holding public office, and some private citizens, sometimes
with the knowledge of their governments, and sometimes with-
out their government's being informed.
These negotiations, or negotiations of this sort,
are being continued. It is obvious that the hope of the
termination of the war turns to a large extent on the success
of negotiations of this sort. One never knows where the
break may come and it is of crucial importance to keep open
every possible line of communication. Reference may be made
to recent developments with respect to China as an instance
of a line of communication aniong many which turned out to be
fruitful.
The materials in these four volumes include
derogatory comments about the perfidiousness of specific
persons involved, and statements which might be offensive to
444 [Vol. 2:2
1993] PENTAGON PAPERS
nations or governments. The publication of this material
is likely to close up channels of communication which
might otherwise have some opportunity of facilitating the
closing of the Vietnam war.
2. Closely related to this is the fact that there
is much material in these volumes which might give offense
to South Korea, to Thailand, and to South Vietnam, just as
serious offense has already been given to Australia and
Canada. South Korea, South Vietnam, and Australia have
troops in Vietnam, and Thailand allows the use of airfields
from which 65% of our sorties are launched.
For the past many months, we have been steadily
withdrawing troops from Vietnam. The rate at which we can
continue this withdrawal depends upon the extent to which we
can continue to rely on the support of other nations,
notably South Vietnam, Korea, Thailand, and Australia. If
the publication of this material gives offense to these
countries, and some of them are notably sensitive, the rate
at which our own troops can be withdrawn will be diminished.
This would be an immediate military impact, having direct
bearing on the security of the United States and its citizens.
There are further references to these items in the
"Special Appendix" filed in the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit in the New York Times case, and in this
Court.
3. There are specific references to the names and
activities of CIA agents still active in Southeast Asia. There
are references to the activities of the National Security
Agency.
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The items designated are specific references to
persons or activities which are currently continuing. No
designation has been made of any general references to CIA
activities.
This may not be exactly equivalent to the dis-
closure of troop movements, but it is very close to it.
4. Volume V-B-4(a), pages 249-257, 259-311,
contains specific reference to SEATO Contingency Plan 5
dealing with communist armed aggression in Laos. This
discloses what the military plans are. The SEATO plans
are continuing plans. This involves not only the disclosure
of military plans, but a breach of faith with other friendly
nations.
Similarly, Volume IV-A-l, pages A26 to A-31,
discloses SEATO Operations Plans 4 and 6 dealing with military
dispositions with respect to Laos, Cambodia, Thailand and
Pakistan. These are continuing military plans made by us
jointly in association with the other nations which are
parties to SEATO. Such publication not only discloses the
plans to possible enemies, but also involves risk of loss of
the support of friendly nations.
5. Volume IV-C-6(b), page 129, sets forth the
United States intelligence community's estimate of the Soviet
reaction to the Vietnam War. This was made in 1967, but is
in large part still applicable. The disclosure of this
information will give Soviet intelligence insights into the
capacity of our intelligence operations, and may strengthen
them both by giving them better understanding of us, and by
leading them to correct matters on their side.
[Vol. 2:2
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6. Closely related is Volume IV-C-6(b), page 157.
This is a United States intelligence board estimate of
Soviet capacity to provide various types of weapons to North
Vietnam. There is much about it that is current, and its
disclosure to the Soviet Union would give them information
which could lead to serious consequences for the United
States.
7. Volume IV-C-6(b), page 168, is an internal
memorandum of the Joints Chief of Staff on May 27, 1967,
containing a recommendation that a nuclear response might
be required in the event of a Chinese attack on Thailand.
Although such a recommendation was never formally made,
the disclosure that this was considered as a possibility,
though in an internal memorandum, could have very serious
consequences to the security of the United States.
8. Volume IV-C-7(b), pages 161-163, contains
the full text of a telegram from Llewellyn Thompson when
he was Ambassador to Moscow in 1968. This gives the
assessment of one of our most experiences diplomats of
Soviet reaction to United States course of action in Vietnam.
The publication of this telegram would provide
valuable intelligence information for the Russians. It is
important to them to know what we think about them. Moreover,
we cannot have an effective ambassador abroad if he is not
able to report candidly and in confidence to the Secretary
of State and the President.
The publication of this telegram would impair
Mr. Llewellyn's continuing effectiveness. He is now an
important and valuable member of our SALT talks delegation
dealing with strategic arms limitation, which surely directly
-7-
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affects the security of the United States.
9. Volume IV-C-9(b), p~ge 52, contains reference
to extremely confidential discussions which took place
between the military staffs of South Vietnam and Laos,
given to us in confidence, relating to possible South
Vietnamese military action in Laos with the consent of
Laos military authorities. The publication of this not only
involves a breach of confidence, but also involves grave risk
of reactions from the other nations involved.
10. Finally, we come to the important matter of
communications intelligence covered by the affidavit of
Vice Admiral Gayler, who is Director of the National Security
Agency.
This is not a matter of United States codes and
cyphers. These are now regarded as not destructible, or
sufficiently nondestructible to be practically effective.
The question which is involved is the codes and
cyphers of other countries, particularly the codes and ciphers
of unfriendly nations.
There are various items in these volumes, among
those which have been specified, which will have the
following consequences:
(a) They will make the enemy aware of
significant intelligence successes.
(b) With this information, the intelligence
analyst of an enemy country can estimate our
capacity. He can also control methods of dissemination
of messages by his own country, in such a way as to
minimize our chance of successful interception.
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(c) Cutting down successful interception
by our communication intelligence will directly
affect our current military operations. Signal
intelligence now gives direct support to our troops
today, and saves many lives. It also helps, directly
in the recovery of downed pilots.
An understanding of United States cryptologic
capabilities has direct value to present and potential
enemies of the United States. It is immediately connected
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11. Finally, reference should be made to prisoners
of war. We are currently engaged in discussions on the
prisoner of war issue, in some cases with governments which
are not wholly friendly, such as Sweden and Russia. It
is obvious that these conversations are conducted on the
understanding that they will be confidential, and they
are not very likely to be fruitful if that confidence is
broken. This is covered by the oral testimony of Mr. Doolin
in both cases.
There is one of these in particular which it is very
likely that we will not be able to proceed further with
as a result of the publication of the papers which has
already been made by the New York Times and the Washington
Post. The longer prisoners are held, the more will die.
There is, finally, the whole question of the institution
of the Presidency-the power constitutionally inhering in the
President as Chief Executive and as Commander-in-Chief of the
Army and Navy to conduct the foreign affairs of the United
States in a way which will not be unduly hindered, to protect
the lives and safety of men in Vietnam, and to be able to
assure his top military aides, the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
that the lives and safety of men in Vietnam, for whom they,
and the President, and the Nation are responsible, will not
be endangered or subjected to unnecessary risk. The Federal
Judiciary has been referred to as "the least dangerous
branch." The Presidency can go to great lengths to provide
for such protection by establishing security classification
schemes, and by using great care in the selection of
its personnel. But, in a nation as large and complicated
- 10-
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as this one is, there will inevitably be weak spots in any
system. When such weak spots occur, the Presidency is
powerless to provide the required protection except with the
aid of the courts. In a proper allocation of powers, under
the separation of powers, each branch should support the
other, in appropriate circumstances. Just as the executive
has used its power, through United States marshals, and
through military force, to enforce the judgments of the
courts, the courts should support the Presidency in a narrow
and limited area where such protection is needed in the
effective meeting of the President's responsibility, and in
the safeguarding of American lives. This is not a question
of exception to the First Amendment, but of rational inter-
pretation of that provision wholly consistent with its
history and purpose.
Since the publication of materials by the Times and
Post, a considerable number of communications have been
received from foreign governments. Reference will be made
to two of these.
On June 25, 1971, there was received from the American
Ambassador to a friendly country a telegram stating that the
principal minister of that country
informed me last night (June 24) that [the
head of state] had instructed him to express
privately and confidentially grave concern
over the unauthorized publication of the
classified Pentagon documents relating to
Viet-Nam. [The minister] indicated that
it was not the substance of these documents
which upset the [head of state], but rather
the principle involved, namely that highly
classified confidential documents which might
contain information or secret exchanges between
the United States government and other govern-
ments, might irresponsibly find their way into
the press. [The minister] pointed out that in his
- 11 -
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relations with us the [head of state] is
completely frank in his discussion of
highly sensitive confidential matters.
However, he has felt able to be frank with
us because he felt that we would tightly
guard the substance of confidential discussions
and exchanges with him. If we are not able
to do this, said [the Minister], it would obviously
have a very inhibiting effect on [this nation's]
ability to exchange views with us on confidential
matters with full frankness.
A formal message has also been addressed to the Secretary
of State by the British Ambassador, the Rt. Hon. the Earl of
Cromer, in which the Ambassador says:
I write to express the concern of Her
Majesty's Government about the unauthorized
publication of confidential exchanges between
our two governments. I am instructed to
inform you that Her Majesty's Government
is concerned about maintaining the general
principle rather than about any specific
individual items ... Her Majesty's
Government only wishes to preserve the
principle that exchanges between govern-
ments should be kept confidential in the
interest of good relations.
This is a great and free country. It must remain a
great and free country. It has a remarkable Constitution,
of which the First Amendment is surely an important part.
But it is, as Chief Justice Marshall so wisely observed in
the formative days of our republic, a Constitution which
the court is expounding. It is a Constitution which has
worked, and which must continue to work. Long experience
has shown that sound constitutional construction is not to
be found in absolutist or doctrinaire constructions of any
of the provisions of the Constitution. It is not suggested
that the First Amendment must yield to any other provision
of the Constitution. It is suggested that the First
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Amendment must be construed in the light of the fact that
it is a part of a constitution, particularly, where foreign
affairs are so directly involved, and where, in a very real
sense, the workability and the integrity of the institution
of the Presidency may be seriously impaired. The Constitution
should be construed in such a way as genuinely to preserve
a free press, while likewise leaving to the Presidency the
protection which it requires for the free flow of information
from foreign nations and for the free development of thought
and ideas between the President and his immediate advisers.
Respectfully submitted.
Erwin N. Griswold
Solicitor General
June 1971
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